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Abstract 
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) are reciprocal trade agreements between two or 
more partners. The relatively recent emergence of deep and comprehensive RTAs 
is expected to have substantial impacts on members, especially developing 
countries. For a particular country, the impacts of RTAs on trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) depend on various factors, with certain types of trade agreements 
working better in stimulating these flows. This thesis contributes four studies 
analysing the effects of RTAs that Vietnam has entered into, focusing on 
Vietnamese trade and investment. Based on econometric modelling, the first study 
investigates the effects of trade agreements and FDI on Vietnamese trade flows, 
while the second study explores whether Vietnam’s overall involvement in FTAs 
enhances its FDI inflows. The remaining two studies employ computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) modelling to analyse the EU-Vietnam FTA (EVFTA) and 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), with a focus on 
Vietnamese trade and investment.  
Using the random effects technique to estimate the gravity models, the first study 
reveals that the bilateral trade agreements with the US and Japan have resulted in 
the greatest expansion in Vietnamese exports and imports, while the impacts from 
other RTAs are more mixed. Furthermore, the impacts on Vietnamese trade flows 
of FDI inflows are not as strong as those of some of the trade agreements. Results 
also suggest that Vietnam’s exports have become more sensitive to FDI following 
the bilateral trade agreements with the US and Japan, whereas Vietnam’s imports 
have become less sensitive to FDI as a result of the trade agreement with Japan.  
The regression results from gravity models in the second study indicate that, overall, 
FTAs are associated with enhanced FDI flows in Vietnam. The results also indicate 
a dominance of vertical FDI in Vietnam. Further investigation of a recent sub-
period reveals that FTAs also affect inward FDI flows to Vietnam through 
interaction terms with the real exchange rate, human capital, and factor endowments.  
The CGE modelling of the EVFTA provides strong evidence of trade diversion 
following the EVFTA because the bilateral trade between Vietnam and the EU 
experiences tremendous growth, compared with the growth of their total exports 
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and imports. At the sectoral level, only the processed food, transport equipment, 
and labour-intensive manufacturing sectors in Vietnam witness significant export 
expansion, whereas the remaining sectors exhibit declines in exports. In terms of 
the investment effect of the EVFTA, the results indicate that Vietnam’s short-run 
current rates of return increase considerably, largely due to the rise in the rental 
price of capital. These findings explain Vietnam’s significant long-run capital gains. 
The results further suggest that Vietnam’s capital gains resulting from tariff 
elimination are much larger than those arising from other policy actions. 
Finally, the CGE modelling of the impacts of RCEP indicates that Vietnam’s total 
real exports and imports both expand, with the growth rate of total exports slightly 
exceeding that of total imports. The results indicate strong evidence of trade 
diversion following RCEP, with the rise in Vietnam’s imports from other RCEP 
members being greater than the increase in its total imports in both relative and 
absolute terms. In addition, Vietnam benefits from export expansion in most of the 
sectors modelled, except for some agricultural sectors. With regard to the 
investment effects of RCEP, the simulation results indicate that among RCEP 
members, Vietnam’s short-run current rates of return experience the largest 
percentage increase, which explains the significant rise in the long-run capital stock 
in Vietnam. The findings also suggest that all the policy components modelled 
contribute to Vietnam’s capital growth, with goods NTMs contributing most in the 
scenario with the greatest liberalisation.   
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1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) are defined as reciprocal trade agreements 
between two or more partners including customs unions and free trade agreements 
(FTAs), with a significant dominance of the latter (WTO, 2019). Between the 1960s 
and 1980s, RTAs were trivial in number, but there has been an increasing quantity 
of RTAs since 1990. In particular, 63 RTAs in goods entered into force over the 
2000-2005 period, compared with 53 RTAs for the 1990-1999 period (Crawford & 
Fiorentino, 2005). The suspension in 2006 of the Doha Round, a multilateral trade 
agreement between WTO members, seems to have accelerated further RTA 
negotiations among countries, including Vietnam. In 2015, 265 RTAs were notified 
and in force, with 137 liberalising trade in goods, 1 liberalising trade in services, 
and the remaining 127 liberalising both goods and services (Acharya, 2016). As of 
January 2019, 291 RTAs were in force, with at least one for each WTO member as 
of June 2016 (WTO, 2019). By December 2015, more than half of RTAs covered 
investment provisions with different scope and coverage (Chornyi, Nerushay, & 
Crawford, 2016) and by January 2019, RTAs covered over half of international 
trade (OECD, 2019). 
A country enters into a RTA largely due to the expectation of increases in intra-
regional trade, members’ welfare (Pant & Paul, 2018), and inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows (Blomstrom & Kokko, 1997; Medvedev, 2012). In the long 
run, the integration is expected to increase growth rates of members thanks to 
greater market access, improved competition capacity, better resource allocation 
and positive externalities (Blomstrom & Kokko, 1997). Therefore, the academic 
literature has keenly explored the impact of RTAs on trade and FDI flows. 
Regarding the relationship between RTAs and trade flows, there is still no firm 
conclusion on whether RTAs create more trade than they divert (Lee & Park, 2005). 
The concepts of trade creation and trade diversion were developed in the Custom 
Union Issue by Viner (2014) which was first published in 1950. Trade creation 
occurs when higher-cost domestic production of an FTA member is replaced with 
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lower-cost imports from other members. Trade diversion takes place when an FTA 
member diverts its trade activities from non-members to other FTA members due 
to tariff reductions. Viner (2014) suggests that the dominance of trade creation or 
trade diversion effects will determine whether a RTA improves or reduces welfare. 
Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) indicate that the creation of a preferential trading 
agreements (PTA) results in larger trade among members, but also fear that that 
PTAs may result in trade diversion.   
There has been a variety of empirical studies examining the trade impact of RTAs 
in which both trade creation and trade diversion are reported. Based on the findings, 
existing studies can be categorised into three groups. Firstly, empirical studies 
analysing the impact of overall FTAs for a large sample of countries such as Baier 
and Bergstrand (2007), Lee and Park (2007), and Foster (2012) and those focusing 
on a particular FTA, including García, Pabsdorf, and Herrera (2013), Clausing 
(2001), Hassan (2001), and Sheng, Tang, and Xu (2014), report empirical evidence 
of trade creation. Secondly, there is evidence of both trade creation and trade 
diversion in empirical studies on multiple FTAs (Carrere, 2006; Kahouli & Maktouf, 
2014). In particular, RTAs result in an increase in intra-regional trade, benefiting 
RTA members at the cost of the rest of the world. Thirdly, examining the impacts 
of various FTAs a particular country has made on its trade flows, some trade 
agreements are found to have positive effects, while others have negative or no 
impacts (Busse & Gröning, 2012; Ullah & Inaba, 2012). Thus, for a specific country, 
it is likely that some types of trade agreements work better than others in terms of 
expanding trade for a specific country. 
With regard to investment effects of FTAs, there has not been a theoretical 
consensus on this issue. The main reason is that there are a variety of mechanisms 
through which FTAs can have impacts on FDI flows such as patterns of FDI, the 
investment provision of FTAs, sources of FDI, and the locational advantages of 
host countries, which may move in diverse directions. Several empirical studies 
have focused on investigating the linkage between FTAs and FDI flows and a 
definite conclusion has not been reached in the literature. Particularly, for multiple 
FTA studies, a group of studies by Yeyati, Stein, and Daude (2003), Medvedev 
(2012), Feils and Rahman (2011), and Thangavelu and Narjoko (2014) report that 
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FTAs lead to increased FDI flows. In contrast, other studies by Lederman, Maloney, 
and Serven (2003), Ullah and Inaba (2014), Dee and Gali (2003), and Jang (2011) 
show empirical evidence that FTAs can have no impact or lead to a decline in FDI 
flows. In terms of case studies, those focusing on a particular FTA show empirical 
evidence that the FTA is associated with increases in members’ FDI flows (Feils & 
Rahman, 2008; Li, Scollay, & Maani, 2016; Lim, 2001; MacDermott, 2007; 
Waldkirch, 2003). In addition, overall FTAs a particular country has engaged in can 
have a positive (Crotti, Cavoli, & Wilson, 2010) or negative (Bae & Jang, 2013) 
impact on its FDI inflows. 
The existing literature is characterised by a relative scarcity of studies exploring 
trade and investment effects of RTAs for a particular country. This pinpoints the 
importance of conducting more country-specific studies, especially for developing 
countries, to better understand the benefits of RTAs in terms of enhanced trade and 
FDI flows. Moreover, FTAs over time have progressed toward deep and 
comprehensive FTAs. Modern FTAs include traditional commitments of increased 
market access for goods and services, provisions on rules of origin and trade 
remedies such as anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguards (Acharya, 2016). 
However, they may also cover more sophisticated and new content in terms of 
investment provisions, electronic commerce, government procurement, 
competition, state-owned enterprises, intellectual property, labour movement, and 
environment. This new generation of FTAs has recently become an area of focus 
for both researchers and policymakers. For instance, the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) and its successor, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), are found to have substantial impacts on trade and 
investment of its members (Minor, Walmsley, & Strutt, 2016; Petri & Plummer, 
2016; Petri, Plummer, & Zhai, 2012; USITC, 2016; Walmsley, Strutt, Minor, & 
Rae, 2018).  
Looking into the context of RTAs for Vietnam leads to a general question that needs 
to be addressed: How do the RTAs that Vietnam has entered into impact on its trade 
and investment? This thesis aims to answer this broad question, taking into account 
both Vietnam’s RTAs that have entered into force and those Vietnam has more 
recently become involved in. Based on econometric and CGE modelling, this thesis 
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attempts to provide a broad picture of the trade and investment effects of RTAs for 
Vietnam.  
1.2 Background and Research Questions 
The Vietnam War ended in 1975 and after the reunification of the country in 1976, 
Vietnam focused on building the economy based on a state-centred development 
strategy. However, the economy stagnated under the centrally planned system, 
leading to a widespread food shortage, with poverty levels above 70% (UNCTAD, 
2008). Therefore, at the sixth Party Congress in 1986, the Vietnamese Government 
launched the “Doi Moi” (Renovation) Policy, shifting from a centrally planned to a 
market-oriented economy. Over the last three decades, Vietnam has received 
significant achievements. For instance, the poverty rate in the early 1990s of 58% 
had substantially reduced to only 14.5% by 2008, 14.2% by 2010 (World Bank, 
2012), and 9.8% by 2016 (Pimhidzai, 2018). The average rate of Vietnam’s GDP 
growth was 6.5% in the 1986-2017 period.1 Over the same period, foreign trade 
growth averaged 18%.2 
Since the beginning of the “Doi Moi” policy, Vietnam has pursued an export-led 
growth strategy in which trade, FDI, and trade liberalisation have been promoted. 
One of the most significant reforms in Vietnam’s trade policy was the abolition of 
state-owned enterprises’ monopoly in foreign trade in the late 1990s, allowing all 
enterprises to trade (Vo, 2005). To further support enterprises’ trading activities, 
foreign exchange management was relaxed, with the foreign exchange surrender 
rate decreasing from 50% in 1999 to 0% in 2003 for all economic entities (Vo & 
Nguyen, 2011).3 Other major trade policy reforms relate to tariffs and quotas. More 
specifically, the tariff system for exports and imports has been revised to be simpler 
and more consistent since 1992 and used to protect domestic production and 
promote trade. For instance, imports of intermediate inputs that can be domestically 
produced face relatively high tariffs in Vietnam (Nguyen & Ezaki, 2005; To & Lee, 
2015), while imported goods used in export production have been subject to tariff 
                                                 
1 Calculated from World Development Indicators, accessed at https://data.worldbank.org/ 
2 Calculated from the database of Vietnam’s General Statistics Office, accessed at www.gso.gov.vn 
3 A foreign exchange surrender requirement relates to the selling of foreign exchange within a certain 
period of time. 
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exemption (Chaponnière & Cling, 2009; Vo, 2005). With respect to quotas, 
Vietnam’s quantitative controls on most imported goods have largely been removed 
since 2001, with the exception of eggs, sugar, tobacco, and salt.  
In addition, FDI attraction has been a critical focus of the Vietnamese reform 
process since the mid-1980s. The Law on Foreign Investment was first promulgated 
in 1987 with three forms of investment including business corporate contract, joint 
ventures, and 100% foreign-invested enterprises. Since then it has been revised 
several times in 1990, 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2005. Amendments such as 
improvements in FDI management procedures, reductions in profit transmittal tax 
rates (Leproux & Brooks, 2004), and increases in foreign participation in some 
industries have aimed at generating an attractive investment climate for inward FDI.  
Together with unilateral reforms, Vietnam has accelerated its trade liberalisation 
process. The “Doi Moi” has integrated Vietnam into the world economy. Vietnam 
became a member of ASEAN in 1995 and APEC in 1998. Vietnam’s entry into the 
Vietnam-US bilateral trade agreement in 2002 was considered as a milestone for 
trade liberalisation. The commitments of reform following the agreement were 
critical to Vietnam’s negotiation process to become a WTO member. Vietnam’s 
accession to the WTO in 2007 after 11 years of negotiation was a breakthrough in 
Vietnam’s trade policy, marking Vietnam’s commitment to a multilateral trading 
system (Nguyen, 2016). More importantly, Vietnam has engaged in deeper trade 
liberalisation through its participation into a variety of bilateral and RTAs. Vietnam 
became a member of the ASEAN free trade area (AFTA) in 1996. Between 2005 
and 2010, ASEAN had five FTAs entering into force with China, Korea, Japan, 
India, New Zealand and Australia. ASEAN’s sixth FTA with an external partner, 
the ASEAN-Hong Kong FTA, was signed in November 2017.4 Vietnam has signed 
bilateral FTAs with Japan (2008), Chile (2011), Korea (2015), and the EU (2019). 
Recent FTAs entering into force include the Vietnam-Eurasian Economic Union 
(2016) and the CPTPP. Three FTAs including the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP), Vietnam-Israel, and European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA)-Vietnam have not been signed yet. 
                                                 
4 https://asean.org/ 
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It has also been observed that increased trade and FDI inflows to Vietnam are 
accompanied by Vietnam’s involvement in bilateral and RTAs. However, economic 
integration through trade agreements and reforms in other areas were 
simultaneously implemented during the last three decades (To, 2018). This 
motivates me to ask the first and second specific research questions: 
Research Question 1: How have trade liberalisation agreements and FDI promoted 
Vietnamese exports and imports? 
This thesis addresses this question in Chapter 2 by evaluating the impact of trade 
liberalisation agreements and FDI on Vietnam’s exports and imports, based on 
panel data for Vietnam and its main trading partners over a 1996-2014 study period. 
With an application of gravity models, the degree to which various trade agreements 
have enhanced the impact on Vietnamese trade flows from inward FDI flows is 
examined. Specifically, this study reveals which of the trade agreements has been 
more efficient in terms of expanding Vietnamese exports and imports. In addition, 
the question of whether Vietnamese trade becomes more sensitive to FDI following 
the trade agreements is also addressed. In other words, how particular FTAs impact 
trade flows through interaction terms with FDI is also explored.  
Research Question 2: How do free trade agreements impact on Vietnam’s inward 
FDI flows? 
This research question is addressed in Chapter 3 of this thesis where the linkage 
between FTAs and FDI is investigated with gravity models. Panel data for 
Vietnam’s 17 main foreign investors over the period 1997-2016 and 23 partners for 
the sub-period 2005-2016 are used. The inclusion of the later sub-period is to 
account for changes in Vietnam’s significant FDI partners, dramatic increases in 
Vietnam’s inward FDI flows, and Vietnam’s involvement in a variety of bilateral 
and RTAs in this period. The estimation of regressions for the two periods allow us 
to compare and contrast the findings, evaluating whether overall FTAs have a 
greater impact on FDI inflows in the later sub-period. In addition, further 
examination of the later sub-period is implemented to assess whether FTAs have 
any effects on Vietnam’s inward FDI flows through interaction terms with key 
drivers of FDI. Based on the outcomes for FTAs and other independent variables 
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such as trade, factor endowments, and the interaction term between FTAs and factor 
endowments, this research question provides insights into Vietnam’s patterns of 
FDI. 
In recent years, Vietnam has participated in mega-FTAs, the new generation of 
trade agreements, with three notable FTAs including the CPTPP, RCEP, and EU-
Vietnam FTA (EVFTA). CPTPP is an FTA involving Vietnam and other 10 
countries in the Asia-Pacific including Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Chile, Mexico, and Peru. This FTA has been in 
force since December 2018. It is the successor to the TPP where the US was 
included. The TPP members accounted for 36.8% of world GDP in 2018.5 However, 
the CPTPP without the US contributed only 13.3% to the world GDP in 2018, with 
a total population around 480 million people.6  
RCEP is a proposed FTA which was launched in November 2012. RCEP covers 
ASEAN member states and six countries having FTAs with the ASEAN-Japan, 
China, South Korea, India, New Zealand, and Australia. With the US withdrawal 
from the TPP, RCEP has become larger than the CPTPP. In 2018, the 16 countries 
included in RCEP accounted for around 32% of world GDP, 28% of global trade, 
and a combined population of over 3.5 billion people-almost half of the world’s 
population. RCEP without India accounted for 30% of global population and 29% 
of world GDP in the same year.7 
While the CPTPP and RCEP are RTAs, the EVFTA is a bilateral FTA between 
Vietnam and the EU. The EVFTA was signed on 30 June 2019 in Vietnam after 10 
years of negotiations. Notably, all of Vietnam’s leading trading and FDI partners 
are covered in the EVFTA and RCEP. For instance, in 2018, the top five export 
markets for Vietnam include the US, EU, China, ASEAN, and Japan, while 
Vietnam’s largest import partner is China, followed by South Korea, ASEAN, 
Japan, and the EU.8  For investment, Japan was the largest foreign investor in 
                                                 
5 Authors’ calculations based on the data from the World Development Indicator, accessed at 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
6 https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-
force/cptpp/cptpp-overview/ 
7 Calculated from the World Development Indicators, accessed at  
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
8 Calculated from IMF data, Direction of Trade Statistics, accessed at https://data.imf.org/ 
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Vietnam in 2018, followed by South Korea, intra-ASEAN, Hong Kong, China, and 
the EU.9 While the TPP/CPTPP has been widely analysed with the impact on 
Vietnam reported by several studies such as Petri et al. (2012), Petri and Plummer 
(2016), Areerat, Kameyama, Ito, and Yamauchi (2012), and Minor et al. (2016), 
studies on RCEP focusing on Vietnam are rare. Furthermore, the EVFTA was 
signed in mid-2019, which is expected to bring substantial gains to the Vietnamese 
economy. Motivated by potential benefits to Vietnamese trade and investment 
following the deep and comprehensive FTAs, this thesis poses the third and fourth 
research questions: 
Research Question 3: How might Vietnamese trade and investment change 
following the EU-Vietnam FTA? 
To answer this research question, Chapter 4 of this thesis explores the impact of the 
EVFTA, focusing on Vietnamese trade and investment with a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model. Based on the text of this agreement, I model as close to 
the agreement’s contents as possible. Like other modern FTAs, the EVFTA is a 
deep and comprehensive FTA covering not only tariff removal but also reductions 
in goods and services non-tariff measures (NTMs), improvement in trade 
facilitation and liberalisation barriers to FDI. Therefore, all of these liberalisation 
components are included in the policy scenarios. However, as EVFTA is a bilateral 
FTA between a developed region and developing country, Vietnam is likely to have 
a greater extent of liberalisation in some areas. Trade facilitation and investment 
liberalisation are therefore modelled for only Vietnam because time to import and 
barriers to FDI based on the OECD FDI index in the EU are already relatively small. 
Specifically, changes in Vietnam’s trade and investment due to both trade and 
investment liberalisation through the EVFTA are examined in the third research 
question of this thesis.  
In addition to the global trade analysis project (GTAP) database version 10, we 
calculate ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of goods and services NTMs based on 
World Bank (2019) and Fontagné et al. (2016) respectively for both Vietnam and 
the EU. Time to import data are sourced from the World Bank Doing Business 
                                                 
9 https://data.aseanstats.org/ 
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(2019), while the data relating to investment liberalisation share the same sources 
as the RCEP modelling.  
Research Question 4: How might Vietnamese trade and investment change 
following RCEP? 
To answer this research question in Chapter 5 of this thesis, a study using a CGE 
modelling framework is conducted to investigate the impact of RCEP with a focus 
on Vietnamese trade and investment. As this FTA has not been concluded yet, 
policy components included in the model rely on guidance in the principles and 
objectives for the RCEP negotiation (ASEAN Secretariat, 2012), as well as 
completed rounds to date. Four policy components are modelled including tariffs, 
goods and services NTMs, and investment liberalisation. Particularly, changes in 
trade and investment in Vietnam due to both trade liberalisation and investment 
liberalisation through RCEP are addressed in the research question above. 
Together with the GTAP database version 10, I use data on AVEs of services NTMs 
by Fontagné, Mitaritonna, and Signoret (2016) and goods NTMs by Kravchenko, 
Utoktham, Narayanan, and Duval (2019). These data are then applied to sectors and 
regions modelled for RCEP. Regarding the data on liberalisation of FDI barriers, I 
also make use of the OECD FDI index (OECD, 2018), FDI stock database (Gouel, 
Guimbard, & Laborde, 2012), total FDI stock  (UNCTAD, 2018), and capital stock 
(Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 2015). Based on these data, I exogenously estimate 
increases in sectoral capital stocks which are implemented as appropriate reductions 
in tax on capital. 
1.3 Summary of Objectives of the Thesis  
The overall objective of this thesis is to examine trade and investment effects of the 
key FTAs with which Vietnam is involved. More specifically, this thesis has the 
following primary objectives: 
1. To assess the impact of trade agreements and FDI on Vietnamese trade, the 
degree of sensitivity of Vietnamese trade to FDI following the trade agreements and 
pinpoint the effective trade agreements in terms of stimulating Vietnamese exports 
and imports; 
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2. To evaluate the impact of the overall FTAs on Vietnam’s inward FDI flows; 
3. To evaluate how the EVFTA affects Vietnam with a focus on trade and 
investment; and 
4. To analyse the effects of RCEP on Vietnam through both trade and investment 
liberalisation, focusing on changes in trade and investment. 
1.4 Methodological Techniques 
Gravity Model 
Two chapters of this thesis use econometric models. In particular, gravity models 
are employed in Chapters 2 and 3 for trade and FDI analysis respectively. Such 
models were originally used by Tinbergen (1962) in trade analysis. However, over 
time they have also been widely used in studies on FDI flows. The gravity model 
predicts that trade or FDI flows between two countries positively depend on their 
GDP and negatively rely on transaction cost such as the distance between them. To 
reduce potential omitted variable bias, gravity models have been extended with 
more explanatory variables for trade and FDI analysis. The advantage of gravity 
models mentioned in the study of Brodzicki and Stanisław (2013) is that 
characteristics of both countries and regions can be accounted for. To estimate the 
gravity model, I make use of ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE), and 
random effects (RE) estimators. Both FE and RE have their own advantages. In 
particular, FE can provide consistent estimates and control for unobserved time-
invariant specific factors, whereas time-invariant variables of gravity models such 
as distance and border can be estimated using RE. Thus, based on some 
specification tests, the best estimator should be determined. 
In terms of other estimators, Webb, Strutt, and Rae (2016) note that Poisson pseudo 
maximum likelihood (Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006) and Heckman selection 
approaches (Helpman, Melitz, & Rubinstein, 2008) are the two major techniques 
that have been applied to contemporary gravity models. However, these estimators 
have often been used to address the issue of zero observations which is not an issue 
in this thesis with the focus only on Vietnam. Moreover, generalised method of 
moments (GMM) including both the difference GMM (Arellano & Bond, 1991) 
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and the system GMM (Blundell & Bond, 1998) have also been found in applications 
of gravity models. This method is efficient in addressing endogeneity. However, 
the technique is appropriate for dynamic panel data with a short time dimension 
which does not fit the data in this thesis. Thus, OLS, FE, and RE are better-suited 
and are used in this thesis. 
Computable General Equilibrium Model 
This thesis makes use of the GTAP model (Hertel, 1997) and database (Aguiar, 
Chepeliev, Corong, McDougall, & van der Mensbrugghe, 2019) to analyse the 
EVFTA and RCEP in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. The GTAP is a multi-sector, 
multi-region CGE model, which has become widely used in global trade analysis. 
The benefit of the GTAP model for trade analysis is that it not only takes into 
account economic activities and sectoral interactions for a country, but also the 
economic relationship between that economy and other economies, as well as the 
rest of the world. As the EVFTA has recently been signed and RCEP is still under 
negotiation, econometric models which usually require historical data are not 
appropriate for these cases. A global CGE model is a much better suited to the task 
of assessing potential future impacts of trade agreements. 
1.5 Contributions of the Thesis 
This thesis comprises four studies which together explore trade and investment 
effects of the key trade agreements Vietnam has made. Each study has its own 
contributions, making the whole thesis significant in several ways. 
First, this thesis extends the evaluation of the effects of FTAs on trade flows. 
Empirical studies that decompose the impact of FTAs that a particular country has 
entered into on its trade flows are scarce. In addition, existing studies often focus 
on analysing the impact on trade flows of either FTAs or FDI flows. This thesis 
takes into account the two factors as key drivers of trade flows, with Vietnam as a 
case study. By doing so, it is possible to point out the efficient trade agreements 
Vietnam has entered into in terms of expanding exports and imports as well as the 
extent of sensitivity of Vietnamese trade to FDI following the trade agreements.  
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Second, whether or not the overall involvement in FTAs of a developing country 
such as Vietnam impacts on its FDI inflows is investigated. There have been limited 
empirical studies on this issue in current literature and all of them have focused on 
case studies for developed countries. However, addressing this linkage is crucial for 
assessing the magnitude of effectiveness of FTAs as drivers of FDI flows. 
Third, this thesis models the EVFTA as closely to the text of the agreement as 
possible, using a global CGE framework. This is the first study on the EVFTA that 
models all the five policy components, including tariffs, goods NTMs, services 
NTMs, trade facilitation, and liberalisation of FDI barriers. Previous studies, such 
as Baker, Vanzetti, and Pham (2014) and Philip et al. (2011) analyse the economic 
effects of tariff elimination through the EVFTA before this agreement was 
concluded. In other studies, the same liberalised assumptions are applied to the 
EVFTA and other mega-FTAs of Vietnam for a comparison purpose (Kikuchi, 
Yanagida, & Vo, 2018), and liberalisation of FDI barriers is not captured (Baker & 
Vanzetti, 2019; European Commission, 2018; Kikuchi et al., 2018). Moreover, 
accounting for priority sectors is important for bilateral FTAs, especially those 
between a developed and developing side. The developing party is more likely to 
have greater liberalisation in some areas. In this thesis, the modelling of services 
NTMs and investment liberalisation pays attention to the sectors receiving greater 
liberalisation following this agreement. 
Fourth, this thesis endeavours to measure the effect of investment liberalisation 
under RCEP on trade and investment, again using a CGE model. Most studies on 
FTAs using CGE frameworks do not model changes in FDI, partly due to the dearth 
of available global FDI data (Strutt, Minor, & Rae, 2015). Those that do largely 
rely on CGE-FDI models in which FDI is endogenously incorporated (Ciuriak & 
Xiao, 2014; Li, Scollay, & Gilbert, 2017). The construction of these models may 
be very convoluted. However, estimation of changes in FDI stocks can be 
exogenously implemented, with estimates later used in the CGE model (Petri et al., 
2012). In this thesis, based on the OECD FDI index, increases in sectoral FDI stock 
and capital stock are exogenously estimated and then serve as inputs for the CGE 
model. With this method, it is possible to capture liberalisation of FDI barriers 
under RCEP within a modified standard CGE modelling.   
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In addition to trade effects, this thesis evaluates changes in investment following 
the EVFTA and RCEP within modified standard CGE frameworks. A few recent 
studies analysing modern FTAs have embarked on some modifications to static 
CGE models to capture capital accumulation in the models (Kawasaki, 2015; 
Kikuchi et al., 2018), but all of them have focused on trade and welfare effects and 
ignored changes in capital stocks. However, trade liberalisation through elimination 
of tariffs and non-tariff barriers (Francois, McDonald, & Nordstrom, 1996; 
Walmsley, 1998) are found to have significant impacts on capital stocks. Likewise, 
investment liberalisation following FTAs also leads to increased FDI flows (Li et 
al., 2017; Petri et al., 2012). Indeed, it is critical to assess changes in investment 
following an FTA, especially in a developing country where there has been an 
investment deficiency. Furthermore, this thesis uses new databases of AVEs of 
goods NTMs in the modelling of both the EVFTA and RCEP, from the World Bank 
(2019) and Kravchenko et al. (2019) respectively. These data are bilateral and 
detailed, facilitating modelling at the GTAP sectoral levels. Thus, they are superior 
to the country-specific AVEs of NTMs that each country imposes on rest of the 
world, often used in previous studies.   
1.6 Thesis Outline  
The remaining chapters of this thesis are organised as below. Chapter 2 illustrates 
the importance of key trade agreements as well as FDI inflows to Vietnamese trade. 
The chapter begins with a description of trade liberalisation, FDI and trade in 
Vietnam. This is followed by a review of relevant theoretical and empirical 
literature, which indicates that FTAs and FDI are critical drivers of trade flows. 
This chapter then moves on to investigate how the two determinants impact 
Vietnamese trade flows.  
Chapter 3 evaluates another role of FTAs as a key determinant of FDI flows for 
Vietnam. In addition to addressing the linkage over an extended period, this chapter 
also emphasises a sub-period during which a variety of FTAs have entered into 
force. The chapter begins by describing trends and patterns of FDI in Vietnam. It 
continues with a theoretical framework and a summary of relevant existing studies. 
Then panel analysis is conducted to assess the FTA-FDI relationship. 
14 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 continue to explore trade and investment effects of FTAs on 
Vietnam through the two modern FTAs, the EVFTA and RCEP. Chapter 4 sheds 
fresh light on modelling liberalising components of the EVFTA, carefully based on 
the text of this agreement. This chapter evaluates how tariff removals, NTMs cuts 
and improvement in trade facilitation lead to changes not only in Vietnamese trade 
but also in Vietnamese investment. In addition, the effects of investment 
liberalisation are also emphasised. This chapter begins with a succinct description 
of key empirical literature analysing FTAs between the EU and its partners, 
including those focusing on trade liberalisation and more modern FTAs. It then 
discusses Vietnam’s trade with the EU and EU’s investment in Vietnam. This 
chapter then proceeds to describe the model used and policy scenarios considered, 
based on the content of this agreement, before discussing the simulation results.  
Chapter 5 examines how Vietnamese trade and investment may change as a result 
of RCEP. This chapter highlights the potential impacts of not only trade 
liberalisation but also investment liberalisation under RCEP. First, this chapter 
synthesises relevant empirical studies on RCEP. Next, the CGE modelling 
framework and policy scenarios are presented. Then, changes in Vietnamese trade 
and investment are analysed.  
Chapter 6 provides a summary of the key findings of the whole thesis, with a 
discussion of the implications for researchers and policymakers. Some limitations 
of this thesis are also noted. Finally, some important prospective avenues for future 
research are summarised.  
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2 Chapter 2: Effects of Trade Agreements and Foreign 
Direct Investment on Trade: Evidence from Vietnam 
2.1 Introduction  
In recent decades there has been a striking proliferation of regional trade agreements 
(RTAs). The World Trade Organization (WTO) notes that 303 RTAs were in force 
as of January 2020: A dramatic increase from less than 10 agreements that were in 
force in the early 1990s (WTO, 2018). RTAs, along with encouraging foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows, have been important areas of policy focus for Vietnam; 
however, they can have complex and sometimes ambiguous effects on trade. In this 
paper, we assess the impact of trade liberalisation agreements and FDI on 
Vietnam’s imports and exports.  
Despite the current prevalence of RTAs, the impact this type of trade liberalisation 
has on trade remains inconclusive. While free trade agreements (FTAs) are 
generally expected to increase trade flows (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007; Lee & Park, 
2007; Vanhnalat, Phonvisay, & Sengsourivong, 2015), there is also evidence of 
trade diversion when evaluating specific RTAs (Carrere, 2006; Kahouli & Maktouf, 
2014). Moreover, there are examples of RTAs that do not lead to increased export 
flows, such as for Bangladesh when there was restricted regionalism and high non-
tariff barriers (Ullah & Inaba, 2012), or in the case of Jordan when the focus was 
on the short term impacts of limited liberalisation (Busse & Gröning, 2012).  
In addition to negotiating RTAs, Vietnam has been implementing policies to 
encourage inflows of FDI. FDI is often regarded as a particularly important 
component of total investment due to its relative stability compared to portfolio 
capital flows and commercial lending (UNCTAD, 1999). As well as addressing the 
issue of capital shortages in host countries, FDI contributes to the development of 
technology, management and an increased understanding of international markets 
(Brooks, Roland-Holst, & Zhai, 2008). Due to its crucial importance to host 
countries, FDI has been widely studied, with special attention paid to the linkage 
between FDI and trade. While some researchers find a complementary relationship 
between FDI and trade (Clausing, 2001; De Mello Jr & Fukasaku, 2000; Jawaid, 
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Raza, Mustafa, & Karim, 2016), others find that FDI and exports are substitutes 
(Belderbos & Sleuwaegen, 1998; Beugelsdijk, Smeets, & Zwinkels, 2008). 
Furthermore, mixed effects are found in the studies of Svensson (1996), Blonigen 
(2001) and Swenson (2004).  
Despite their potentially ambiguous impacts, FTAs and inward FDI are considered 
to be key drivers of Vietnam’s trade. Since Vietnam’s “Doi Moi” or Renovation 
Policy10 was launched in the mid-1980s to facilitate change from a centrally planned 
to a market-oriented economy, Vietnamese trade policy has been based on pursuing 
an export-led growth strategy (Nguyen & Xing, 2008), in which trade liberalisation, 
exports and FDI have been promoted (Chaponnière & Cling, 2009). Therefore, 
examining the effects of both trade liberalisation and FDI on Vietnam’s trade is 
important, especially when foreign trade has become a primary factor driving 
economic growth (Kastelle & Liesch, 2013). Most developing countries are heavily 
dependent on imports of machinery, equipment and energy to support economic 
development, with imports being crucial for technology transfer (Acharya & Keller, 
2009). Moreover, increased exports may result in higher labour productivity and 
the creation of well-paying jobs, thanks to greater competition with foreign firms 
(Mijiyawa, 2017).  
From the start of the Renovation Policy, Vietnam experienced an expansion of 
foreign trade, with an annual growth rate of almost 18% over the period 1995-
2017.11 Likewise, there has been a surge of FDI inflows to Vietnam, increasing from 
US$ 1.8 billion in 1995 to US$ 14.1 billion in 2017 (UNCTAD, 2018). The 
acceleration of Vietnam’s foreign trade has accompanied its deeper involvement in 
trade liberalisation, achieved through a series of trade agreements. With this general 
observation in mind, it is of interest to examine the extent to which various bilateral 
and FTAs have enhanced the impact from FDI inflows.  
The current study investigates the extent to which trade agreements and FDI inflows 
stimulate Vietnamese exports and imports. We make a number of significant 
                                                 
10 The “Doi Moi” (Renovation) Policy was launched by the Vietnamese Government at its Sixth 
Party Congress in December 1986 with the goal of creating a market-oriented economy.  
11 Calculated from the database of the Vietnam’s General Statistics Office, accessed at 
www.gso.gov.vn 
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contributions to the literature. First, while most previous studies focus on analysing 
the impacts of either trade liberalisation or FDI on trade, we take into account the 
impacts of both factors, due to their mutual importance to trade in a transitional 
economy such as Vietnam. The second contribution of this paper is that we 
decompose the different effects of various FTAs and FDI on both exports and 
imports for Vietnam. Initial evidence confirms that both trade and FDI have 
increased in recent years, but there are two important questions that warrant further 
investigation in this paper. Of the trade agreements that Vietnam has entered into, 
which of these has been the more effective in terms of stimulating exports and 
imports? In addition, to what extent has Vietnamese trade become more sensitive 
to FDI as a result of the trade agreements?  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 briefly describes 
Vietnamese trade liberalisation, FDI and trade, followed by a discussion of the 
previous studies of relevance in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 outlines the model 
specification, data and methodology used to examine Vietnam over the 1996-2014 
study period using random effects estimation. Section 2.5 discusses the empirical 
results, finding that there is significant variation in the impacts of the various trade 
agreements, and the sensitivity of imports and exports to FDI has also changed. 
Section 2.6 presents our concluding remarks. 
2.2 Trade Liberalisation, FDI and Trade in Vietnam  
2.2.1  Trade Liberalisation and Trade 
Since the Renovation Policy was introduced in the mid-1980s, trade reforms 
focusing on liberalisation have been considered a primary focus of Vietnam’s 
economic reform. Together with unilateral reforms, Vietnam has accelerated its 
trade liberalisation process through bilateral and RTAs. In particular, Vietnam 
became a member of the ASEAN free trade area (AFTA) in 1996. Foreign trade 
between Vietnam and its ASEAN partners increased considerably between 2002 
and 2007, with an average growth rate of almost 27% for this period before the 
Global Financial Crisis.12 
                                                 
12 Calculated from the database of Vietnam’s General Statistics Office, accessed at www.gso.gov.vn.  
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Trade between Vietnam and the United States (US) has increased since the 
elimination of the US embargo in 1994. The bilateral trade agreement between 
Vietnam and the US (USBTA) came into force in 2002 and is considered a 
milestone in Vietnam’s trade liberalisation process. This was the most 
comprehensive trade agreement between the US and a developing country 
(Athukorala, 2006). According to the GSO (2018), Vietnam’s exports to the US 
amounted to US$ 2.5 billion in 2002, which was more than double the previous 
year. This bilateral trade agreement also accommodated a dramatic increase in 
Vietnam’s imports from the US, from US$ 411 million in 2001 to US$ 1.1 billion 
in 2003 (GSO, 2018). 
Due to the commitments of reforms, the USBTA was good preparation for 
Vietnam’s negotiation to become a WTO member. With accession to the WTO in 
2007, following 11 years of negotiation, Vietnam’s exports have benefitted from 
most-favoured nation (MFN) status. In particular, Vietnam’s exports in 2008 were 
more than 57% above those in 2006 (GSO, 2018). Similarly, compared to the level 
reached before Vietnam’s accession to the WTO, Vietnam’s imports saw a 80% 
increase, surging from US$ 44.9 billion in 2006 to US$ 80.7 billion in 2008 (GSO, 
2018). 
As shown in Figure 2.1 Vietnam’s foreign trade has increased substantially since 
the mid-1990s. While the Global Financial Crisis caused a dip in this growth, the 
strong growth has resumed in more recent years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
Figure 2.1: Vietnam's Total Exports and Imports, 1995-2017 (US$ billion) 
 
Source: GSO (2018) 
In recent years, Vietnam has been involved in deeper trade liberalisation through 
its participation in a variety of bilateral and RTAs which include the following: 
ASEAN-China Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (ACCECA) 
starting in 2005, ASEAN-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement 
in 2010, ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP) in 2008, 
ASEAN-Korea Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (AKCECA) in 
2010, ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand Free Trade Agreement in 2010, Chile-
Vietnam Free Trade Agreement in 2014 and the Japan-Vietnam Economic 
Partnership (JVEPA) in 2009.13 It appears these FTAs have largely contributed to 
the increase in Vietnam’s exports and imports since the Global Financial Crisis. 
However, compared with Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, Vietnam is 
characterised by a much weaker global competitiveness ranking (Appendix, Table 
2.3), as well as through generally lower exports to China (Appendix, Table 2.4). 
This points towards the need for increasing competitiveness being a key priority in 
Vietnam’s trade liberalisation process. 
                                                 
13 The entry into force years noted are WTO data, accessed at www.wto.org.  
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2.2.2  FDI and Trade  
Investment is a significant factor spurring economic development in Vietnam. To 
address the problem of capital deficiency, the Vietnamese government has been 
trying to improve access to investment, especially through FDI, which is regarded 
as more stable than portfolio capital and debt flows (Maher, Christiansen, & 
Fortainer, 2001). 
Figure 2.2 indicates that Vietnam has performed well in attracting FDI inflows, 
amounting to US$ 14.1 billion in 2017 as opposed to the minimal level of US$ 0.18 
billion in 1990. As can be seen from Figure 2, Vietnam experienced significant 
decreases in FDI as a result of the Asian Financial Crisis, though even before this, 
the impact of policy backsliding was impacting the FDI boom (Athukorala & Tran, 
2012). However, reforms implemented in response to this decline helped to reverse 
the downturn, particularly reforms implemented since 2003 (Athukorala & Tran, 
2012).  It is interesting to note that while most other ASEAN members saw a sharp 
decrease in FDI inflows in 2008 due to the Global Financial Crisis, Vietnam 
continued to attract increased FDI inflows amounting to US$ 9.6 billion, a 37% 
expansion relative to 2007, demonstrating Vietnam’s capacity in sustaining FDI 
interest despite the crisis (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009).   
Figure 2.2: Total FDI Inflows to Vietnam, 1990-2017 (US$ billion) 
Source: UNCTAD (2018) 
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Figure 2.3 indicates that from 1988 up to late 2017, more than 70% of the total 
registered FDI in Vietnam originated from Asia. Specifically, East Asian countries 
including Hong Kong, Taiwan, Republic of Korea and China accounted for 37% of 
the total registered FDI in Vietnam, with Korea ranking first. Japan and Singapore 
were the second and third largest investors in Vietnam. 
Figure 2.3: FDI Inflows to Vietnam, Share by Source Country, 1988-2017 (%) 
 
Source: Vietnam’s Statistical Yearbook 2017 
As shown in Figure 2.4, FDI inflows to Vietnam have been highly concentrated, 
mostly surging to regions with better economic development. In particular, the 
South East region has been the largest FDI destination with 42.7% of the total 
registered FDI during the period 1988-2017, followed by the Red River Delta 
region (27.9%) and the North Central and Central coastal region (17.9%). In 
contrast, the three remaining areas have attracted limited FDI flows (11.4%) with 
Central Highlands receiving a minimal share (0.3%).  
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Figure 2.4: FDI Inflow Shares to Different Regions in Vietnam, 1988-2017 (%) 
 
Source: Vietnam’s Statistical Yearbook 2017 
In addition to providing investment capital for Vietnam, FDI flows into Vietnam 
have an important role in stimulating Vietnam’s trade. As can be seen in Figure 2.5, 
the foreign invested sector14 has contributed greatly to Vietnam’s total trade, with 
increasing shares in total exports and total imports. Exports by the foreign invested 
sector accounted for half of total exports for the first time in 2003, as opposed to 
27% in 1995. In 2017, the foreign-invested sector accounted for more than 70% of 
Vietnam’s total exports. Like exports, imports by the foreign invested sector have 
increased dramatically, from a relatively small share of total imports in 1995 (18%) 
to more than a half of total imports in 2017 (60%), more than tripling its share over 
this period.      
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Total exports and imports of Vietnam are the combined values from the domestic economic 
sector and foreign invested sector. The foreign invested sector refers to enterprises in which 
foreign ownership accounts for at least a 51 percent threshold, as stated in the 2014 Law on 
Investment in Vietnam, accessed at the website of Ministry of Justice of Vietnam: 
www.moj.gov.vn/vbpq/lists/vn%20bn%20php%20lut/view_detail.aspx?itemid=30315  
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Figure 2.5: Foreign Invested Sector's Shares of Total Exports and Imports in 
Vietnam, 1995-2017 (%)     
 
Source: GSO (2018) 
2.3 Previous Studies 
2.3.1 Trade Liberalisation and Trade Flows 
Trade liberalisation is expected to increase welfare because both consumers and 
producers have access to a variety of cheaper products and intermediate goods 
respectively as a result of an RTA (Sheng, Tang, & Xu, 2014) and exporters have 
improved access to international markets. However, Viner (2014) argues that in 
addition to welfare improvements, a RTA might reduce welfare, depending on trade 
creation or trade diversion effects. Trade creation involves replacing higher-cost 
domestic production of an FTA’s member with lower-cost imports from other 
member countries. By contrast, trade diversion occurs when the removal of tariffs 
leads an FTA member to divert its import activities from non-members to other 
FTA members, even though imports from non-members would be cheaper if such 
countries were not discriminated against (Clausing, 2001; Deme & Ndrianasy, 2017; 
Viner, 2014). 
There is little research on the impact of trade liberalisation on exports and imports 
in Vietnam. The very limited research includes that of Pham (2011) who conducts 
a panel data analysis of Vietnam and its 17 partner countries between 1990 and 
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2008, focussing on the evaluation of Vietnam’s accession to the WTO affected 
Vietnam’s exports and imports. Her findings show that WTO accession has 
increased Vietnam’s imports because there was a considerable decrease in tariffs as 
a consequence of joining. By way of contrast, there was no conclusive evidence on 
whether Vietnam’s accession to the WTO affected exports (Pham, 2011). There is 
also some related literature on how trade liberalisation affects export quality and 
productivity in Vietnam, with Nguyen (2016) finding that trade liberalisation has 
been important for improving Vietnam’s export quality and suggesting that FDI 
inflows may help to raise the degree of export sophistication. However, Doan, 
Nguyen, Vu, Tran, and Lim (2016) find that exposure to competition from imports 
may lead to lower productivity for smaller firms in Vietnam, though the impact is 
small and there is some evidence of positive effects for larger firms. 
Despite the limited extent of studies on the impact of FTAs in Vietnam, empirical 
studies of other countries have provided evidence of both trade creation and trade 
diversion effects of FTAs. For instance, in gravity models that include either one 
dummy FTA variable (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007) or two RTA dummy variables 
called RTA-Insider and RTA-Outsider to capture intra-bloc and extra-bloc trade 
respectively (Lee & Park, 2007), it was found that RTAs stimulate trade among 
members. These results are supported by Foster (2012), who finds that RTAs result 
in increasing imports between RTA partners. Moreover, when focusing on a 
specific RTA, findings by García, Pabsdorf, and Herrera (2013), Clausing (2001), 
Hassan (2001) and Sheng et al. (2014) identify trade creation effects on members’ 
trade of the Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR), the FTA between Canada and 
the US (CUSFTA), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) and the ASEAN-China FTA respectively. On the other hand, some 
studies on multiple RTAs have found mixed effects, including trade creation and 
trade diversion. For instance, Kahouli and Maktouf (2014) and Carrere (2006) adopt 
gravity models and apply panel data to a large sample of countries to examine the 
impact of multiple RTAs on trade flows. Their findings indicate that RTAs have 
generated an increase in intra-regional trade, benefiting members within RTAs at 
the cost of the rest of the world.  
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Empirical studies by Ullah and Inaba (2012) and Busse and Gröning (2012) apply 
gravity models to examine the impacts of various FTAs for particular countries and 
find that the effects on trade flows can be negative in some cases. In particular, 
Ullah and Inaba (2012) show that while the South Asian Free Trade Agreement 
(SAFTA) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and 
Economic Cooperation Free Trade Area (BIMSTEC FTA) have no statistically 
significant impacts on Bangladesh’s exports, other RTAs such as the Asia Pacific 
Trade Agreement (APTA) and SAARC have negative impacts. Moreover, Busse 
and Gröning (2012) find that with the exception of the FTA with the US, which has 
stimulated Jordan’s exports, other multilateral or preferential trade liberalisation 
have not resulted in statistically significant effects on exports and imports.  
2.3.2 FDI and Trade 
The Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model was the first theoretical attempt at explaining 
FDI (Faeth, 2009) whereby movements of production factors including FDI across 
countries can be substituted by foreign trade. Based on the ‘public goods’ or 
‘jointness’ of characterisation of firm-specific activities, Markusen (1984) supports 
the substitutionary relationship. Furthermore, the proximity-concentration trade-off 
has suggested that horizontal FDI, which duplicates an existing production facility 
in foreign markets, and trade are substitutes (Brainard, 1993; Helpman, Melitz, & 
Yeaple, 2003). In contrast to this, Lipsey and Weiss (1981) hypothesise a 
complementary relationship between trade and FDI whereby vertical FDI, which 
involves locating different stages of production in a variety of host countries, 
complements trade (Helpman, 1984). 
There have been few studies examining the relationship between Vietnam’s trade 
and FDI. For instance, using panel data covering 19 major trading partners of 
Vietnam between 1990 and 2007, Anwar and Nguyen (2011) explore the link 
between FDI and trade in Vietnam before, during and after the Asian Financial 
Crisis. They show that a 1% increase in FDI would increase exports and imports of 
Vietnam by 0.45% and 0.23% respectively. Similarly, with an application of the 
gravity model, Nguyen and Xing (2008) also evaluate the impact of FDI inflows on 
Vietnam’s exports during the period of 1990-2004 and find that a 1% increase in 
FDI results in a 0.13% increase in exports of Vietnam. Pham (2012) examines the 
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empirical relationship between FDI flows and trade for Vietnam from 1990-2007, 
finding a positive impact of FDI on exports and imports. Other studies such as 
Minor, Walmsley, and Strutt (2018) have emphasised the impact of other 
potentially complementary reforms, such as reform of state-owned enterprises, 
which may also positively impact Vietnam’s trade flows. 
Empirical studies of other countries that explore the impact of FDI on trade include 
De Mello Jr and Fukasaku (2000), Bajo-Rubio and Montero-Muñoz (2001), 
Dritsaki, Dritsaki, and Adamopoulos (2004), Waheed and Jawaid (2010), Hailu 
(2010), Jawaid et al. (2016) and Mijiyawa (2017). It is clear that FDI can have 
mixed effects on trade. In particular, Svensson (1996) reports that while production 
in Sweden’s foreign subsidiaries has a complementary effect on Sweden’s exports 
of intermediates, it has negative impacts on Sweden’s exports of finished goods. 
The findings of mixed effects have been supported by Blomstrom, Lipsey, and 
Kulchycky (1988) and Blonigen (2001). Moreover, Swenson (2004) finds that FDI 
inflows into the US, which are disaggregated into product, industry and overall 
manufacturing components, have mixed effects on the US’s imports. Furthermore, 
the findings of Beugelsdijk et al. (2008) conclude that horizontal FDI and exports 
are substitutes. A more recent study by Tabassum, Nazeer, and Ahmed (2012) 
concludes that FDI has no significant relationship on Pakistan’s exports in both the 
short-run and the long-run. 
In this paper, we analyse how particular trade agreements and FDI impact on 
Vietnamese trade, which facilitates insights well beyond existing studies that focus 
on the effects of either trade liberalisation or FDI on trade in a particular country. 
By doing so, it is possible for us to examine the efficiency of key trade agreements 
Vietnam has entered into in terms of expanding exports and imports, as well as the 
sensitivity of Vietnamese trade to FDI following the trade agreements. 
2.4 Model Specification, Data and Methodology 
To examine the impact of trade agreements and FDI inflows on Vietnam’s trade, 
we use gravity models which have been widely employed for international trade 
analysis. We begin by summarising a basic gravity model before presenting 
extended gravity models.  
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2.4.1 Gravity Model and Model Specification 
Gravity models were so named due to the use of gravitational force to explain 
bilateral trade flows. Tinbergen and Poyhonen are considered as the first authors 
using these models in international trade analysis (Kahouli & Maktouf, 2014) in the 
1960s. The theoretical foundations of the gravity model have been improved over 
time, particularly due to the contributions of Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985), 
Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003).  
The basic gravity model is as follows: 
ln 𝑋𝑖𝑗  = α0 + α1 ln 𝑌𝑖+α2 ln 𝑌𝑗+α 3 ln 𝑡𝑖𝑗+𝑒𝑖𝑗            (1) 
  
where Xij indicates trade flows between the two countries; Yi and Yj is GDP of 
country i and country j respectively; and tij is trade costs between two countries 
such as distance, adjacency and institutions. With the increasing number of studies 
applying gravity models to international trade analysis, more explanatory variables 
have been added to the gravity model to reduce potential omitted variable bias. 
Following Baier and Bergstrand (2007), Carrere (2006) and Kahouli and Maktouf 
(2014), the current study includes various dummy variables for trade agreements.  
Extended gravity models may be respectively defined for exports and imports as 
follows:  
ln EXvit=α0+α1 ln GDPvt+α2 ln GDPit+α3 ln DISvi+α4BORvi+α5 ln RERvit+α6 ln FDIivt−1
+ α7 ln DGDPPCvit + α8CRISvit
A + α9CRISvit
G + α10AFTAvit + α11ACCECAvit + α12AJCEPvit +
α13AKCECAvit+α14JVEPAvit+α15USBTAvit+εijt                                     (2)   
ln IMivt=α0+α1 ln GDPvt+α2 ln GDPit+α3 ln DISvi+α4BORvi+α5 ln RERvit+α6 ln FDIivt−1
+ α7 ln DGDPPCvit + α8CRISvit
A + α9CRISvit
G + α10AFTAvit + α11ACCECAvit + α12AJCEPvit +
α13AKCECAvit+α14JVEPAvit+α15USBTAvit+εijt                                      (3)    
where v denotes Vietnam and i is the country partner of Vietnam. EXvit is real 
exports from Vietnam to country i. IMPivt is real imports into Vietnam from country 
i. GDPvt and GDPit represent real GDP of Vietnam and country i, respectively. DISvi 
is the distance between the capital of Vietnam and that of country i. BORvi is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if Vietnam and country i share a common 
border. RERvit is the real exchange rate between the currency of Vietnam (VND) 
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and that of country i. CRISG and CRISA represent the Global Financial Crisis and 
the Asian Financial Crisis respectively. CRISG gets the value of 1 for the period 
2008-2009 (Shelburne, 2010) while CRISA takes the value of 1 during the period 
1997-1998 if Vietnam’s partners were really struck by the crisis (Cuyvers, Soeng, 
Plasmans, & Van Den Bulcke, 2011). FDIivt-1 represents real FDI flows from 
country partner i to Vietnam.15 There is a dual causality between FDI and GDP. 
While MNEs prefer large market potential (GDP), additional FDI inflow also 
enlarges market potential which attracts further still more MNEs. To address the 
possibility of endogeneity due to the dual causality, FDIivt-1 is in lagged form 
(Nguyen & Xing, 2008). DGDPPCvit represents the absolute value difference in 
GDP per capita between Vietnam and its partners. While the positive sign on 
DGDPPCvit might lend support to the H-O framework, a negative sign might reflect 
support for the Linder hypothesis (Antonucci & Manzocchi, 2006; Kahouli & 
Maktouf, 2014). One might argue that since trade agreements are usually 
implemented gradually over a period of time, there is a case for considering the use 
of some form of non-binary dummy variable. This might take a form such as (… 0, 
0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1, 1, 1,…) or (…0, 0, 0.33, 0.67, 1, 1, 1,…) etc. The choice of 
which form of non-binary dummy to employ and with this, the imposition of the 
trade agreement effect may become somewhat arbitrary. Therefore, the use of 
binary trade dummy variables is preferred. In this study, AFTA, ACCECA, AJCEP, 
AKCECA, JVEPA, and USBTA represent dummy variables. The dummy variables 
used here take the value of 1 if Vietnam and the country partner have participated 
in an FTA and 0 otherwise, based on the FTA’s entry into force (Bae & Jang, 2013; 
Baier & Bergstrand, 2007; Lee & Park, 2007). Of course, the dummy variables 
could be picking up influences from factors other than the trade agreements. 
Therefore, the date of the FTA's coming into force is chosen as the key date rather 
than when the FTA was signed.  This way, the dummy variable captures the FTA 
impacts on trade flows occurring from its date of commencement. Finally, εijt = αij+ 
vijt. While αij denotes the specific country-pair effect that accounts for the 
                                                 
15 Investment produces impacts on outputs over a period of time and so its influence on trade 
volumes would be also distributed over several future periods. However, the inclusion of additional 
lags in FDI led to results that were inferior. The estimation of additional parameters might have 
adversely affected test power and hence the number of significant coefficients in the regressions. 
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unobservable and time-invariant characteristics that are specific to each pair of 
countries, vijt represents the error term that is assumed to be log normally distributed. 
2.4.2 Data 
This study employs panel data covering Vietnam and its 17 country partners over 
the period 1996-2014. Based on Vietnam’s main FDI and trading partners as well 
as the availability of the data, 17 partners are selected, namely: Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand, China, Japan, Korea, Canada, United States, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, France, Germany, Italy, Netherland, United Kingdom, and Sweden. 
During the last 2 decades, from 1995 to 2014, these 17 partners have accounted for 
more than 84% of Vietnam’s total FDI inflows, 74% of Vietnam’s exports and 84% 
of Vietnam’s imports. 16  In 2014, FDI flows to Vietnam from these partners 
comprised 91%17 of Vietnam’s total FDI inflows while these countries accounted 
for almost 80% of Vietnam’s total trade. 
Data for bilateral exports and imports between Vietnam and its partners are 
collected from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO), while inward FDI 
into Vietnam by source countries are obtained from the ASEAN Secretariat. The 
data are then scaled by the consumer price index (CPI) of the US to generate real 
values.  
The bilateral real exchange rate data between Vietnam and its partners are not 
directly available. Therefore, they are measured as follows, using US$ exchange 
rates: 
RERvit = (CPIit/CPIvt) * (nERvt/$ / nERit/$)  
where CPIit and CPIvt are the annual consumer price index of country i and Vietnam 
at year t respectively. nERvt/$ and nERit/$ are the nominal exchange rates, indicating 
the amount of each country’s currency per 1 US$ at year t. The data are sourced 
from the World Development Indicators (WDIs) with the exception of Taiwan, for 
which CPI and nominal exchange rate data are obtained from the National Statistics 
                                                 
16 Calculated from the database of Vietnam’s General Statistics Office, accessed at www.gso.gov.vn. 
17 The remaining 9% of FDI is primarily sourced from Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, 
Samoa, Bermuda and other regions. 
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Republic of China and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis respectively. 
Taiwan’s nominal GDP, GDP deflator and population data are obtained from the 
IMF, while real GDP and population data for other countries are sourced from the 
World Bank’s WDIs. DGDPPCvit is calculated as the absolute value of the 
difference between Vietnam’s GDP per capita and its partners’ GDP per capita: 
𝐷𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑣𝑖𝑡=ln |
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑣𝑡
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑣𝑡
−
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡
|   
Information on Vietnam’s different FTAs is available from the website of WTO 
whereas data on distance and border are from Centre d'Études Prospectives et 
d'Informations Internationales (CEPII). 
2.4.3 Methodology 
The available panel estimators include ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects 
(FE) and random effects (RE) techniques. According to Goh and Tham (2013) and 
others, the disadvantage of pooled OLS is the assumption of homogeneity for all 
countries, which can result in biased estimates because of the relationship between 
the explanatory variables and unobservable effects. A key benefit attached to FE is 
the provision of consistent estimates (Goh & Tham, 2013; Martínez, Bengoa-Calvo, 
& Sánchez-Robles, 2012). Unobserved time-invariant specific factors such as 
distance, border, language and colonial history, which might affect trade flows, are 
controlled for by FE. However, important time-invariant variables of gravity 
models, such as border and distance, cannot be easily estimated separately in a FE 
model. RE, on the other hand, can provide estimates for specific time-invariant 
variables. Recent empirical studies such as (Mijiyawa, 2017) and (Kahouli & Omri, 
2017) have applied the system-generalised method of moments (GMM) technique 
to panel data due to its superior efficiency in dealing with the issue of endogeneity. 
However, the authors state that the technique is more appropriate for dynamic panel 
data with a short time dimension, which is not the case for our study period. 
Therefore, RE is used in this paper. 
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2.5 Empirical Results  
Table 2.1 reports the results for the gravity models based on estimation using RE 
regressions. Breusch-Pagan LM tests (RE vs. OLS) were carried out and the LM 
statistics are statistically significant at 1%, indicating that RE models are 
statistically preferable to OLS for both the export and import gravity equations. The 
Wald tests for groupwise heteroscedasticity reject the null hypothesis that the 
variance of the disturbance term in each gravity model is constant over time. 
Therefore, the White robust standard error is used to address the problem. 
We begin our discussion with analysis of the impacts of trade agreements and FDI 
on Vietnam’s exports and imports, which is the main focus of this paper. We then 
analyse the effects of other factors on trade. 
2.5.1 Impacts of Trade Agreements and FDI on Trade 
Our econometric results are reported in Table 2.1. As expected, the trade 
agreements have different effects on Vietnam’s trade. The bilateral trade 
agreements considered, including both the Japan-Vietnam Economic Partnership 
(JVEPA) and Vietnam-US bilateral trade agreement (USBTA) generate trade 
creation. Specifically, JVEPA increases Vietnam’s exports to Japan by 48% 
(computed as exp(0.394)-1) and Vietnam’s imports from Japan by 71% 
(exp(0.538)-1). Using the same method of calculation, the USBTA has a stronger 
expansion impact on trade between Vietnam and the US, with Vietnam’s exports 
and imports increasing by 368% and 70% respectively. There is also evidence of 
trade creation effects in the ASEAN-Korea Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (AKCECA), which stimulates Vietnam’s exports by 41%.  
It is noteworthy that the ASEAN-China Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (ACCECA) has supported Vietnam’s imports by 55%. According to 
GSO (2018), China has traditionally been the largest import partner for Vietnam, 
thus it is understandable that Vietnam’s imports from China went up sharply as a 
result of the FTA. However, our results indicate that this FTA has not stimulated 
Vietnam’s exports to China. This may be due to the very strong competition 
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Vietnam faces from other ASEAN exporting countries, with China regarded as a 
key export market for all ASEAN members.  
The ASEAN free trade area (AFTA) has no significant impact on Vietnam’s trade, 
due in part to the delay and only small decrease in tariffs in the first years of AFTA 
implementation (Vanhnalat et al., 2015). Our results suggest that the ASEAN-Japan 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP) has negative effects on Vietnam’s 
trade. This is in line with Busse and Gröning (2012) and Ullah and Inaba (2012) 
who find evidence of negative impacts of particular FTAs on trade for Jordan and 
Bangladesh respectively. This result is also consistent with increased competition 
occurring among members as a result of the AJCEP. However, we note our dataset 
is only able to examine the first six years during which this RTA has been in force; 
future studies might throw more light on its trade effects during the next stages of 
implementation. 
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Table 2.1: Estimation Results from Gravity Models (Random Effects) 
 Dependent variables 
Independent variables ln EXvit ln IMivt 
ln GDPvt 1.993*** 1.510*** 
 (0.187) (0.179) 
ln GDPit 0.515** 0.452* 
 (0.229) (0.233) 
ln DISvi -0.693*** -1.444*** 
 (0.249) (0.459) 
BORvi 0.088 0.678 
 (0.504) (0.669) 
ln RERvit 0.043** 0.003 
 (0.020) (0.041) 
ln FDIivt-1 0.038* 0.048*** 
 (0.021) (0.010) 
ln DGDPPCvit -0.051 0.173 
 (0.097) (0.272) 
CRISA 0.214 -0.036 
 (0.142) (0.047) 
CRISG -0.108* 0.067 
 (0.063) (0.062) 
AFTA 0.201 0.034 
 (0.272) (0.125) 
ACCECA 0.062 0.441*** 
 (0.096) (0.152) 
AJCEP -0.490** -0.424* 
 (0.192) (0.228) 
AKCECA 0.341** 0.067 
 (0.171) (0.209) 
JVEPA 0.394* 0.538** 
 (0.218) (0.264) 
USBTA 1.544*** 0.528*** 
 (0.105) (0.113) 
Constant -37.604*** -19.679*** 
 (5.169) (5.134) 
Wooldridge test, F 86.78*** 24.62*** 
Breusch-Pagan LM test 344.17*** 866.81*** 
 Wald test statistics 589.60*** 5180.83*** 
Number of observations 323 323 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5     
and 10% levels 
Regarding the impacts of FDI on trade, the estimated coefficient suggests that a 1% 
increase in FDI will lead to a 0.04% increase in exports over the period of 1996-
2014, which supports the findings of Nguyen and Xing (2008), Anwar and Nguyen 
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(2011) and Pham (2012). Although the size of the coefficient is quite small, one can 
gain a good idea by looking at the study of Anwar and Nguyen (2011) in which the 
impact of FDI on exports in different periods is examined. Using RE approach, they 
find that Vietnamese exports increase by 0.38% in the 1990-1997 period, only 0.17% 
in the 1998-2000 period, and 0.16% in the 2001-2007 period. One possible reason 
for the lower sensitivity of exports to FDI in more recent periods is that the domestic 
demand for products of FDI firms in Vietnam has significantly increased. The 
positive impact of FDI inflows on Vietnam’s exports can be explained as follows. 
Firstly, the export capacity of domestic firms in Vietnam has increased on account 
of FDI spill-over effects in terms of superior technology and management from 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Brooks et al., 2008). Moreover, Vietnam’s 
domestic firms have improved their technology due to increased competition with 
MNEs (Mijiyawa, 2017). Secondly, the complementary relationship between FDI 
inflows and exports in Vietnam might be partly explained by the exports of foreign 
affiliates constructed by vertical FDI to their home countries, due to fragmentation 
of various production stages across countries (Helpman, 1984). Thirdly, the rapidly 
increased shares of the foreign invested sector in Vietnam’s total exports suggest 
there is a high possibility that Vietnam is becoming an increasingly important 
‘export platform’ by many MNEs. Through MNEs, a source country would launch 
FDI in a host country and consider the foreign country as a production platform for 
exports to its other partners (Ekholm, Forslid, & Markusen, 2007; Faeth, 2009; 
Kneller & Pisu, 2004). For instance, Samsung Electronics from South Korea has 
surpassed Petro Vietnam, a state-owned enterprise, to be the largest firm in Vietnam 
and significant contributor to Vietnam’s total exports. 
The results reported in Table 2.1 also suggest that FDI inflows have stimulated 
Vietnam’s imports from partners, which is consistent with Anwar and Nguyen 
(2011) and Pham (2012). The positive impact of FDI inflows on imports is also 
found in some other ASEAN countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand 
between 1970 and 1994 (De Mello Jr & Fukasaku, 2000) and Pakistan (Waheed & 
Jawaid, 2010). The expansion effects of inward FDI on Vietnam’s imports might 
be attributable to different types of FDI. Firstly, when a firm engages in vertical 
FDI in a variety of host countries to take advantage of relatively cheap and abundant 
factor endowments, firm-specific assets would be applied in all of its production 
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plants in addition to the one located in the home country (Helpman, 1984). This 
suggests that inward FDI increases imports into the host country due to the demand 
for the principal components of these affiliates from their home countries. Secondly, 
horizontal FDI also results in an increase in a host country’s imports, due to foreign 
affiliates’ demand for intermediate inputs from their home countries. This is 
consistent with the finding that a higher level of production for a US firm in a host 
country is associated with the host country’s increased imports from the US firm 
(Lipsey & Weiss, 1984). 
In terms of the control variables, Vietnam’s exports and imports depend on the GDP 
of both Vietnam and Vietnam’s partners, with much stronger dependence on the 
economic growth of Vietnam. Distance has a significantly negative effect on both 
Vietnam’s exports and imports. The significantly positive coefficient of the real 
exchange rate between Vietnam and country partners suggests that a depreciation 
of the Vietnamese dong would increase the competitiveness of Vietnamese 
products which, in turn, has an expansion impact on Vietnam’s exports. However, 
the real exchange rate has no impact on Vietnam’s imports. Maybe this is because, 
compared with exports, imports are more sensitive to FDI than the real exchange 
rate. The dummy variable for the Global Financial Crisis is negative and statistically 
significant, indicating an adverse impact on Vietnam’s exports. This supports the 
conclusion of Kahouli and Maktouf (2014) that the crisis reduced exports among 
countries. Unlike exports, Vietnam’s imports were not affected by the crisis. One 
possible reason is that Vietnam’s exports markets during the Global Financial Crisis 
were adversely affected (due to economic slowdown in the economies of trading 
partners), but domestic demand for imports remained strong. 
2.5.2 Trade-FDI Relationship Following Particular Trade Agreements 
As discussed above and shown in Table 2.1, we find that FDI and trade are 
complementary. Among the key six trade agreements, only USBTA and JVEPA are 
found to stimulate both Vietnam’s exports and imports. Vietnam’s exports are also 
stimulated by AKCECA and imports by ACCECA. Therefore, it is of interest to 
consider whether the trade agreements have had any impacts on the trade-FDI 
relationship. Following Hejazi and Safarian (2005), multiplicative dummies 
between FDI and the particular trade agreements are included in the estimation. In 
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particular, ln FDIivt-1*USBTA, ln FDIivt-1*JVEPA and ln FDIivt-1*AKCECA are 
included in the exports model and ln FDIivt-1*USBTA, ln FDIivt-1*JVEPA and ln 
FDIivt-1*ACCECA are included in the imports model. The regression results with 
these interactive terms are reported in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2: Regression Results with Multiplicative Dummies (Random Effects) 
  Dependent variable 
Independent variables ln EXvit ln IMivt 
ln GDPvt 1.998*** 1.488*** 
  (0.189) (0.173) 
ln GDPit 0.507** 0.477** 
  (0.233) (0.218) 
ln DISvi -0.701*** -1.480*** 
  (0.253) (0.457) 
BORvi 0.164 0.799 
  (0.531) (0.761) 
ln RERvit 0.041** -0.001 
  (0.021) (0.044) 
ln FDIivt-1 0.040* 0.061*** 
  (0.024) (0.014) 
ln DGDPPCvit -0.027 0.212 
  (0.108) (0.297) 
CRISA 0.213 -0.024 
  (0.143) (0.047) 
CRISG -0.118* 0.063 
  (0.064) (0.062) 
AFTA 0.207 0.062 
  (0.267) (0.107) 
ACCECA 0.050 1.991 
  (0.100) (1.619) 
AJCEP -0.635** -0.407** 
  (0.265) (0.194) 
AKCECA 3.086 0.086 
  (2.105) (0.185) 
JVEPA -0.619 0.802* 
  (0.566) (0.421) 
USBTA 0.901** 1.110*** 
  (0.367) (0.288) 
ln FDIivt-1*USBTA 0.034* -0.031* 
  (0.020) (0.016) 
ln FDIivt-1*JVEPA 0.055** -0.014 
  (0.024) (0.022) 
ln FDIivt-1*AKCECA -0.139  
  (0.111)  
ln FDIivt-1*ACCECA  -0.087 
   (0.091) 
Constant -37.733*** -20.052*** 
  (5.107) 5.013 
Wooldridge test, F 83.99*** 24.17*** 
Breusch-Pagan LM test 351.59*** 855.09*** 
Wald test statistics 503.49*** 4649.70*** 
Number of observation 323 323 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1,     
5 and 10 percent levels. 
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All the independent variables maintain the same sign as those reported in Table 2.1. 
Therefore, we focus on the impact of the interactive terms.  
For exports, there is no significant change in FDI slope with the inception of 
AKCECA. In contrast, the slope on FDI increases from 0.040 to 0.074 
(0.040+0.034) as a result of USBTA. Following JVEPA, the FDI slope more than 
doubles, increasing from 0.040 to 0.095 (0.040 + 0.055). The dramatic increase in 
FDI slopes implies that Vietnam’s exports have become more sensitive to FDI as a 
result of USBTA and JVEPA. This suggests that the complementary relationship 
between FDI and exports has become more salient as a result of the two trade 
agreements. For imports, JVEPA and ACCECA appear not to result in a significant 
change of slope on FDI. However, the slope on FDI decreases from 0.061 to 0.030 
(0.061-0.031) following USBTA. This suggests that USBTA has reduced the 
complementary relationship between FDI and imports.  
The changes in sensitivity of Vietnam’s trade to FDI following the particular trade 
agreements are consistent with a change in the foreign investment behaviour of 
multinational firms. For instance, Buckley, Clegg, Forsans, and Reilly (2007) point 
out that US multinational firms’ foreign investment decisions in Canada, which 
were mainly dependent on market size and exchange rate factors prior to the North 
American FTA, were driven by the Canadian market and financial market factors 
following the FTA. Vietnam has become an attractive destination for FDI due to 
the advantages brought about by the particular FTAs, which could affect Vietnam’s 
trade. The reduction in trade cost due to particular trade agreements could also 
affect the type of FDI flows in Vietnam, which in turn impacts on Vietnam’s trade 
as well. 
2.6 Conclusion 
While Vietnam has participated in numerous bilateral and FTAs, we find that the 
bilateral trade agreements with the US and Japan have led to the most noticeable 
expansion in Vietnamese exports and imports. The impacts from other RTAs are 
more mixed, due in part to increasing competition among members and the long 
tariff reduction process. In terms of FDI inflows, there is strong evidence of FDI 
inflows stimulating Vietnam’s exports and imports. However, the impact on 
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Vietnamese trade from FDI inflows is not as strong as that from some of the trade 
agreements. Furthermore, our findings suggest that Vietnam’s exports (imports) 
have become more (less) sensitive to FDI as a result of the bilateral trade agreement 
with the US and exports have become more sensitive to FDI following the free trade 
agreement with Japan. 
These findings have important implications for Vietnam’s policy makers. Firstly, 
to continue building growth in trade it is important that Vietnam continues its trade 
liberalisation process, including through FTAs. Furthermore, to take advantage of 
a number of RTAs Vietnam is participating in, Vietnam needs to increase its 
competitive ability, including with ASEAN member countries. Secondly, in 
addition to addressing the problem of capital deficiency, FDI inflows to Vietnam 
can help to increase trade. Therefore, intensifying policies that help to attract FDI 
are expected to be useful in promoting trade. 
It seems that certain types of agreements work better than others in terms of 
stimulating Vietnamese trade. In particular, policymakers may benefit from looking 
closely at the trade agreements with Japan and the US when it comes to future trade 
deals. Given that government policy is interested in stimulating FDI, closer trading 
ties with Japan and the US may confer most benefit in terms of Vietnamese exports. 
Therefore, a useful avenue for future research might be to more closely explore the 
nature of these agreements and whether or not lessons are available for trade 
agreements involving other countries. In terms of the changed sensitivities of trade 
to FDI, further research might also explore more closely the particular forms of FDI 
that have the most impact on this.  
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Chapter Appendix 
Table 2.3: Global Competitiveness Index Rankings 
  2006- 2007- 2008- 2009- 2010- 2011- 2012- 2013- 2014- 2015- 2016- 2017- 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Singapore 8 7 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Malaysia 19 21 21 24 26 21 25 24 20 20 18 25 
Thailand 28 28 34 36 38 39 38 37 31 31 32 34 
Indonesia 54 54 55 54 44 46 50 38 34 34 37 41 
Philippines 75 71 70 75 85 76 65 59 52 52 47 57 
Vietnam 64 68 71 87 59 65 75 70 68 68 56 60 
Source: Created from World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Reports 2006-2007 to 
2017-2018.18     
Table 2.4: Exports from ASEAN-5 to China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF (2017) 
 
  
                                                 
18 http://www.weforum.org/ 
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3 Chapter 3: The Impact of Free Trade Agreements on FDI 
Inflows: The Case of Vietnam  
3.1 Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) occurs as a result of corporate strategies and 
investment decisions of multinational corporations (De Mello Jr & Fukasaku, 2000). 
It is favoured around the world, especially in developing countries, for the great 
benefits it brings, including a critical source of finance, technology diffusion 
(UNCTAD, 2015), knowledge spill-over effects on domestic firms in terms of 
production process, innovative products, patents, establishment of production and 
distribution networks (Mijiyawa, 2017). While large FDI flows have surged to a 
limited number of developing countries such as China, India and Mexico 
(Waldkirch, 2010), increasing capital has been challenging for governments in 
many developing countries, particularly as it often requires significant economic 
reforms.  
Free trade agreements (FTAs) have been viewed as an increasingly important driver 
of FDI in emerging countries (Yeyati, Stein, & Daude, 2003). One of the most 
important reasons a country enters into an FTA is the expectation of increased FDI 
flows (Blomstrom & Kokko, 1997; Medvedev, 2012). In the long run, the 
integration is expected to increase growth rates of members thanks to greater 
markets, improved competition capacity, better resource allocation and positive 
externalities (Blomstrom & Kokko, 1997). However, the effects of FTAs on FDI 
depend on different channels such as patterns of FDI, the investment provision of 
FTAs, intra- and extra-FTA source countries, the locational advantages of host 
countries and interactions among them. In addition, individual members of a 
regional trade agreement (RTA) may experience gains or even losses in FDI flows 
(Feils & Rahman, 2011). Therefore, it has been difficult to draw a definite 
conclusion on the role of FTAs on FDI because some of the channels might be in 
opposite directions (Yeyati et al., 2003), thus the expected effect of FTAs on FDI 
remains an open question (Medvedev, 2012).  
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Existing analysis of the linkage between FDI and FTAs has mainly focused on 
either multiple FTAs for a group of countries or case studies of a specific FTA. The 
question of how a particular country’s general participation in FTAs impacts on its 
FDI flows has not received much attention. The limited studies include Crotti, 
Cavoli, and Wilson (2010) and Bae and Jang (2013) for Australia and Korea 
respectively. However, there remains a paucity of studies assessing the overall 
impact of FTAs on FDI in a developing country where there has been a shortage of 
investment. This paper contributes to the existing literature by examining the 
impact on FDI inflows of the overall FTAs that Vietnam has participated in. This 
allows us to evaluate whether FTAs, in general, have been associated with increased 
FDI flows, which is a major motive for Vietnam and other developing countries 
pursuing FTAs. A secondary question is whether FTAs have changed investors’ 
sensitivity to key determinants of FDI flows in Vietnam. 
Furthermore, vertical FDI is more likely between industrialised and developing 
countries while there is a prevalence of horizontal FDI among industrialised 
countries (Aizenman & Noy, 2006). Therefore, vertical FDI might be more popular 
in developing countries (Egger & Winner, 2005). However, multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) can have a mixed option including both vertical FDI and 
horizontal FDI in practice (Aizenman & Noy, 2006). Based on the outcomes for the 
FTAs and other determinants of FDI, we can further explain patterns of FDI flows 
in Vietnam, which have been ignored in studies analysing FDI flows in Vietnam. 
Vietnam is a particularly interesting case study for several reasons. Firstly, FDI 
flows in Vietnam have recently become the main source of external financing for 
the domestic savings-investment gap. Over the period 2007-2009, FDI inflows to 
Vietnam, on average, accounted for 61% in capital flows (Tran, 2013) and this has 
remained a high share, with a slight decrease to 59% during the 2010-2017 period.19  
Secondly, although Vietnam has not received a large amount of FDI flows 
compared to other developing countries such as China, India and Mexico, its 
increasing success in attracting FDI flows has been impressive. In particular, FDI 
flows into Vietnam in 2017 (14.1 billion US$) were 70 times larger than the flows 
                                                 
19 Calculated from Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics, IMF, accessed at 
http://data.imf.org 
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in 1990 (180 million US$), while the figures are 21.1, 3.7, 17.3, 11.1, and 3.0 times 
for Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and, Thailand respectively 
(UNCTAD, 2018). Vietnam became the second largest FDI recipient (after 
Singapore) in ASEAN for the first time in 2008, continuing in 2009. In 2017, 
Vietnam was the third largest FDI destination in the ASEAN region, following 
Singapore and Indonesia (UNCTAD, 2018). 
Thirdly, FDI has played a key role in Vietnam’s exports. Exports from the foreign 
invested sector have accounted for more than 60% of Vietnam’s exports since 2012, 
reaching 73% in 2017 (GSO, 2018).20  
Fourthly, there has been rapid trade liberalisation in the world economy, achieved 
through a number of RTAs, with 291 RTAs in force as of January 2019 (WTO, 
2019). Consistent with the global trend, Vietnam has been actively and deeply 
involved in trade liberalisation process, with 11 FTAs entered into force as of April 
2019, as shown in Table 3.1.21 Significant changes in Vietnam’s inward FDI have 
been observed following these FTAs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 The foreign invested sector refers to enterprises in which foreign ownership accounts for at least a 51 
percent threshold, as stated in the 2014 Law on Investment in Vietnam, accessed at the website of Ministry of 
Justice of Vietnam http://www.moj.gov.vn 
21 Although the US-Vietnam trade agreement is an important trade agreement, it is not categorised as a RTA, 
therefore is not included in this table. See 
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicSearchByMemberResult.aspx?MemberCode=704&lang=1&redirect=1 and 
http://wtocenter.vn/fta. 
55 
 
 
Table 3.1: Vietnam's RTAs Entering into Force as of April 2019 
RTAs Date of signature Date of entry into force 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) Jan-1992 Jan-1993 
ASEAN-China Nov-2004 Jan-2005 
ASEAN-Korea Aug-2006 Jan-2010 
ASEAN-Japan Mar-2008 Dec-2008 
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Feb-2009 Jan-2010 
ASEAN-India Aug-2009 Jan-2010 
Vietnam-Eurasian Economic Union May-2015 Oct-2016 
Vietnam-Japan Dec-2008 Oct-2009 
Vietnam-Chile Nov-2011 Jan-2014 
Vietnam-Korea May-2015 Dec-2015 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement 
for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 
March-2018 Dec-2018 
Source: WTO (2019) 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 briefly presents 
trends and patterns of FDI flows in Vietnam. Section 3.3 summarises the theoretical 
framework of FDI, followed by a discussion of previous relevant studies in Section 
3.4. Model specification, data, and methodology are presented in Section 3.5, with 
Section 3.6 discussing the empirical results. Section 3.7 presents our concluding 
remarks. 
3.2 Trends and Patterns of FDI in Vietnam 
In this section, we present trends of FDI in Vietnam, followed by a discussion of 
changes in Vietnam’s sources of FDI and the sectoral composition of Vietnam’s 
inward FDI flows. Figure 3.1 indicates FDI flows into Vietnam between 1990 and 
2017. In the immediate aftermath of the Renovation Policy in the mid-1980s, 
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Vietnam became an attractive destination of foreign firms due to a variety of 
investment opportunities in infrastructure and resource extraction boom 
(Athukorala & Tran, 2012), which explains much of the rapid increase in Vietnam’s 
inward FDI flows over the 1990-1996 period.  
After reaching its peak in 1996, FDI inflows to Vietnam experienced significant 
decreases over the 1997-2001 period. This decrease was largely due to adverse 
impacts on Vietnam’s investment environment due to the revised FDI law in 1996 
which included some restrictions on foreign firms (Athukorala & Tran, 2012; 
Schaumburg-Müller, 2003). The Asian Financial Crisis, however, contributed to 
the deterioration of this downturn (Schaumburg-Müller, 2003).  
Since 2003, Vietnam has experienced a substantial increase in inward FDI. It is 
notable that FDI inflows to Vietnam in 2008, 2009, and 2010 were higher than the 
annual levels before the Global Financial Crisis. A survey carried out by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit characterised Vietnam, along with Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China, as the most attractive FDI destination between 2008 and 2010 
(Breu, Dobbs, Remes, Skilling, & Kim, 2012). This is in line with UNCTAD (2010), 
which ranked Vietnam one of the most attractive destination for FDI over the 2007-
2009 period. 
Figure 3.1: Annual FDI Inflows to Vietnam, 1990-2017 (US$ million) 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2018) 
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Table 3.2 presents sources of Vietnam’s inward FDI flows from FTA partners as 
well as other key partners. Over the 1996-2000 period, FDI flows from intra-
ASEAN accounted for almost one-fifth of Vietnam’s total inward FDI, followed by 
Japan (16.9%), Taiwan (14.4%), South Korea (10.9%), and Hong Kong (9.8%). 
However, these main investors contributed smaller shares between 2001 and 2005. 
The remaining periods experienced increasing FDI shares of partners having FTAs 
with Vietnam, such as ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea. In the most recent 
period from 2016 to 2017, ASEAN+6 together accounted for 71.1% of Vietnam’s 
total FDI inflows, with the top 3 investors including South Korea (26.1%), Japan 
(18.4%), and intra-ASEAN (18.1%). In contrast, although Australia, India, and 
New Zealand invested more in Vietnam following FTAs, their FDI shares in 
Vietnam’s total inward FDI remain minimal. 
Table 3.2: Sources of Vietnam's Inward FDI (%) 
Source country 
1996-
2000 
2001-
2005 
2006-
2010 
2011-
2015 
2016-
2017 
Intra-ASEAN 19.7 12.2 14.9 18.7 18.1 
China 0.7 2.1 1.8 4.6 6.8 
India 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.5 
Japan 16.9 12.4 10.4 18.3 18.4 
South Korea 10.9 6.9 12.8 21.6 26.1 
Australia 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.7 1.1 
NZ 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
ASEAN+6* 48.8 34.6 40.9 64.2 71.1 
Hong Kong 9.8 4.4 4.3 9.1 5.4 
Taiwan 14.4 7.3 9.5 6.9 5.8 
US 3.8 6.0 16.3 1.1 2.1 
Others 23.2 47.6 29.0 18.7 15.7 
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total (Mil. $US) 8,987.0 7,714.0 34,560.0 45,787.0 26,700.0 
Source: Calculated based on ASEAN Secretariat database (ASEAN Secretariat, 2019) 
Note: * Includes nine ASEAN members plus China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New 
Zealand. 
The sectoral composition of Vietnam’s FDI inflows are shown in Table 3.3. The 
manufacturing sector has been the largest FDI recipient. This sector has recently 
become more important, accounting for more than 70% of Vietnam’s annual inward 
FDI in three successive years of 2012, 2013 and 2014, due to a surge of Korean 
investment. In 2016, 64% of Vietnam’s inward FDI flows surged to this sector, with 
Korea making the greatest contributions (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017). In contrast, 
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mining and quarrying, which used to be the traditional beneficiaries of FDI, have 
seen their shares decrease over time. Their annual shares have been less than 10% 
since 2006, compared with the average annual shares of 28.2% for the 2000-2004 
period. Similarly, FDI shares of agriculture, fishery and forestry have gradually 
declined, from 7.1% in 2000 to 0.6% in 2014. It is notable that real estate, which 
attracted minimal FDI prior to 2005, has recently become a favoured sector for 
foreign investors, absorbing one-third of Vietnam’s FDI flows in 2009. While 
reducing in importance somewhat, this sector maintained relatively high shares of 
11% and 7% in 2015 and 2016 respectively (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017). 
Table 3.3: Shares of FDI Flows into Vietnam by Sectors (%) 
  
Agriculture, 
fishery & 
forestry 
Mining &  
quarrying 
Manufacturing 
  
 
Construction 
  
Trade 
  
 
Financial 
services 
 Real 
estate 
Others 
  
Total 
    
2000 7.1 24.1 39.5 8.2 0.0 0.9 0.0 20.3 100.0 
2001 9.2 23.0 38.2 5.7 0.0 1.2 0.0 22.6 100.0 
2002 7.3 33.9 47.8 2.8 0.9 3.3 0.5 3.6 100.0 
2003 2.9 29.8 40.2 0.3 1.8 1.2 0.4 23.4 100.0 
2004 3.5 30.0 35.0 0.6 1.9 1.1 0.6 27.4 100.0 
2005 2.8 12.9 59.9 1.2 3.0 1.0 2.2 17.1 100.0 
2006 2.2 1.8 63.0 5.3 1.3 0.9 22.4 3.2 100.0 
2007 2.3 1.8 62.4 5.4 1.4 0.8 21.9 3.9 100.0 
2008 3.6 1.2 56.8 15.9 2.5 1.1 13.2 5.8 100.0 
2009 0.6 1.8 15.4 2.4 1.4 0.0 34.0 44.4 100.0 
2010 0.1 0.0 30.6 10.1 1.5 0.4 29.3 28.1 100.0 
2011 1.0 0.5 48.5 17.2 2.9 0.0 5.0 24.8 100.0 
2012 0.6 1.0 71.6 2.1 4.7 0.0 12.1 7.8 100.0 
2013 0.4 0.4 76.9 1.0 2.5 0.0 4.4 14.4 100.0 
2014 0.6 0.5 71.1 5.0 1.9 0.0 13.0 8.0 100.0 
Source: Data compiled from the ASEAN Investment Reports 2011, 2013-2014, and 201522  
3.3 Theoretical Framework 
In this section, we analyse firms’ motivations to invest abroad before moving to 
discuss channels through which FTAs affect FDI flows. With regard to theories 
explaining why firms invest abroad, the well-known eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 
1981), also known as the OLI (Ownership, Location, and Internalisation) 
framework, discusses three conditions for FDI to occur. Firstly, the firm needs 
                                                 
22 https://asean.org/ 
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ownership advantages including both tangible and intangible firm-specific assets 
such as proprietary technology, trademarks, production management, 
organisational and marketing systems, or R&D capacity. Secondly, based on 
location-specific advantages such as input prices, transport and communication 
costs, government intervention, education, and infrastructure, the firm chooses the 
best foreign destination. Thirdly, internalisation advantages of a MNE mean that 
the firm will get more benefits if it internally exploits ownership advantages itself 
rather than licensing them to foreign producers. Blomstrom and Kokko (1997) and 
Globerman (2002) support the view that FDI is driven by the motivation to exploit 
firm-specific intangible assets. Horstmann and Markusen (1987) argue that serving 
foreign markets though horizontal FDI would be preferable to licensing strategy 
because it helps preserve secrecy in terms of firm-specific assets. The proximity-
concentration hypothesis suggests that given greater transport costs, trade barriers, 
lower plant scale economies, and investment barriers, a firm is more likely to 
choose overseas production over exports (Brainard, 1993).  
FDI patterns reflect firms’ motivations for investing abroad. A firm will engage in 
vertical FDI (resource seeking) to take advantage of relatively cheap and abundant 
factors of production across countries, while it may launch horizontal FDI (tariff-
jumping or market seeking) to jump trade barriers such as tariffs, distance, 
transportation, and insurance (Bae & Jang, 2013).  
A number of key factors contribute to how FTAs impact on FDI. Firstly, FTAs have 
different effects on the two patterns of FDI. Firms of an FTA member are likely to 
serve FTA members’ demand through exports and benefit from economies of scale 
rather than through foreign production, due to reduced trade costs following FTAs. 
Thus, FTAs tend to have adverse impacts on horizontal FDI. In contrast, FTAs 
increase vertical FDI as it becomes cheaper for MNEs within the integrated region 
to export intermediate goods to FTA members and import final goods from these 
countries to their home countries. 
Secondly, FTAs’ investment provisions create an FDI-friendly environment (Bae 
& Jang, 2013), which stimulates inward FDI to FTA members. For example, 
following the AFTA, two investment packages including the ASEAN Industrial 
Cooperation and the ASEAN Investment Area were established to encourage both 
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intra- and extra-ASEAN FDI flows (Ismail, Smith, & Kugler, 2009; Te Velde & 
Bezemer, 2006). 
Thirdly, as a result of RTAs, non-members become important sources of increased 
FDI inflows due to two possible reasons. Firstly, possible increases in relative 
protection against firms from non-members result in enhanced FDI from outsiders 
into the whole region (Blomstrom & Kokko, 1997). Secondly, RTAs also generate 
greater market size, making the integrated areas more attractive (Buckley, Clagg, 
Forsans, & Reilly, 2001). Outside investors can launch horizontal FDI in one or 
more FTA members to serve the demand of these countries and use them as 
platforms to export to other locations of the region (Feils & Rahman, 2008; 
Lederman, Maloney, & Serven, 2003; Te Velde & Bezemer, 2006).  
Fourthly, locational advantages of host countries are also channels through which 
FTAs affect FDI. A RTA may not benefit all its members in terms of increased FDI 
flows, depending largely on FDI competition and location-specific advantages 
(Feils & Rahman, 2008, 2011). FTA members with stronger locational advantages 
are more likely to receive FDI inflows from remaining members and outsiders 
(Blomstrom & Kokko, 1997). 
3.4 Previous Studies 
In this section, we review empirical studies examining the relationship between 
FTAs and FDI. We start with studies focusing on multiple FTAs for a group of 
countries before proceeding to summarise case studies, with a focus either on one 
specific FTA or country, followed by a summary of FDI studies on Vietnam. 
In terms of multi-FTA studies for a large number of countries, mixed results of 
FTAs on FDI have been found, with a dominance of positive effects. Yeyati et al. 
(2003) use panel data covering 20 source countries from the OECD and 60 host 
countries during the 1982-1999 period to examine how FTAs impact on the location 
of FDI. Based on a gravity model, they find that FTAs increase FDI stocks between 
members by 27%. Medvedev (2012) accounts for all existing preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) and uses a large panel covering 153 countries over the 1980-
2004 period. His findings show that PTA membership results in a substantial 
increase in net FDI inflows. Using gravity models and panel data from 1980 to 2003, 
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Feils and Rahman (2011) analyse FDI flows from 59 countries into 24 OECD host 
countries. They report that there is an increase in FDI flows among regional 
integrated area members, with greater impacts for larger economies. Thangavelu 
and Narjoko (2014) find that FTAs increase FDI inflows to the ASEAN region 
between 2000 and 2009, based on an extended gravity model. 
In contrast, Lederman et al. (2003) find that the coefficient on free trade area 
dummy has no impact on FDI flows. Ullah and Inaba (2014) analyse FDI flows to 
nine Asian host countries from 23 source countries over the 1995-2010 period. 
Similarly, estimation results of the gravity model suggests that both bilateral 
investment treaties and bilateral trade agreements are not associated with increased 
FDI flows due to existing liberal FDI policies. Dee and Gali (2003) examine effects 
of PTAs on foreign investment over the period from 1988 to 1997 using a gravity 
model. They find evidence of net investment creation in six of the nine PTAs 
examined. One PTA creates negative net investment effects, while the two 
remaining PTAs show no effects. Employing a knowledge capital model, Jang 
(2011) shows that bilateral FTAs have a negative effect on bilateral FDI in intra-
OECD country pairs and a positive effect in extra-OECD country pairs. These 
outcomes are consistent with their hypothesis that there is a dominance of 
horizontal FDI in intra-OECD country pairs and vertical FDI in extra-OECD 
country pairs.  
Case studies, which focus on a specifically well-known FTA, usually report positive 
results, with significant difference in FDI gains among FTA members. For instance, 
the North American FTA (NAFTA) has received a lot of attention, with Waldkirch 
(2003) finding that this agreement is associated with enhanced FDI flows into 
Mexico from the US and Canada. Feils and Rahman (2008) indicate the US and 
Canada are great beneficiaries in terms of inward FDI due to the implementation of 
NAFTA. Based on a fixed-effects gravity model, MacDermott (2007) finds that 
NAFTA increases FDI flows into the US, Canada, and Mexico by 0.96%, 1.54%, 
and 1.73% respectively. Regarding the European Union, Dunning (1997) finds that 
there has been an increase in both intra- and extra-European Community FDI 
following the Internal Market Program (IMP) launched in 1986. Lim (2001) reports 
the Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR) has had a stronger impact on FDI flows 
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in Brazil than in Argentina, with FDI as a percent of GDP rising by 578% and 71% 
respectively. Ismail et al. (2009) use a gravity model and point out that during the 
implementation period of the AFTA from 1995 to 2003, FDI flows among original 
AFTA members were not as much as the bilateral FDI flows from these countries 
to Brunei, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. Li, Scollay, and Gilbert (2017) suggest 
that the ASEAN-China FTA has increased FDI flows to China and ASEAN-6 
countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam) based 
on an extended knowledge capital model. 
There are very few case studies assessing the impact on FDI flows of overall FTAs 
in a specific country. The limited studies include  Crotti et al. (2010) and Bae and 
Jang (2013) for cases of two developed countries, Australia and Korea respectively, 
with inconsistent results. In particular, Crotti et al. (2010) examine FDI flows into 
Australia from 27 source countries using panel data between 1993 and 2003. They 
find that Australia’s bilateral trade agreements are associated with increased FDI 
flows into Australia based on a gravity model. However, with a knowledge-capital 
model, Bae and Jang (2013) find that between 2000 and 2010, while FTAs increase 
Korea’s outward FDI by more than 50%, their effects on Korea’s inward FDI are 
negative due in part to the possible dominance of horizontal FDI over vertical FDI.  
For Vietnam, there have been a variety of studies on Vietnam’s FDI, with many of 
them analysing the role of FDI. For instance, Athukorala and Tran (2012) explore 
the importance of FDI in reaping developmental gains in Vietnam. Le and Pomfret 
(2011) assess the impact on the productivity of Vietnam’s domestic firms of 
technology spillovers through FDI. Anwar and Nguyen (2010) and Vu, Gangnes, 
and Noy (2008) evaluate the impact of FDI on growth in Vietnam. Some studies 
examine the linkage between FDI and trade (Anwar & Nguyen, 2011; Nguyen & 
Xing, 2008; Pham & Nguyen, 2013). Other studies, such as Pham (2002) and Hoang 
and Goujon (2014), assess the drivers of FDI inflows among Vietnamese provinces. 
Xaypanya, Rangkakulnuwat, and Paweenawat (2015) investigate key determinants 
of FDI in Vietnam and other ASEAN countries. However, very few studies account 
for changes in Vietnam’s inward FDI following FTAs. In particular, Nguyen and 
Haughton (2002) examine whether there is an expansion of FDI flows into Vietnam 
as a result of the bilateral trade agreement between Vietnam and the US between 
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1990 and 1999. They find that FDI flows into Vietnam go up by 30% in the first 
year following this agreement. Using the Hausman-Taylor estimator approach for 
the panel data covering Vietnam’s 18 major FDI partners, Hoang, Do, Bui, and 
Dang (2013) find evidence of investment diversion for Vietnam following the 
AFTA and the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA during the 1995-2011 period. 
In contrast, Le (2017) applies the Prais-Winsten panel-corrected standard error 
(PCSE) estimation  to the 1996-2012 panel data for Vietnam’s 25 main partners, 
showing that the ASEAN-Korea FTA and the Japan-Vietnam FTAs are associated 
with increased FDI flows into Vietnam during the period 1996 to 2012. These 
results are mixed and inconsistent, depending on study periods, methodologies used 
and specific FTAs. Therefore, it is imperative to have a study assessing whether 
FTAs have, in general, been efficient in attracting FDI flows to Vietnam.  
In conclusion, there have been a wide range of studies on the link between RTAs 
and FDI, with mixed results. However, there has been a lack of empirical studies 
evaluating the impact of overall FTAs on inward FDI for a particular country, 
especially in the case of developing countries. The current study therefore 
contributes to the existing literature on FDI-FTA linkages in developing countries, 
with a case study of Vietnam. We also examine whether there are any changes in 
foreign investors’ sensitivity to key drivers of FDI following FTAs in Vietnam. 
Furthermore, based on the outcomes for FTAs and other drivers of FDI, we provide 
insights into Vietnam’s patterns of FDI, which are generally ignored in existing 
studies. 
3.5 Model Specification, Data and Methodology 
3.5.1 Model Specification 
In this section, we measure the impact of FTAs on Vietnam’s inward FDI flows 
using a gravity model approach.23 Brenton, Di Mauro, and Lücke (1999) show that 
theoretical models explaining FDI such as OLI framework and others developed by 
Brainard (1997) and Markusen and Venables (2000) consider economic size and 
other country characteristics as important drivers of FDI, which stimulate 
                                                 
23 The gravity model was first adopted by Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963) in trade analysis. 
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applications of gravity models to studies on FDI. The gravity model, which seems 
to fit FDI flows well (Feils & Rahman, 2011; Hejazi & Safarian, 2005), predicts 
that FDI flows between two countries positively depend on the countries’ economic 
sizes and negatively relates to the distance between them. 
Faeth (2009) states that a variety of theoretical models should be combined to 
explain FDI. Consistent with Bevan and Estrin (2004), we extend the basic model 
to account for comparative and locational advantages in Vietnam. A dummy 
variable is also added to the model to account for the impact of FTAs on FDI flows 
(Crotti et al., 2010; Yeyati et al., 2003).  
The extended gravity model for FDI flows is specified as follows: 
ln rFDIivt = α0 + α1 ln GDPvt−1 + α2 ln GDPit−1 + α3 ln DISvi + α4 ln rERvit−1 +
α5 ln rIMPivt−1 + α6 ln DIFFvit−1 + α7 ln INFRAvt−1 + α8HCvt−1 + α9FTAvit +
α10CRISA +α11POLITIvt−1+α12BORvi+εivt            (1) 
where v denotes Vietnam and i is the country partner of Vietnam. The independent 
variables, with the exception of the time invariant and dummy variables,  are lagged 
one-year on the grounds that MNEs may rely on previous information to make 
investment decisions (Bellak, Leibrecht, & Damijan, 2009; Bevan & Estrin, 2004). 
This is also helpful in dealing with the possibility of endogeneity (Ullah & Inaba, 
2014).24 rFDIivt represents real FDI flows from country partner i to Vietnam. GDPvt 
and GDPit represent real GDP of Vietnam and country i, respectively. DISvi is the 
distance between the capital of Vietnam and that of country i. BORvi is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if Vietnam and country i share a common border. 
rERvit is the real exchange rate between the currency of Vietnam (VND) and that of 
country i. Following Feils and Rahman (2008), rIMPivt, which is Vietnam’s real 
bilateral imports from home country i, is a determinant of FDI flows. Factor 
endowments are important determinants of FDI flows (Bae & Jang, 2013; Park & 
Park, 2008; Yeyati et al., 2003). Therefore, DIFFvit, which is the ratio of GDP per 
capita of Vietnam and GDP per capita of country partner i, is defined as a proxy for 
the differences in factor endowments between the two countries (Bae & Jang, 2013). 
                                                 
24 Also see Crotti et al. (2010) and Nguyen and Xing (2008) who use lagged independent variables 
to avoid the problem of endogeneity. 
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INFRAvt-1 denotes a proxy for infrastructure development in Vietnam. HCvt-1 is 
defined as human capital, representing the importance of labor quality in Vietnam. 
It is the percentage of Vietnamese students in Vietnam’s total population. CRISA 
represents the Asian Financial Crisis, taking the value of 1 during the period 1998-
1999 for countries affected. POLITIvt-1 denotes a proxy for governance indicator.  
The World Development Indicators (WDIs) of the World Bank provide six 
governance indicators including control of corruption, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence. A principal component of these six indicators was calculated 
and included in the model, but no impact was observed.  Among these six individual 
indicators, only political stability and absence of violence positively impacts on FDI 
flows into Vietnam. Therefore, it is used as a governance indicator in this study, 
which is in line with Edwards (1990) and Chakrabarti (2001). FTAvit is the key 
variable, getting the value of 1 if Vietnam and country partner i have participated 
into an FTA (date of entry into force), and 0 otherwise. Finally, εivt = αvi+ vvit. While 
αvi denotes the specific country-pair effect that accounts for the unobservable and 
time-invariant characteristics that are specific to each pair of countries, vvit 
represents the error term that is assumed to be log normally distributed. 
3.5.2 Data 
This study employs panel data comprising Vietnam and its 17 country partners over 
the 1997-2016 period. Based on Vietnam’s main FDI partners and the availability 
of the data, the 17 partners selected include Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, China, Japan, Korea, Canada, US, Hong Kong, Taiwan, France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherland, United Kingdom, and Sweden. During the last two decades, from 
1995 to 2016, these 17 partners have accounted for almost 84% of Vietnam’s total 
inward FDI.25  Indeed, in 2016 at the end of the study period, FDI flows into 
Vietnam from these partners contributed 83% of Vietnam’s FDI inflows. 
We also include a sub-period spanning from 2005 to 2016 with Vietnam’s 23 
trading partners due to three reasons. Firstly, AFTA was Vietnam’s first FTA, and 
                                                 
25 Calculated from the database of Vietnam’s General Statistics Office, accessed at www.gso.gov.vn. 
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it took almost ten years before Vietnam had its second FTA (ASEAN-China FTA), 
at the end of 2004. Since then, Vietnam has participated in a variety of FTAs. 
Secondly, Brunei, India, Australia, Denmark, Belgium and Luxembourg have 
become Vietnam’s significant FDI partners in this sub-period and this change in 
partners should be accounted for. Furthermore, the 2005-2016 period has 
experienced dramatic increases in Vietnam’s FDI inflows.  
FDI flows into Vietnam by source countries are obtained from the ASEAN 
Secretariat, while Vietnam’s imports from its partners are collected from the 
General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO). The data are then scaled by the 
consumer price index of the US to generate real values. 
The bilateral real exchange rate data between Vietnam and its partners are not 
directly available. Following Duong, Holmes, Strutt, and Lim (2019), they are 
calculated as follows: 
rERvit = (CPIit/CPIvt) * (nERvt/$ / nERit/$)  
where CPIit, CPIvt are the annual consumer price index of country i and Vietnam at 
year t respectively. nERvt/$ and nERit/$ are the nominal exchange rates, indicating 
the amount of each country’s currency per 1 $US at year t. CPI and nominal 
exchange rate data for Taiwan are from the National Statistics Republic of China 
and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis respectively, whereas the data for others 
are from the World Bank’s WDIs. 
Real GDP and population data are sourced from the WDIs of the World Bank except 
for Taiwan whose data are collected from the IMF. Political stability and absence 
of violence index is from the WDIs, ranging from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) for 
governance performance. Human capital (percentage of Vietnamese students in its 
total population) is from the General Statistical Office of Vietnam. The length of 
railways (a proxy for infrastructure) is from the WDIs. Information on Vietnam’s 
FTAs are from the World Trade Organization, whereas data on distance and border 
are from Centre d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII). 
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3.5.3 Methodology 
As a panel dataset is used, panel estimators, such as ordinary least squares (OLS), 
fixed effects (FE), and random effects (RE) methods can be employed. First, based 
on Wald statistics for groupwise heteroscedasticity, we test whether there is the 
presence of heteroscedasticity across panel data for the whole period and sub-
period. The Wald tests, as reported in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5, reject the null 
hypothesis that the variance of the disturbance term in each model is constant over 
time. To address the issue, the White-adjusted robust standard errors are used. Next, 
we check the serial correlation for the models in the two periods. The Wooldridge 
test suggests that there is no serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error term in the 
sub-period model, while it indicates that autocorrelation exists in the whole period 
model. To deal with the problem of autocorrelation, generalised least squares (GLS) 
should be used (Barreto & Howland, 2005; Wooldridge, 2012). We then utilise the 
Hausman’s specification test (FE vs. RE) and the Breusch and Pagan LM test (OLS 
vs. RE) to determine the preferred estimator for each model. 
In terms of dynamic panel data, the difference generalised method of moments 
(GMM) estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991) and the system GMM estimator 
(Blundell & Bond, 1998) have been increasingly applied to studies on FDI analysis 
(Kahouli & Omri, 2017; Mijiyawa, 2017; Saini & Singhania, 2018; Ullah & Khan, 
2017). However, it is well-known that GMM estimator is efficient for panels with 
small or moderate time points (T) and large cross-section units (N), which is not the 
case for the whole period (T=20>N=17). In this respect, large T may lead to 
inconsistent GMM estimators (Han & Phillips, 2010). In the sub-period, we have 
N>T. However, the GMM technique is still inapplicable because the data do not 
meet the requirements of GMM estimation.26 Therefore, the GMM estimator is not 
an alternative to estimate the panel data in this study.   
                                                 
26 Two conditions need to be met for the application of the GMM (Kahouli & Omri, 2017). First, the differenced 
error term should be serially correlated at the first order, but no autocorrelation at the second order. Second, 
based on Sargan/Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, the instruments and the error term need to be 
uncorrelated. 
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3.6 Empirical Results 
We estimate two separate regressions, allowing us to compare and contrast the 
findings. The first regression includes data for the whole period, whereas the second 
regression is restricted to the more recent data with Vietnam’s additional FDI 
partners included.  
The estimated results for the whole period, from 1997 to 2016, are shown in Table 
3.4 using OLS, FE and RE methods. The LM statistic (643.68) of the Breusch and 
Pagan LM test (RE vs. FE), is significant at 1%, suggesting that RE model is 
superior to the OLS model. In addition, the test statistic (1.22) of the Hausman’s 
specification test (FE vs. RE) indicates that RE model is preferable to FE model. 
We therefore focus on the estimated results based on RE estimation reported in the 
fourth column. We begin with a discussion of the impacts from the control variables 
before focusing on our main variable (FTAs). 
Home country market size positively affects FDI inflows to Vietnam, with an 
elasticity of 0.71. Vietnam’s market size, however, has no significant effects on 
inward FDI. Although this seems to contrast with the literature showing that host 
country market size is a driver of FDI, this finding reflects the fact that source 
country market size is much larger than the size of the Vietnamese market. 
Therefore, overseas investors may not base on Vietnam’s market size to determine 
whether they invest in Vietnam or not.  
The significantly positive estimated elasticity of FDI inflows with respect to the 
real exchange rate between Vietnam and its partners suggests that a depreciation of 
Vietnamese currency contributes to enhanced FDI flows. Foreign investors benefit 
from a weak host country currency as they receive a larger investment (Blonigen, 
2005; Feils & Rahman, 2011). However, inward FDI responds negatively to the 
distance between Vietnam’s capital and its partners’ capitals. Greater geographic 
distance between two countries results in less FDI due to increased costs such as 
transportation, transaction and management costs. Regarding the quality of human 
capital (HC), infrastructure (INFRA) and political stability (POLITI) of Vietnam, 
these are found to be associated with increased FDI flows.  
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With regards to the relationship between trade and FDI, the elasticity of FDI inflows 
with respect to imports by Vietnam from partners is 0.39 and significant at 5%, 
underlining a complementarity between them (Lipsey & Weiss, 1981; Markusen, 
1984). This is partly because MNEs need intermediate inputs and services from 
headquarters in their home countries (De Mello Jr & Fukasaku, 2000). We can 
further infer that vertical FDI seems to dominate FDI flows into Vietnam because 
the increase in imports by Vietnam from partners (or exports from partners to 
Vietnam) does not reduce FDI flows from partners to Vietnam. 
In terms of factor endowments, the DIFFvit-1 coefficient carries a negative sign as 
expected and is significant at the 1% level, with a 1 % increase in DIFFvit-1 
resulting in a 1.06% decrease in Vietnam’s FDI inflows. An increase in the ratio of 
GDP per capita of Vietnam to GDP per capita of country partner i (ln DIFFvit-1) 
indicates a decreased difference in factor endowments between Vietnam and its 
partners. In other words, Vietnam’s factor endowments have become relatively 
more expensive. Therefore, vertical FDI, which has been motivated by cheaper 
factor endowments, tends to decrease. This decrease, in turn, reduces FDI flows to 
Vietnam. This finding also supports the dominance of vertical FDI over horizontal 
FDI flows in Vietnam. This is in agreement with Bae and Jang (2013), who find 
that a smaller gap of GDP per capita between Korea and its developed partners 
decreases FDI flows from these partners into Korea. In contrast, for the dominance 
of horizontal FDI in total FDI, Hattari and Rajan (2008) find that the smaller the 
income divergence between the host and source countries, the larger will be 
bilateral FDI flows between them. 
FTAs, the main focus area of our study, are found to be associated with increased 
FDI flows to Vietnam, on average, of 129% (exp(0.827)-1). This finding is 
consistent with positive impacts of the ASEAN-Korea FTA and the Japan-Vietnam 
FTA on FDI flows in Vietnam (Le, 2017), investment creation in China and 
ASEAN-6 following the ASEAN-China FTA (Li et al., 2017), and significant 
increase in FDI flows to Brunei, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam from original 
ASEAN members as a result of the AFTA (Ismail et al., 2009). Although there is 
evidence of investment diversion of the AFTA and the ASEAN-Australia-New 
Zealand FTA in Vietnam (Hoang et al., 2013), our results show that FTAs, in 
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general, are significantly beneficial to Vietnam in terms of enhanced FDI flows. 
This increase is largely due to the prevalence of vertical FDI. A more friendly-FDI 
environment following FTAs also contributes to the positive change in Vietnam’s 
inward FDI.  
 
Table 3.4: Estimation Results for FDI Inflows to Vietnam, 1997-2016 
 Variables OLS FE RE 
ln GDPvt-1 -0.548 -0.402 -0.063 
  (1.107) (2.447) (0.623) 
ln GDPit-1 0.324*** 1.216 0.705* 
  (0.119) (2.624) (0.421) 
ln DISvi -1.108*** - -1.927*** 
  (0.211) - (0.503) 
ln rERvit-1 0.120*** 0.156* 0.138** 
  (0.043) (0.089) (0.070) 
ln rIMPivt-1 0.807*** 0.340 0.392** 
  (0.111) (0.198) (0.188) 
ln DIFFvit-1 -0.840*** -0.688 -1.062*** 
  (0.148) (2.768) (0.279) 
ln INFRAvt-1 2.471** 2.298*** 2.306*** 
  (1.149) (0.548) (0.566) 
HCvt-1 0.859 0.985* 0.976** 
  (0.840) (0.462) (0.439) 
FTA 0.443** 0.840*** 0.827*** 
  (0.192) (0.258) (0.172) 
CRISA 0.207 0.257 0.238 
  (0.263) (0.245) (0.236) 
POLITIvt-1 1.821* 1.757*** 1.760*** 
  (0.948) (0.515) (0.516) 
BOR -0.712 - -0.716 
  (0.474) - (1.007) 
Constant -9.653 -36.376** -16.781 
  (23.455) (15.000) (13.350) 
Breusch-Pagan LM test   643.68*** 
Hausman test   1.22 
Wald test statistics   240.13*** 
Wooldridge test, F   4.90* 
Number of observations   340 
***, **, *: Significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. White robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. 
Table 3.5 reports the results for the sub-period between 2005 and 2016. We estimate 
the gravity model using OLS, FE, and RE methods. Similarly, both the Breusch-
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Pagan LM test (RE vs. OLS) and the Hausman test (RE vs. FE) suggest that RE 
should be used. As most of Vietnam’s FTAs entered into force in this sub-period, 
we also examine whether foreign investors’ sensitivity to key determinants of FDI 
has changed following FTAs. Therefore, we base on RE (3) and RE (4) for the result 
explanation.  
As shown in Table 3.5, the signs and significance of most of the estimated 
coefficients for the sub-period remain unchanged. However, Vietnam’s market size 
has become an important determinant of FDI. One possible reason is that Vietnam 
has experienced significantly decreased gaps between the GDP of Vietnam and its 
partners since 2005, which may make the market size of Vietnam more important. 
Consistent with the outcome for the whole period, FTAs are also found to stimulate 
FDI flows. As expected, the impact of FTAs is much stronger in this sub-period, 
increasing FDI inflows to Vietnam by 246% (exp(1.240)-1). Therefore, there has 
been a significant role for FTAs in attracting FDI. In addition, in this FTA period, 
the effect of FTAs on FDI flows instead works interactively through DIFF, HC, and 
rER, as shown in (4). 
Regarding the interaction terms FTA*ln rERvit-1, the sub-period has seen FDI and 
the real exchange rate becoming negatively related following FTAs, with a more 
important role of the real exchange rate. The negative sign on the FTA*ln rERvit-1 
suggests that a real exchange rate depreciation leads to a fall in FDI. This outcome 
is opposite to the finding in Table 4 and the general literature as well. However, this 
result may be partly explained by the Vietnamese nominal exchange rate 
(VND/1US$), a component used in calculations of the real exchange rate in this 
study. The nominal exchange rate in Vietnam has experienced substantial 
fluctuations since 2008, with a depreciating trend of the VND against the US dollar 
between 2009 and 2011 (Le et al., 2016), and a variety of adjustments from the 
State Bank of Vietnam, especially in the exchange rate band. In addition, the habit 
of keeping US dollars, either as a hedge against inflation or with expectations of a 
depreciation in VND against US$, leads to an artificial demand for US dollars and 
generates pressures on the nominal exchange rate (State Bank of Vietnam, 2015). 
Although a nominal exchange rate depreciation benefits foreign investors, high 
volatility in the exchange rate may reduce the confidence of overseas investors. As 
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most of the FTAs Vietnam has made coming into force in the period with significant 
fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate, it is understandable that foreign investors, 
especially from FTA partners, may be more cautious and respond negatively to 
changes in the Vietnamese nominal exchange rate and the real exchange rate 
between Vietnam and its partners as well.   
The FTA*HC coefficient is positive and statistically significant at 5 %. The results 
are in line with Yeyati et al. (2003), who interact FTA dummy with human capital 
(proportion of the labour force with complete secondary education) and find the 
positive impact of the interaction on FDI flows. Our finding shows that human 
capital has become more important as a driver of FDI following the FTAs. For 
Samsung, Vietnam has become an attractive alternative to China due to not only 
younger labour force and cheaper labour costs, but improvement of quality of 
labour as well. 
Consistent with Yeyati et al. (2003) and Bae and Jang (2013), we include the 
interaction term between FTA dummy and relative factor endowments, FTA* ln 
DIFFvit-1. If FDI is more likely to be vertical FDI, then we expect the impact of 
the FTAs on FDI flows to be large. The FTA* ln DIFFvit-1 coefficient is 
significantly positive as expected. This finding is in line with Bae and Jang (2013), 
who also find a positive impact from this kind of interaction term on FDI inflows 
to Korea where Korea’s partners have higher GDP per capita than Korea. This result, 
together with the consistent findings for FTAs, trade, and factor endowments in 
both the whole period and sub-period, strongly suggest the prevalence of vertical 
FDI in Vietnam.  
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Table 3.5: Estimation Results for FDI Inflows to Vietnam, 2005-2016  
Variables OLS (1) FE (2) RE (3) RE (4) 
ln GDPvt-1 1.421 1.973 1.482* 1.711
** 
  (1.077) (3.670) (0.766) (0.755) 
ln GDPit-1 0.746*** 3.063 0.873*** 0.833
*** 
  (0.163) (3.071) (0.273) (0.236) 
ln DISvi -2.228*** - -2.462*** -2.693
*** 
  (0.271) - (0.462) (0.483) 
ln rERvit-1 0.028 3.858** 0.066 0.215 
  (0.052) (1.544) (0.123) (0.183) 
ln rIMPivt-1 0.140 0.110 0.120* 0.094 
  (0.089) (0.084) (0.069) (0.060) 
ln DIFFvit-1 -1.548*** 0.851 -1.661*** -1.816
*** 
  (0.292) (2.907) (0.225) (0.205) 
ln INFRAvt-1 2.839** 2.981*** 2.837*** 2.760
*** 
  (1.274) (1.032) (1.036) (1.069) 
HCvt-1 0.772 0.286 0.755 0.221 
  (1.072) (0.798) (0.747) (0.877) 
FTA 1.149*** 1.022** 1.240*** 1.138 
  (0.386) (0.491) (0.467) (0.979) 
POLITIvt-1 2.501 2.422* 2.495* 2.487
* 
  (1.522) (1.353) (1.351) (1.402) 
BOR 0.125  -0.078 -0.068 
  (0.477)  (0.801) (0.663) 
FTA* ln DIFFvit-1    0.419
*** 
     (0.063) 
FTA*HC    1.323
** 
     (0.664) 
FTA*ln rERvit-1    -0.182
* 
    (0.110) 
Constant -52.566* -172.408*** -55.865*** -58.324
*** 
  (26.658) (49.483) (20.297) (19.400) 
Breusch-Pagan LM   101.97*** 102.44
*** 
Hausman test   9.13 6.78 
Wald test statistics   2,195.84*** 2,420.94
*** 
Wooldridge test, F   2.652 2.633 
No. of obser.   276 276 
***, **, *: Significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. White robust standard errors are 
in parentheses.  
 
3.7 Conclusion and Recommendations 
The impact of FTAs on FDI has been ambiguous in the literature to date. Our study 
focuses on Vietnam to provide evidence on the effect of the overall FTAs on FDI 
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flows in a developing country. Panel regression results indicate that the overall 
FTAs have substantially stimulated FDI inflows to Vietnam in the whole period, 
with a much stronger impact in the later sub-period. This indicates that FTAs have 
become efficient drivers of Vietnam’s inward FDI. Therefore, the more Vietnam’s 
involvement in economic integration through FTAs, the more likely it is to induce 
FDI inflows, suggesting the importance of further FTA negotiations. This result, 
along with the outcomes for trade, factor endowments, and the interaction term 
between FTAs and factor endowments, suggests the dominance of vertical FDI in 
Vietnam, which is consistent with the theoretical reasoning indicating that vertical 
FDI is more prevalent in developing countries. 
We also examine whether the FTAs result in any changes in foreign investors’ 
sensitivity to the key determinants of FDI in the sub-period. We find that the real 
exchange rate, human capital, and factor endowments become more important as 
drivers of FDI following the FTAs. These findings have important implications for 
Vietnam’s policy makers. In addition to relatively cheaper labour costs as 
Vietnam’s locational advantages, Vietnam should continue to develop human 
capital. Furthermore, maintaining stability of the exchange rate appears important 
to enhance overseas investors’ confidence. 
As factor endowments are found to be associated with increased FDI inflows into 
Vietnam, future research might explore threshold effects of factor endowments on 
inward FDI in an extended study on the ASEAN, such as ASEAN-6. Given that the 
real exchange rate has a more important role on FDI flows in Vietnam following 
FTAs, another avenue for future research might be to more closely explore the 
linkage between them. Furthermore, this study could not account for Vietnam’s 
involvement in recent mega-FTAs, such as the CPTPP (Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership), RCEP (Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership), and EU-Vietnam FTA, which cover most 
of Vietnam’s main FDI partners. Future research might look at how these FTAs 
impact on Vietnam’s total and sectoral FDI.  
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4 Chapter 4. Trade and Investment Effects of the EU-
Vietnam Free Trade Agreement 
4.1 Introduction 
The suspension of the Doha Development Round negotiations has encouraged 
countries to reap economic gains through regional trade agreements (RTAs) 
(Kutlina-Dimitrova & Lakatos, 2014). Likewise, Vietnam has been actively 
involved in a variety of RTAs, among which the EU-Vietnam free trade agreement 
(EVFTA) is the most ambitious and comprehensive FTA ever concluded between 
the EU and a developing country. This FTA was first negotiated in October 2012 
and signed on 30 June, 2019. This is the EU’s second FTA with an ASEAN member 
after Singapore, making further contributions towards the goal of a potential EU-
ASEAN FTA.  
The EU plays a critical role in Vietnam’s trade. For instance, in 2018, the EU was 
Vietnam’s second largest export destination after the US and the fifth largest import 
partner, with trade between Vietnam and the EU accounting for 12.0% of Vietnam’s 
total trade. The magnitude of trade complementary between the two regions is 
relatively high (Baker, Vanzetti, & Pham, 2014).  Vietnam tends to export relatively 
labour-intensive products to the EU, whereas the EU’s main exports to Vietnam are 
more likely to be high-tech products. Thus, the agreement is expected to benefit 
trade between the two sides. 
The EU is a significant investor in ASEAN, but the EU investment varies 
significantly among ASEAN member states. Over the period from 2000 to 2017, 
Singapore received 71.4% of total EU investment to ASEAN, followed by Malaysia 
(9.5%), and Indonesia (5.9%), while the rest of ASEAN shared the remaining 
13.2%, with Vietnam receiving only 4.1%.27  Given that the EU investment in 
Vietnam is still small in comparison with some ASEAN members, liberalisation 
under the EVFTA is expected to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) from 
the EU to Vietnam. Therefore, there is still great potential for enhanced FDI inflows 
to Vietnam from the EU and trade development between the two regions. Thus, it 
                                                 
27Authors’ calculations based on the ASEAN FDI database, accessed at https://data.aseanstats.org/ 
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is of interest to examine changes in both Vietnamese trade and investment 
following the EVFTA. 
The EVFTA is ambitious and comprehensive, but existing studies on this agreement 
have not modelled liberalisation of FDI barriers following this agreement (Baker & 
Vanzetti, 2019; European Commission, 2018b; Kikuchi, Yanagida, & Vo, 2018). 
Furthermore, these studies do not analyse how investment in Vietnam changes as a 
result of this agreement. Thus, the goal of this paper is to explore the impact of the 
EVFTA using a CGE modelling framework, with a focus on Vietnamese trade and 
investment. Both trade and investment liberalisation under this agreement are 
modelled through reductions in tariffs, non-tariff measures (NTMs) to both goods 
and services trade, improved trade facilitation, and reduced barriers to FDI.  
The remaining paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 briefly summarises the 
existing literature. Section 4.3 describes trade and investment between Vietnam and 
the EU. Section 4.4 presents the modelling framework and policy scenarios. Our 
simulated results are presented in Section 4.5, with Section 4.6 noting our 
conclusions. 
4.2 Previous Studies 
The EU has concluded a variety of bilateral FTAs with both developed and 
developing countries. Many of them are based on tariff elimination and have been 
found to stimulate trade between the EU and EU’ developing FTA partners such as 
the EU-Chile FTA (Jean, Mulder, & Ramos, 2014; Nowak-Lehmann, Herzer, & 
Vollmer, 2007), the EU-Ukraine FTA (Frey & Olekseyuk-Viber, 2011), and the 
EU-Mexico FTA (Slootmaekers, 2004).    
With regard to deep and comprehensive FTAs, the EU-Korea FTA, which came 
into effect in 2011, is the first agreement ever concluded between the EU and a 
partner (Lakatos & Nilsson, 2017). To assess the economic impact of this FTA, 
Decreux, Milner, and Péridy (2010) use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model called MIRAGE (Modelling International Relationships in Applied General 
Equilibrium) in which tariffs, goods, and services NTMs are modelled. They find 
that relative to the baseline assuming no conclusion to the Doha Round, Korea’s 
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GDP goes up by 0.84%, compared with 0.07% for the EU. In addition, EU’s exports 
to Korea grow by 82.6%, whereas exports from Korea to the EU rise by 38.39%. 
Based on a dynamic general equilibrium model, Kutlina-Dimitrova and Lakatos 
(2014) examine the economic impacts of the EU-Singapore FTA which was 
concluded in December 2012. Their simulation results indicate that as a result of 
reductions in tariffs and NTMs, Singapore’s GDP increases by 0.94% (2.7 € billion), 
while EU’s GDP grows marginally (0.00%), with a gain of 550 € million. 
Furthermore, EU’s exports to Singapore and Singapore’s exports to the EU are 
expected to increase by 1.4 € billion and 3.5 € billion respectively. 
Like the EU-South Korea and EU-Singapore FTAs, the EVFTA is one of a new 
generation of FTAs. However, studies on this agreement are still limited. In 
particular, before the EVFTA was concluded,  Philip et al. (2011) and Baker et al. 
(2014) focus on analysing the potential impacts of tariff reductions under this 
agreement using CGE models. Philip et al. (2011) find that in the case of rapid tariff 
dismantling, the FTA would increase Vietnam’s annual GDP and aggregate imports 
by around 2.7% and 1.8% respectively. In addition, they indicate that the impacts 
of the EVFTA on Vietnam’s investment vary significantly depending on the 
scenarios, with the largest increase up to 3.4% by 2020. The simulation results by 
Baker et al. (2014) indicate that Vietnam’s GDP would increase by 7-8% relative 
to the 2025 baseline following this FTA. In addition, Vietnam’s exports to the EU 
increase by around 50%, while its imports from the EU go up by 43% relative to 
the 2020 baseline.  
Recent studies on the EVFTA include Duong (2016), Vu (2016), Kikuchi et al. 
(2018), European Commission (2018b), and Baker and Vanzetti (2019). In 
particular, based on a gravity model and panel data covering Vietnam and 27 EU 
member states over the 1997-2013 period, Duong (2016) reports that tariff cuts 
under the EVFTA lead to an expansion in the bilateral trade between Vietnam and 
the EU. With a partial equilibrium model, namely SMART (Software for Market 
Analysis and Restrictions on Trade) model, Vu (2016) examines the ex-ante impact 
of the EVFTA on Vietnamese imports of pharmaceutical products from the EU. She 
finds that as a result of tariff elimination, Vietnam’s pharmaceutical imports from 
the EU would not experience a significant increase (around 3%). Employing a static 
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global CGE model, Kikuchi et al. (2018) compare economic impacts of different 
mega-RTAs on Vietnam. Policy scenarios include tariff removals, reductions in 
goods and services NTMs, and spill-over to non-member countries for goods.  They 
find that the EVFTA would expand Vietnam’s GDP by 8.1%, which is larger than 
the CPTPP (6.5%), but smaller than RCEP (9.2%) and TPP (13.2%). In addition, at 
the sectoral level, they find that exports of a variety of Vietnamese agricultural 
sectors decline following these FTAs. The European Commission (2018b) uses a 
dynamic GTAP model to explore the economic impacts of the EVFTA. In addition 
to tariffs, trade facilitation, goods and services NTMs are modelled. The economic 
impacts on trade, public procurement, and global value chain integration are 
analysed. For instance, by 2035, exports from the EU to Vietnam and Vietnam to 
the EU grow by 29% and 18% respectively. Baker and Vanzetti (2019) use a 
recursive dynamic CGE model to explore the impact of the EVFTA on the United 
Kingdom (UK) economy. They model reductions in tariffs and NTMs following 
this agreement and find that real GDP and real wages in the UK grow slightly by 
0.01% and 0.03% respectively, while those of Vietnam rise by 1.20% and 3-4% by 
2030. In addition, UK’s exports to Vietnam rise by 60% and its imports from 
Vietnam (Vietnam’s exports to the UK) rise by 33% by 2030. In contrast, UK’s 
total exports and imports increase slightly by 0.09% and 0.01% respectively, 
compared with 2.14% and 1.59% in Vietnam. Among the sectors modelled, they 
show that both UK and EU27 exports to Vietnam rise significantly in services 
sectors. With respect to sectoral output, output of the leather and wearing apparel 
sectors in the UK and EU decline, but expands in Vietnam. 
With the exception of Philip et al. (2011), none of the existing studies on the 
EVFTA analyses changes in investment following this agreement. Although Philip 
et al. (2011) provide some estimates on Vietnam’s investment as a result of the 
EVFTA, they only analyse the impacts of tariff elimination. Moreover, reductions 
in FDI barriers have not yet been modelled in existing studies on the EVFTA. This 
study aims at analysing the impact of the EVFTA on Vietnam, focusing on 
Vietnamese trade and investment. This is the first study on the EVFTA which 
models both trade and investment liberalisation and examines changes in 
Vietnamese capital stocks in addition to changes in Vietnamese trade. 
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4.3 Trade and Investment between the EU and Vietnam 
4.3.1 Vietnam’s Trade with the EU 
The EU, along with China, Japan, and the US have traditionally been key trading 
partners of ASEAN. In 2017, the EU was ASEAN’s second largest export 
destination after China, while it was ASEAN’s third largest import partner after 
China and Japan (ASEAN Secretariat, 2018).  
Like other ASEAN members, the EU has been Vietnam’s main trading partner in 
terms of exports and imports of goods. Figure 4.1 indicates Vietnam’s exports to 
the EU in the 2000-2018 period. The shares of Vietnam’s exports to the EU in its 
total exports, which are shown in the line chart of this figure, are quite stable, 
ranging between 16.2% and 21.1%. In 2018, the EU was Vietnam’s second largest 
export market, accounting for 17.8% of Vietnam’s total exports after the US 
(19.7%), followed by China (17.3%), ASEAN (10.3%), and Japan (7.9%).28 The 
bar chart of Figure 4.1 points out that exports from Vietnam to the EU have 
substantially increased over the last two decades except for in 2009, due to the 
Global Financial Crisis. In 2018, Vietnam’s exports to the EU reached 42.4 billion 
US$, which was approximately14 times larger than it was in 2000. 
Figure 4.1: Vietnam's Exports to the EU (billion US$ and %) 
  
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF (2019) 
                                                 
28 Calculated from IMF data, Direction of Trade Statistics, accessed at https://data.imf.org/ 
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Figure 4.2 shows Vietnam’s imports from the EU between 2000 and 2018. As can 
be seen in the bars of this figure, there was a rapid expansion in Vietnam’s imports 
from the EU, increasing from 1.4 billion US$ in 2000 to 13.8 billion US$ in 2018, 
with an average import growth of 14.6% for this period. The line in this figure 
indicates that shares of Vietnam’s imports from the EU in its total imports had a 
stronger downward trend than those of its exports. Nevertheless, in 2018, the EU 
was still among Vietnam’s top five import partners, constituting 6.0% of Vietnam’s 
total imports, while China, South Korea, ASEAN, and Japan accounted for 28.3%, 
20.6%, 13.8%, and 8.3% respectively.29 
Figure 4.2: Vietnam's Imports from the EU (billion US$ and %) 
 
 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF (2019) 
The main products traded between Vietnam and the EU are presented in Table 4.1. 
They accounted for 84% of Vietnam’s total exports to the EU and 73.1% of 
Vietnam’s total imports from the EU in 2017.30 As shown in this table, there have 
been significant changes in the composition of Vietnam’s main export commodities 
to the EU. In particular, in 2005, Vietnam’s exports of footwear represented 32% 
of Vietnam’s total exports to the EU, followed by apparel and clothing accessories 
(14.7%), furniture (8.6%), coffee (7.1%), and fish (6.5%). Although these products 
remained among Vietnam’s top ten export products to the EU in 2017, they 
contributed much smaller shares than in 2005. Instead, electrical machinery and 
                                                 
29 Calculated from IMF data, Direction of Trade Statistics, accessed at https://data.imf.org/ 
30 Authors’ calculations based on the ASEAN Statistics Database, accessed at 
https://data.aseanstats.org/ 
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appliances accounted for 39.8% of Vietnam’s total exports to the EU in 2017, 
compared with 1.6% in 2005. With respect to imports, Vietnam has mainly 
imported electrical machinery and appliances, nuclear reactors and boilers, 
pharmaceutical products, optical and photographical instruments, and transport 
equipment. The five main import products accounted for around 61% of Vietnam’s 
total imports from the EU in both 2005 and 2017. Although electrical machinery 
and appliances are both Vietnam’s key export and import products with the EU, 
Vietnam’s exports of these products are much greater than its imports in dollar 
terms. The key trade products suggest that trade between Vietnam and the EU is 
likely to be complementary.
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Table 4.1: Vietnam's Top 10 Trade Products with the EU (million US$ and %), 2005 and 2017 
 
Export products (Vietnam to the EU), 2005 
Mil. 
US$ 
% 
Total 
Export products, 2017 
Mil. 
US$ 
% 
Total 
1 Footwear; gaiters and the like; parts of such articles 1,394 32.0 Electrical machinery and appliances 15,260 39.8 
2 Apparel and clothing accessories; not knitted or crocheted 474 10.9 Footwear, gaiters and the like, etc 4,785 12.5 
3 Furniture, furnishings, lighting, signs, etc 376 8.6 Nuclear reactors, and boilers, etc 2,821 7.4 
4 Coffee, tea, mate and spices 308 7.1 Apparel (not knitted or crocheted), etc 2,603 6.8 
5 Fish, crustaceans, and molluscs, etc 284 6.5 Coffee, tea, mate and spices 1,573 4.1 
6 Apparel and clothing accessories; knitted or crocheted 166 3.8 Apparel (knitted or crocheted), etc 1,142 3.0 
7 Leather, saddlery, travel goods, and animal gut 143 3.3 Furniture, furnishings, and signs, etc 1,103 2.9 
8 Nuclear reactors, boilers, and machinery, etc 119 2.7 Edible fruit and nuts, etc 1,062 2.8 
9 Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons 94 2.2 Fish, crustaceans, and molluscs, etc 941 2.5 
10  Ceramic products 89 2.0 Leather, saddlery, and travel goods, etc 899 2.3 
 Import products (EU to Vietnam), 2005 
Mil. 
US$ 
% 
Total 
Import products, 2017 
Mil. 
US$ 
% 
Total 
1 Nuclear reactors, boilers, and machinery, etc 535 21.5 Electrical machinery and appliances 2,316 19.1 
2 Electrical machinery and appliances 380 15.3 Nuclear reactors and boilers, etc 2,135 17.6 
3 Transport equipment 357 14.4 Pharmaceutical products 1,705 14.1 
4 Pharmaceutical products 151 6.1 Optical instruments, etc 688 5.7 
5 Live animals; animal product 99 4.0 Transport equipment 507 4.2 
6 Optical and photographic instruments, etc 81 3.2 Plastics and articles thereof 378 3.1 
7 Plastics and articles thereof 68 2.7 Chemical products n.e.c. 341 2.8 
8 Chemical products n.e.c. 68 2.7 Raw hides and skins and leather 303 2.5 
9 Iron and steel 55 2.2 Organic chemicals 251 2.1 
10 Organic chemicals 47 1.9 Live animals; animal product 246 2.0 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat (2019) 
Note: % Total is defined as share in Vietnam’s exports (imports) to (from) the EU
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Services trade between the EU and Vietnam is still limited (UNCTAD, 2019). 
Indeed, Vietnam’s trade in services accounted for only 10% of Vietnam’s total trade 
over the period from 2005 to 2014 and decreased to 7.5% and 6.6% in 2015 and 
2017 respectively. 31  Among the services sectors, travel and transport together 
accounted for 82.6% of Vietnam’s total services trade in 2017.32 
4.3.2 EU’s Investment in Vietnam 
The EU was ASEAN’s largest foreign investor during the last decade, accounting 
for 18.5% of total FDI inflows to ASEAN, followed by intra-ASEAN (18.1%), the 
US (12.4%), Japan (11.8%), China (6.1%), and South Korea (3.6%) (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2018). The EU is also Vietnam’s important investor. Figure 4.3 
indicates FDI inflows to Vietnam by source country in the 2000-2017 period. The 
EU was Vietnam’s fourth largest investor, accounting for one-tenth of Vietnam’s 
total inward FDI, after Korea (19.0%), intra-ASEAN (17.0%), and Japan (15.6%). 
Other significant investors in Vietnam include Taiwan, Hong Kong, the US, and 
China. 
Figure 4.3: FDI Flows to Vietnam by Source Country (%), 2000-2017 
 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat (2019) 
                                                 
31 Authors’ calculations based on the database of UNCTAD, accessed at 
https://unctadstat.unctad.org/ 
32 Authors’ calculations based on the database of ASEAN Secretariat, accessed at 
https://www.aseanstats.org/ 
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Regarding FDI to Vietnam from the EU member states, Table 4.2 shows 
accumulation of projects with total registered capital of the ten largest EU investors 
in Vietnam as of December 2017. These countries accounted for 6.8% of Vietnam’s 
total registered capital, with Netherlands contributing the most (2.6%). Most of the 
projects and registered FDI from the EU are associated with those from Netherlands, 
United Kingdom, France, Luxembourg, and Germany. In 2017, Netherlands, 
Germany, and United Kingdom together accounted for 83% of the EU investment 
in Vietnam, with more than a half from Netherlands.33 The European Commission 
(2018a) states that as of 2017, industrial processing and manufacturing sectors 
accounted for 35% of EU’s total investment stock in Vietnam. 
Table 4.2: Accumulation of Projects by Top 10 EU Member States as of 31/12/2017 
Country No. of projects Registered capital (Mil. US$) Share* (%) 
Netherlands 306 8177.1 2.6 
United Kingdom 318 3464.7 1.1 
France 513 2786.6 0.9 
Luxembourg 45 2336.6 0.7 
Germany 293 1759.5 0.6 
Cyprus 17 975.4 0.3 
Belgium 63 914 0.3 
Denmark 130 883.4 0.3 
Italy 87 388.7 0.1 
Slovakia 10 197.3 0.1 
Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2018)  
Note: * is defined as percentage of Vietnam’s total registered capital 
4.4 Modelling Framework and Scenarios 
4.4.1 Model and Database 
The current paper uses the global trade analysis project (GTAP) model (Hertel, 
1997) to analyse the impact of the EVFTA on Vietnam, with a focus on trade and 
investment. This type of model is ideal for analysing FTAs as changes in a policy 
component may result in both domestically and globally economic impacts. In order 
to examine the change in capital stock, we use a long-run closure (Francois, 
McDonald, & Nordstrom, 1996; Walmsley, 1998). A rise in income leads to 
                                                 
33 Authors’ calculations based on the ASEAN Statistics Database, accessed at 
https://data.aseanstats.org/ 
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increases in both savings and investment, with the rise in savings being 
proportionate to additional income (Kawasaki, 2015).   
In this study, we use the GTAP version 10 database (Aguiar, Chepeliev, Corong, 
McDougall, & van der Mensbrugghe, 2019), which contains 141 countries/regions 
and 65 sectors, with a base year of 2014. Existing trade agreements to 2014 are 
included in the GTAP database used and we note that the EVFTA is the first FTA 
that both Vietnam and the EU are members of. For the purpose of our analysis, the 
regions have been aggregated into 26 regions (Appendix, Table 4.10). In addition 
to modelling Vietnam’s key trading partners, we model 17 regions within the EU 
so that the bilateral trade flows between Vietnam and its important trading partners 
in the EU are accounted for. In terms of the sectoral aggregation, in order to be able 
to focus on key trade products between Vietnam and the EU, we aggregate the 65 
GTAP sectors into 22 sectors, as shown in Appendix, Table 4.11. 
4.4.2 Scenarios 
Trade in goods and services, trade facilitation, and investment liberalisation are 
included in the text of the EVFTA. Therefore, we take into account these factors in 
our policy scenarios. 
Table 4.3 briefly summarises two scenarios simulated in the current study. Each 
scenario includes five components, with Scenario 2 assuming a greater 
liberalisation in NTMs, trade facilitation and FDI barriers.34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34  Although the EVFTA is already signed, there remains uncertainty about exactly how much 
liberalisation will be achieved under these aspects of the agreement. Therefore, it is appropriate to 
model a range of outcomes. 
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Table 4.3: Policy Scenarios 
Policy components Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Tariff cuts 99% cut on all goods by Vietnam 
and the EU 
99% cut on all goods by Vietnam and 
the EU 
Goods NTMs A symmetric reduction (for 
Vietnam and the EU) of 10% 
A symmetric reduction (for Vietnam and 
the EU) of 20% 
Services NTMs 
 
Vietnam: 
- Business, finance, 
communication, and transport: 
10% cut 
- Other services: 3% cut 
EU: 3% cut in all services 
Vietnam: 
- Business, finance, communication, and 
transport: 20% cut 
- Other services: 3% cut 
EU: 3% cut in all services 
Trade facilitation 
(only Vietnam) 
7.5% cut in time to import by 
Vietnam 
15% cut in time to import by Vietnam 
FDI barriers (Only 
Vietnam) 
- Food products, beverages, 
chemicals, plastics products, 
textiles, and apparel: 50% cut  
- Other manufacturing sectors: 
25% cut  
- Services sectors: 25% cut 
- Food products, beverages, chemicals, 
plastics products, textiles, and apparel: 
75% cut  
- Other manufacturing sectors: 50% cut  
- Services sectors: 50% cut  
 
4.4.2.1 Tariffs 
A key goal of FTAs is to reduce trade barriers among members. Tariffs and quotas, 
the most basic forms of trade barriers, will be largely eliminated as a result of the 
EVFTA. In particular, 99% of tariffs will be eliminated (Delegation of the European 
Union to Vietnam, 2019), with the exception of a few minor products retaining 
partial liberalisation through tariff rate quotas (TRQs). The EU will apply zero-duty 
TRQs on some sensitive agricultural products imported from Vietnam including 
birds’ egg and egg yolks, garlic, sweetcorn, rice, cassava starch, tuna, surimi, and 
speciality sugar.35 Specially, among these products, up to 80 thousand metric tonnes 
of Vietnamese rice (husked rice and milled rice) are allowed to be imported into the 
EU duty-free. Indeed, in the fourth quarter of 2018, Cambodia and Thailand 
accounted for 37% and 27% respectively of EU’s rice imports, while Vietnam made 
up only 2% (European Commission, 2019), a modest figure for the third largest rice 
exporter in the world. The agreement, therefore, is expected to bring large benefits 
to the Vietnamese rice. In Vietnam, TRQs are imposed on imports of eggs, sugar, 
                                                 
35 See Annex 2-A “Reduction or elimination of customs duties”, accessed at 
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157340.pdf and Appendix 2-A-1 
“Tariff schedule of the European Union” of the EVFTA, accessed at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437 
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tobacco, and salt from the EU.36 These products with partial liberalisation agreed 
by the EU and Vietnam comprise a small number of tariff lines and are not key 
export products of the two regions.37 Therefore, we make an ambitious assumption 
on tariff cuts that both the EU and Vietnam reduce tariffs by 99% on all 
commodities in both scenarios. 
Table 4.4 reports tariff rates imposed by Vietnam and the EU on imports from the 
EU and Vietnam respectively. Processed food and labour-intensive products from 
the EU, on average, face quite high tariff rates of 12.31% and 11.38% respectively 
in Vietnam, compared with 6.97% and 7.67% faced by the Vietnamese counterparts 
in the EU. In addition, the EU imposes relatively minimal import tariff rates on 
agriculture (0.60%), extraction (0.61%), and other manufactures (0.13%) from 
Vietnam. In contrast, the EU still faces relatively high tariff rates of 2.57%, 4.66%, 
and 4.11% respectively in Vietnam. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 See Appendix 2-A-2 “Tariff schedule of Vietnam” of the EVFTA, accessed at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437 
37See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/august/tradoc_153674.pdf  and 
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/june/tradoc_154622.pdf 
 93 
Table 4.4: Tariff Rates Imposed by Vietnam and the EU (%) 
Sector Tariffs imposed by Vietnam Tariffs imposed by the EU 
Agriculture 2.57 0.60 
    Rice 24.87 20.39 
    Fishing 8.76 3.60 
    OthAgri 2.06 0.06 
    Livestock 2.54 2.88 
Processed food 12.31 6.97 
    MeatProds 13.72 7.09 
    FoodBever 12.24 6.96 
Extraction 4.66 0.61 
Labor-intensive manufactures 11.38 7.67 
    Textiles 10.59 5.31 
    AppaLeath 11.95 7.83 
Other manufactures 4.11 0.13 
    Wood 0.56 0.14 
    Chemicals 3.22 1.00 
    Metals 3.99 0.47 
    ElecEquip 1.09 0.02 
    Machinery 3.03 0.01 
    TransEquip 9.32 1.42 
    OthManufac 6.48 0.05 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the GTAP 10 database 
4.4.2.2 Non-tariff Measures 
Given that many tariffs have been reduced, trade barriers in the form of NTMs have 
become increasingly important. NTMs are classified into technical measures and 
non-technical measures. The former comprises technical barriers to trade (TBT), 
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, while the latter includes contingent 
trade measures, quantitative restrictions, price controls, exports restrictions, finance 
measures, and behind-the-border measures (UNCTAD, 2015). 
Goods NTMs 
In terms of goods NTMs, technical NTMs are modelled in this study as the EVFTA 
has two separate chapters on TBT and SPS.38 The UNCTAD (2015) indicates that 
SPS measures deal with restricting specific substances, ensuring food safety, 
preventing the spread of disease or pests as well as conformity assessment 
                                                 
38 See Chapter 5 on Technical Barriers to Trade and Chapter 6 on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures of the EVFTA, assessed at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437 
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procedures relating to food safety such as certification and testing. In addition, 
technical measures refer to those largely dealing with labelling requirements and 
conformity assessment procedures involving technical requirements such as 
certification and testing (UNCTAD, 2015).  
It is noted that assumptions of reductions in goods NTMs following FTAs range 
between 20% and 50% in much of the current literature. It is very difficult to assess 
the precise magnitude to which goods NTMs will be reduced as a result of the 
EVFTA. Therefore, from a conservative perspective, we assume symmetric 
reductions in goods NTMs for the two regions of 20% for the ambitious scenario 
and 10% for the conservative scenario.   
Data on ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of good NTMs at the GTAP sectoral level 
are sourced from the World Bank (2019), which are based on the estimation method 
of Kee and Nicita (2016) developed from their previous work (Kee, Nicita, & 
Olarreaga, 2009). AVEs of goods NTMs for the sectors modelled are presented in 
Appendix, Table 4.12.  
Services NTMs 
The text of the EVFTA shows that EU firms would have significantly increased 
access to a variety of services sectors in Vietnam, including business services, 
financial services, communication, and transportation services.39 In contrast, the 
agreement indicates much smaller liberalisation of the EU services sectors. 
In terms of reductions in services NTMs, studies analysing the recent bilateral FTAs 
between the EU and partners show conservative views. In particular, Kutlina-
Dimitrova and Lakatos (2014) assume that both the EU and Singapore reduce 
services NTMs by 3% due to the EU-Singapore FTA. Decreux et al. (2010) assume 
a 10% cut by only Korea in services NTMs for telecommunication, financial, and 
business services as a result of the EU-Korea FTA. Following Kutlina-Dimitrova 
and Lakatos (2014), in this paper we assume the EU reduces services NTMs by 3% 
in all services sectors. As Vietnam has committed to large reductions in finance, 
                                                 
39 See Annex 8-B “Vietnam’s Schedule of Specific Commitments” of Chapter 8 “Liberalisation of 
Investment, Trade in Services and Electronic Commerce” in the EVFTA, accessed at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437 
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business, communication, and transport, we start with a 10% cut by Vietnam in 
these four services sectors in the conservative scenario (Scenario 1) and 20% in the 
ambitious scenario (Scenario 2). For other services sectors, we assume that Vietnam 
reduces services NTMs by 3% in both scenarios. 
We use the latest available estimates of AVEs of services NTMs by Fontagné, 
Mitaritonna, and Signoret (2016) (Appendix, Table 4.13). Their estimated sectors 
include communication, construction, insurance, business services, financial 
services, government service, trade and transport, which are consistent with the 
GTAP 10 database. 
4.4.2.3 Trade Facilitation 
The World Trade Organisation (2019) defines trade facilitation as the simplification, 
modernisation, and harmonisation of export and import processes, reducing 
unnecessarily bureaucratic delays in cross-border trade in goods. Following 
Walmsley, Strutt, Minor, and Rae (2018), we estimate improvement in trade 
facilitation through a 7.5% and a 15% cut in time to import for Vietnam in Scenario 
1 and Scenario 2 respectively. We do not model the impact of this policy component 
for the EU member states because their time to trade is already very small 
(Appendix, Table 4.14).  
The World Bank Doing Business (2019) reports data on trading across borders, with 
the number of days delay in both good exports and imports for 175 countries due to 
border compliance and documentary compliance. Hummels, Minor, Reisman, and 
Endean (2007) estimate tariff equivalents of one day waiting for exports and 
imports. Based on the estimates by Hummels et al. (2007), Minor and Hummels 
(2013) create a global database which includes ad valorem of per day time cost in 
trade for use in CGE models, making it possible for the inclusion of trade 
facilitation in CGE modelling framework. Combining these estimates with the 
trading across borders data from the World Bank Doing Business (2019), we then 
convert the days of delay in imports to tariff equivalents for the sectors modelled 
for Vietnam.  
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4.4.2.4 Investment Liberalisation 
Vietnam’s investment liberalisation described in the EVFTA mainly focuses on 
manufacturing sectors.  Following this agreement, the EU investors will benefit 
from substantially increased access to a wide range of Vietnam’s key manufacturing 
sectors including food products and beverages, chemicals (other than explosives), 
rubber and plastics products, textiles, and apparel.40 In this study, reductions in FDI 
barriers are not modelled for the EU as Vietnam’s investment in the EU has been 
minimal. In particular,  as of 31 December 2017, Germany was the main destination 
of Vietnam’s direct investment in the EU, followed by the UK, with Vietnam’s total 
registered capital of 105.3 million US$ and 11.1 million US$ in Germany and the 
UK respectively (General Statistics Office of Vietnam, 2018). We assume that 
Vietnam liberalises FDI barriers in the key sectors by 50% and other manufacturing 
sectors and services sectors by 25% in the conservative scenario (Scenario 1). In 
the more ambitious scenario (Scenario 2), the reductions are assumed up to 75% 
and 50% respectively.41  
4.5 Simulated Results of the EVFTA 
This section begins with a representation of macroeconomic gains following the 
EVFTA in terms of real GDP, investment, and aggregate exports and imports. Then, 
the sectoral effects of this agreement are depicted. 
4.5.1 Macroeconomic Impacts 
4.5.1.1 Real GDP 
The simulation results indicate that in percentage terms, there are almost no changes 
in the EU’s real GDP, whereas Vietnam’s real GDP increases by 1.54% in Scenario 
                                                 
40 See Annex 8-B: Vietnam’s Schedule of Specific Commitments, Chapter 8 on Liberalisation of 
Investment, Trade in Services and Electronic Commerce, assessed at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437 
 
41 Reductions in FDI barriers are implemented as tax on capital by sector. However, this policy 
instrument has marginal (negligible) economic impacts on Vietnam in both scenarios. We, 
therefore, do not present the results of this component. Full details of investment modelling and a 
literature review on modelling FDI liberalisation are provided in Chapter 5 of this thesis, as this 
modelling is much more important in the case of RCEP. 
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1 and 1.98% in Scenario 2. Figure 4.4 decomposes the changes in Vietnam’s real 
GDP by policy components. The GDP gains in Scenario 1 are largely attributable 
to tariff elimination, which results in an increase of 1.15%, followed by good NTMs 
and trade facilitation (0.30%)42, and services NTMs (0.09%). In Scenario 2, cuts to 
goods and services NTMs, trade facilitation, and FDI barriers are greater, but tariff 
elimination continues to dominate the results. 
Figure 4.4: Changes in Vietnam's Real GDP Due to Liberalising Components of 
the EVFTA (%) 
Source: Authors’ model results 
4.5.1.2 Investment Effects 
This section begins with an analysis of the change in Vietnam’s long-run capital 
stock. This is followed by the change in the current rate of return, rental price of 
capital, and price of capital goods in both the short- and long-run. Following the 
EVFTA, Vietnam receives considerable gains in the long-run capital stock, whereas 
the capital changes for the EU member states are close to 0%. In particular, 
Vietnam’s long-run capital stock rises by 2.93% in Scenario 1 and 3.57% in 
Scenario 2. Figure 4.5 presents changes in Vietnam’s long-run capital stock by 
liberalising components as a result of this agreement. All the policy components 
have positive impacts on Vietnam’s capital growth, but the magnitude of their 
contributions vary significantly. Most of these gains are from tariff elimination, 
                                                 
42 Goods NTMs contribute 0.23%. 
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which increases Vietnam’s long-run capital stock by 2.39% in Scenario 1, followed 
by goods NTMs and trade facilitation (0.46%)43, and services NTMs (0.08%). With 
larger cuts to goods NTMs & trade facilitation and services NTMs in Scenario 2, 
their contributions to Vietnam’s capital growth increase to 0.94%44 and 0.14% 
respectively. However, tariff removal continues to dominate the results (2.49%).  
Figure 4.5: Changes in Vietnam's Capital Stock due to Liberalising Components of 
the EVFTA (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ model results 
The significant increases in Vietnam’s long-run capital stock relate to the short-run 
current rate of return, which is specified as follows (Hertel, 1997):  
rorc(r) = GRNETRATIO(r) × [rental(r) − pcgds(r)]                                           (1)                                 
In which r is a particular region; GRNETRATIO is the ratio of GROSS/NET rates 
of return on capital; rorc is the current rate of return; pcgds is the price of capital 
goods; rental is the rental price of capital. 
Equation (1) indicates that the change in the current rate of return positively 
depends on the change in the rental price of capital and negatively relates to the 
change in the price of capital goods. Table 4.5 provides changes in Vietnam’s 
current rates of return, rental prices of capital, and prices of capital goods in the 
short-run for both Scenarios 1 and 2. It is notable that as a result of the EVFTA, 
                                                 
43 Goods NTMs contribute 0.40% 
44 Goods NTMs contribute 0.84% 
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Vietnam’s prices of capital goods rise by 0.39% in Scenario 1 and 0.47% in 
Scenario 2. Changes in the price of capital goods depend on two factors moving in 
the opposite direction. In particular, reductions in tariffs and NTMs are likely to 
reduce the price of imported capital goods, whereas the increase in the demand for 
these products leads to the enhanced price (Walmsley, 1998). Therefore, the 
positive change in the price of capital goods suggests that the impact of the latter 
dominates the results. Indeed, Vietnam imports around 30.7% of products used in 
the production of the capital goods, but the EU is not Vietnam’s largest import 
partner.45 Instead, Vietnam largely imports from China, South Korea, ASEAN, and 
Japan.  
As the price of capital goods rises as a result of the EVFTA, the increase in the 
current rate of return in Vietnam is due to the change in the rental price of capital 
which grows by 2.55% in Scenario 1 and 3.11% in Scenario 2. The rise in the rental 
price of capital in Vietnam is due to the increased demand for the services of capital 
stock following the EVFTA, given the available capital stock. The significant 
increases in Vietnam’s short-run current rates of return (3.50% in Scenario 1 and 
4.26% in Scenario 2) can explain the expansion in Vietnam’s capital stock in the 
long-run when the capital stock is no longer fixed, and the supply of capital will 
rise to meet the increased demand for capital. 
Table 4.5: Changes in the Short-run Current Rate of Return, Rental Price of Capital 
and Price of Capital Goods in Vietnam (%) 
Variables Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Current rate of return on capital 3.50 4.26 
Rental price of capital 2.55 3.11 
Price of capital goods 0.39 0.47 
Source: Authors’ model resullts 
Table 4.6 indicates the long-run current rate of return, rental price of capital, and 
price of capital goods of Vietnam, which are relatively small compared with those 
in the short-run. Changes in the current and expected rates of return are equated for 
all regions in the long-run, at minamal rates of 0.01% in Scenario 1 and 0.02% in 
Scenario 2 following the EVFTA. Therefore, changes in the rental price of capital 
                                                 
45 Authors’ calculation from the GTAP 10 data base 
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are mainly determined by changes in the price of capital goods.46 In Vietnam, 
changes in long-run rental prices of capital and prices of capital goods are almost 
the same, around 0.1% in both scenarios. 
Table 4.6: Changes in the Long-run Current Rate of Return, Rental Price of Capital 
and Price of Capital Goods in Vietnam (%) 
Variables Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Current rate of return on capital 0.01 0.02 
Rental price of capital 0.10 0.12 
Price of capital goods 0.09 0.11 
Source: Authors’ model results 
4.5.1.3 Aggregate Exports and Imports 
Table 4.7 describes changes in total exports, total imports, and bilateral trade 
between Vietnam and the EU. This agreement substantially benefits both Vietnam 
and the EU in terms of bilateral trade. In Scenario 1, Vietnam’s exports to the EU 
increase by 24.8% (almost 8.2 billion US$) and EU’s exports to Vietnam exhibit a 
37.2% increase (5.1 billion US$). In Scenario 2, they increase to 30.0% (9.9 billion 
US$) and 44.5% (6.1 billion US$) respectively. The significant expansion in the 
bilateral trade is not surprising as the EU has been Vietnam’s key trading partner. 
In addition, the EU benefits from increased access to the Vietnamese market as 
Vietnam imposed much higher import tariffs on EU products than the tariffs 
imposed by the EU against Vietnamese exports prior to the agreement. Although 
the export growth of the EU is greater than that of Vietnam, the absolute values 
imply Vietnam has a trade surplus with the EU. Among the EU member states, 
Vietnam would trade more with Italy, France, Spain, Germany, and UK. 
While the bilateral trade between Vietnam and the EU grow substantially, total 
trade of both Vietnam and the EU experiences much smaller growth. In particular, 
both EU’s total real exports and total imports grow marginally (0.01%) in both 
scenarios. Likewise, the percentage increases in Vietnam’s total exports and 
imports range between 3.11% and 4.17% in the two scenarios. The results indicate 
that although the EVFTA creates more trade for both Vietnam and the EU, there is 
strong evidence of trade diversion effects as well. The EU and Vietnam 
                                                 
46 rental(r) = [
1
GRNETRATIO(r)
] × rorc(r) + pcgds(r)                                                                                      
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dramatically increase their bilateral trade and trade less with the rest of the world. 
In particular, the expansion in Vietnam’s exports to the EU is much greater than in 
Vietnam’s total exports, and the increase in Vietnam’s total imports are largely 
attributable to the rise in Vietnam’s imports from the EU.47 In addition, for the EU, 
the rise in the EU’s exports to Vietnam is much larger than in the EU’s total exports. 
Similarly, the increase in the EU’s imports from Vietnam exceeds the expansion in 
the EU’s total imports.48  
Table 4.7: Changes in Total Real Exports, Imports, and Bilateral Trade (% and 
million US$) 
  Scenario 1   Scenario 2 
  % MIL. US$   % MIL. US$ 
Total exports      
     Vietnam 3.11 5,206  3.84 6,417 
     EU 0.02 1,141  0.02 1,290 
Total imports      
     Vietnam 3.39 6,637  4.17 8,158 
     EU 0.02 1,096  0.02 1,239 
Bilateral trade      
     Vietnam exports to the EU 24.82 8,176  29.97 9,870 
     EU exports to Vietnam 37.20 5,077  44.45 6,066 
Source: Authors’ model results 
When the increase in Vietnam’s total exports is decomposed by policy components, 
we find that tariff elimination contributes the most to the export growth rate of 
Vietnam, with 83.1% in Scenario 1 and 71.2% in Scenario 2. This is followed by 
the contributions of goods NTMs and trade facilitation, services NTMs, and tax on 
capital.  
4.5.2 Sectoral Impacts 
Table 4.8 presents changes in Vietnam’s real sectoral exports and imports. The six 
aggregated sectors from the 22 sectors modelled reveal that that the agricultural, 
extraction, and other manufacturing sectors exhibit export contraction. One of the 
main reasons is that these sectors do not benefit from tariff reductions under the 
EVFTA as the EU imposed minimal import tariffs against these Vietnamese 
                                                 
47 Vietnam’s imports from the EU are similar to EU’s exports to Vietnam 
48 EU’s imports from Vietnam are similar to Vietnam’s exports to the EU 
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products (<1%) prior to the creation of this FTA. Export contraction also occurs in 
the services sector. 
In contrast, the processed food and labour-intensive manufacturing sectors are 
beneficiaries in terms of exports following this agreement. These sectors gain more 
access to the EU market thanks to tariff reductions as they used to have relatively 
high tariffs imposed by the EU before the creation of the FTA. Exports of the 
processed food sector on average rise by around 3.0% in both scenarios. Exports of 
the labour-intensive manufacturing sector expand mainly due to apparel & leather 
products, whose exports grow by 19.6% (6.8 billion US$) in Scenario 1 and to 23.5% 
(8.1 billion US$) in Scenario 2 due to larger cuts to NTMs, time to trade, and FDI 
barriers. In dollar terms, among the 22 sectors modelled, apparel & leather products 
experience the greatest expansion in exports, followed by food & beverages, textiles, 
transport equipment, livestock, and meat products. The export expansion in these 
six sectors compensates for the declines in exports of the remaining sectors (See 
Appendix, Table 4.15). Regarding the changes in sectoral imports, all the 
aggregated sectors experience import growth, as shown in Table 4.8. Within these 
sectors, textiles, apparel and leather products exhibit rapid expansion in imports, 
partly due to the need for large exports in these sectors, followed by chemicals, food 
and beverages (See Appendix, Table 4.15).  
Table 4.8: Changes in Vietnam's Real Exports and Imports by Sector (% and million 
US$) 
  Export   Import 
 Scenario 1   Scenario 2  Scenario 1   Scenario 2 
  % MIL. US$   % MIL. US$   % MIL. US$   % MIL. US$ 
Agriculture -2.4 -250  -2.7 -290  2.6 297  3.2 367 
Processed food 3.2 320  3.1 306  3.7 601  4.3 704 
Extraction -2.9 -320  -3.2 -352  2.1 244  2.5 291 
Labor-intensive 17.4 6,991  21.1 8,445  12.8 3,832  15.4 4,589 
Other manufac -1.6 -1,361  -1.7 -1,473  1.3 1,591  1.7 2,026 
Services -1.8 -159   -2.2 -193   5.1 605   7.8 932 
Source: Authors’ model results 
Note: Aggregate sector compositions are defined in Appendix, Table 4.11 
The changes in real exports and imports by sector suggest that following the 
EVFTA, the domestic agricultural, extraction, other manufacturing, and services 
sectors may face difficulty due to both export contraction and import expansion. 
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Table 4.9 depicts changes in Vietnam’s sectoral output. Output declines in 
extraction and other manufactures, but slightly expands in agriculture and processed 
food. Notably, output of labour-intensive manufactures rise substantially by 15.7% 
(8.5 billion US$) in Scenario 1 and 18.8% (10.1 billion US$) in Scenario 2, mainly 
due to the large expansion in exports of these sectors.  
Table 4.9: Changes in Vietnam's Sectoral Output (% and million US$) 
  Scenario 1   Scenario 2 
  % MIL. US$   % MIL. US$ 
Agriculture 0.1 85  0.2 109 
Processed food 0.7 221  0.7 218 
Extraction -0.4 -135  -0.4 -122 
Labour-intensive manufactures 15.7 8,462  18.8 10,135 
Other manufactures -1.2 -1,541  -1.2 -1,631 
Services 1.6 2,152   1.9 2,555 
Source: Authors’ model results 
Note: Aggregate sector compositions are defined in Appendix, Table 4.11 
4.6 Conclusion 
This study implements simulations for two policy scenarios to explore the impacts 
of the EVFTA on Vietnamese trade and investment, using a global CGE model. 
The five components in each scenario are tariff elimination, reductions in goods 
and services NTMs, improvement in trade facilitation associated with reductions in 
time to import, and investment liberalisation. The second scenario models a greater 
magnitude of liberalisation for all components except tariffs.  
Simulation results reveal that the bilateral trade between Vietnam and the EU grow 
substantially, and by a much greater amount than the growth of total exports and 
total imports for the two regions. These findings suggest that trade diversion occurs 
as a result of the EVFTA. In addition, when aggregating the sectors modelled into 
six aggregate sectors including agricultural, processed food, extraction, labour-
intensive manufacturing, other manufacturing, and services sectors, we find that the 
processed food and labour-intensive manufacturing sectors in Vietnam experiences 
significant export growth, whereas the remaining four sectors witness declines in 
exports. Therefore, the Vietnamese government may need to consider policies 
aiming to mitigate the adverse impacts of the EVFTA in these sectors. 
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With regard to the investment effect of the EVFTA, we find that the EVFTA leads 
to positive changes in Vietnam’s short-run current rates of return, which is due to 
the change in the short-run rental price of capital. These findings suggest that 
Vietnam would receive significant capital gains in the long-run. We further find 
that all the policy components contribute to the capital growth in Vietnam in the 
long-run. However, capital gains resulting from tariff elimination are much larger 
than those from other policy components. 
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Chapter Appendix 
Table 4.10: Regional Aggregation 
No. Regions  Description GTAP regions Aggregated regions 
  modelled     for reporting 
1 Vietnam  Vietnam VNM Vietnam 
2 RestASEAN Other ASEAN countries  IDN,  MYS, PHL, THA, SGP,  LAO, KHM, BRN, XSE Rest of the world 
3 China China  CHN Rest of the world 
4 Japan Japan  JPN Rest of the world 
5 South Korea South Korea  KOR Rest of the world 
6 Hong Kong Hong Kong  HKG Rest of the world 
7 Taiwan Taiwan  TWN Rest of the world 
8 United States United States  USA Rest of the world 
9 Austria Austria AUT EU28 
10 Belgium Belgium BEL EU28 
11 Czech Czech Republic  CZE EU28 
12 Denmark Denmark  DNK EU28 
13 Finland Finland FIN EU28 
14 France France FRA EU28 
15 Germany Germany DEU EU28 
16 Ireland Ireland  IRL EU28 
17 Italy Italy  ITA EU28 
18 Netherlands Netherlands NLD EU28 
19 Poland Poland  POL EU28 
20 Portugal Portugal  PRT EU28 
21 Slovakia Slovakia SVK EU28 
22 Spain Spain  ESP EU28 
23 Sweden Sweden  SWE EU28 
24 UK United Kingdom GBR EU28 
25 RestEU28 Other EU-28 countries CYP, EST, GRC, HUN, LVA, LTU, LUX, MLT, SVN, BGR, HRV, ROU EU28 
26 ROW  Rest of World XOC, MNG, XEA, BGD, NPL, PAK, LKA, XSA, CAN, MEX, XNA,  Rest of the world 
   ARG, BOL, BRA, CHL, COL, ECU, PRY, PER, URY, VEN, XSM,  
   CRI, GTM, HND, NIC, PAN, SLV, XCA, DOM, JAM, PRI, TTO,   
   XCB, BHR, IRN, ISR, JOR, KWT, OMN, QAT, SAU, TUR, ARE,  
    XWS, EGY, MAR, TUN, XNF, BEN, BFA, CMR, CIV, GHA, GIN,  
    NGA, SEN, TGO, XWF, XCF, XAC, ETH, KEN, MDG, MWI, MUS,  
    MOZ, RWA, TZA, UGA, ZMB, ZWE, XEC, BWA, NAM, ZAF, XSC,  
   CHE, NOR, XEF, ALB, BLR, RUS, UKR, XEE, XER, KAZ, KGZ,  
       XSU, ARM, AZE, GEO, XTW, AUS, NZL,  IND   
Source: Authors’ aggregation based on 141 regions of GTAP 10 Data Base 
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Table 4.11: Sectoral Aggregation 
No. Sectors Description  GTAP sectors Aggregated sectors 
  modelled     for reporting 
1  Rice Paddy rice; Processed rice PDR; PCR Agriculture 
2 Fishing Fishing FSH Agriculture 
3 OthAgri Wheat; Other grains nec; Oil seeds; WHT; GRO; OSD Agriculture 
  Vegetables, fruit and nuts; Sugar cane and sugar beet; V_F; C_B  
  Plant-based fibers; Crops nec; Forestry PFB; OCR; FRS  
4 Livestock Bovine cattle and sheep; Other animal products nec; CTL; OAP; Agriculture 
  Raw milk; Wool, silk-worm cocoons RMK; WOL;  
5 MeatProds Bovine cattle and sheep products; Other meat products CMT; OMT; Processed food 
6 Wood Wood products LUM Other manufactures 
7 Extraction Coal; Oil; Gas; Minerals nec; COA; OIL; GAS; OXT Extraction 
  Petroleum and coal products; Mineral products nec P_C; NMM  
8  FoodBever Vegetable oils and fats; Dairy products; Sugar; VOL; MIL; SGR; Processed food 
  Food products nec; Beverages and tobacco products OFD; B_T  
9 Textiles Textiles TEX Labor-intensive manufac 
10 AppaLeath Wearing apparel; Leather products WAP; LEA Labor-intensive manufac 
11 Chemicals Chemicals; Pharmaceutical products; Rubber & plastic CHM; BPH; RPP Other manufacture 
12 Metals Ferrous metals; Metals nec; Metal products; I_S; NFM; FMP Other manufacture 
13  ElecEquip Electronic equipment ELE Other manufacture 
14 Machinery Electrical equipment; Machinery and equipment nec EEQ; OME Other manufacture 
15 TransEquip Motor vehicles and parts; Transport equipment nec MVH; OTN Other manufacture 
16 OthManufac Paper products and publishing; Manufactures nec PPP; OMF Other manufacture 
17  Construction Construction CNS Services 
18 FinBusTra Insurance; Finance; Other business services; Trade INS; OFI; OBS; TRD Services 
19 Transport Transport nec; Water transport; Air transport OTP; WTP; ATP Services 
20 Communication Communication CMN Services 
21 GovSvs Government services  OSG Services 
22  OthSvs Electricity; Gas manufacture and distribution; ELY; GDT; Services 
  Water; Recreational and other services; WTR; ROS;   
  Accommodation, food and service activities AFS  
  Warehousing and support activities WHS  
  Real estate activities; Education RSA; EDU  
    Human health and social work activities; Dwellings HHT; DWE   
Source: Authors’ aggregation based on 65 sectors of GTAP 10 Data Base 
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Table 4.12: Ad-valorem Equivalents of Goods Non-tariff Barriers Imposed by 
Vietnam (EU) on EU (Vietnamese) Products (%) 
  Imposed by EU Imposed by VN 
Aggregated sector on VN products on EU products 
Rice 14.13 106.52 
Fishing 0.71 2.26 
Other agriculture 5.22 25.23 
Livestock 32.56 1.32 
Meat products 10.05 4.12 
Wood 5.90 33.36 
Extraction 32.77 4.53 
Food and beverages 5.54 8.91 
Textiles 5.31 2.66 
Wearing apparel and leather products 18.34 5.43 
Chemicals 1.01 7.21 
Metals 5.45 10.41 
Electronic equipment 0.28 2.62 
Machinery 4.61 2.33 
Transport equipment 5.92 3.39 
Other manufactures 3.15 7.49 
Source: World Bank (2019). Trade weighted by the authors for the aggregated sectors and regions 
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Table 4.13: Ad-valorem Equivalents of Services Barriers in Vietnam and EU 
Member States (%) 
    Finance, business     Government 
Country Construction and trade Transport Communication services 
Austria 33.56 37.45 21.45 30.43 64.94 
Belgium 41.05 24.51 10.49 17.30 56.63 
Czech Republic 67.58 48.05 39.79 45.50 80.40 
Denmark 18.02 25.97 11.12 15.08 63.71 
Finland 53.66 31.52 34.72 51.80 90.14 
France 47.44 45.94 19.59 52.33 61.50 
Germany 16.36 26.42 7.32 31.00 44.99 
Ireland 71.34 3.87 24.91 26.30 59.79 
Italy 37.26 35.50 22.38 38.01 51.47 
Netherlands 39.64 25.68 24.72 21.24 50.88 
Poland 45.56 44.19 37.23 52.20 64.26 
Portugal 70.04 58.15 23.82 41.20 68.06 
Slovakia 41.85 57.88 40.53 65.27 76.17 
Spain 42.84 37.37 26.66 38.86 70.11 
Sweden 35.90 24.50 20.06 29.89 69.16 
United Kingdom 44.77 27.48 9.11 19.49 63.71 
RestEU28 40.76 17.84 16.06 28.11 60.03 
Vietnam 34.49 59.78 41.26 47.35 59.90 
Source:  Fontagné et al. (2016). Trade weighted by the authors for the aggregated sectors and 
regions 
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Table 4.14: Time to Import, Vietnam and the EU Member States 
  Time to import 
  Border  Documentary  Total 
  compliance(h) compliance (h) (days) 
Austria 0 1 0.0 
Belgium 0 1 0.0 
Czech 0 1 0.0 
Denmark 0 1 0.0 
Finland 2 1 0.1 
France 0 1 0.0 
Germany 0 1 0.0 
Ireland 24 1 1.0 
Italy 0 1 0.0 
Netherlands 0 1 0.0 
Poland 0 1 0.0 
Portugal 0 1 0.0 
Slovakia 0 1 0.0 
Spain 0 1 0.0 
Sweden 0 1 0.0 
UK 3 2 0.2 
Cyprus 15 2 0.7 
Estonia 0 1 0.0 
Greece 1 1 0.1 
Hungary 0 1 0.0 
Latvia 0 1 0.0 
Lithuania 0 1 0.0 
Luxembourg 0 1 0.0 
Malta 2 1 0.1 
Slovenia 0 1 0.0 
Bulgaria 1 1 0.1 
Croatia 0 1 0.0 
Romania 0 1 0.0 
EU28 1 1 0.1 
Vietnam 56 76 5.5 
Source: World Bank Doing Business (2019). Trade weighted 
by the authors for the EU28 
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Table 4.15: Changes in Real Exports and Imports by All Sectors Modelled (million 
US$ and %) 
  Export   Import 
 Scenario 1   Scenario 2  Scenario 1   Scenario 2 
  % MIL. US$   % MIL. US$   % MIL. US$   % MIL. US$ 
  Rice -1.9 -45  -2.8 -64  5.3 2  6.4 3 
  Fishing -2.0 -3  -2.9 -5  3.0 36  3.5 42 
  OthAgri -2.7 -212  -3.1 -242  2.4 215  3.0 268 
  Livestock 1.1 4  2.0 7  3.5 44  4.5 56 
  Meat products 5.9 3  6.1 4  2.8 88  3.4 106 
  FoodBever 3.2 312  3.0 292  3.9 514  4.6 601 
  Extraction -2.9 -323  -3.2 -359  2.1 245  2.5 294 
  Textiles 2.6 142  2.6 142  13.3 2,344  16.0 2,812 
  AppaLeath 19.6 6,769  23.5 8,135  12.2 1,496  14.6 1,796 
  Wood -2.8 -65  -3.1 -74  2.3 38  3.0 49 
  Chemicals -1.5 -112  -1.8 -135  3.0 733  3.7 902 
  Metals -1.2 -72  -1.1 -67  0.1 17  0.3 55 
  ElecEquip -1.8 -902  -2.0 -998  -0.5 -172  -0.4 -158 
  Machinery -1.2 -129  -1.2 -127  1.7 448  2.1 570 
  TransEquip 1.6 42  1.7 45  4.9 354  5.7 406 
  OthManufac -1.8 -144  -1.9 -151.86  2.9 169  3.5 205 
  Construction -1.3 0  -1.6 0  4.4 1  5.3 2 
  FinBusTra -2.4 -85  -2.8 -99  6.1 339  9.8 541 
  Transport -0.4 -8  -0.5 -11  4.0 85  6.2 133 
  Communication -2.0 -19  -2.4 -24  6.0 78  9.7 127 
  GovSvs -3.5 -6  -4.1 -8  3.8 8  4.6 9 
  OthSvs -3.0 -52   -3.5 -62   3.5 92   4.3 115 
Source: Authors’ model results  
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5 Chapter 5: Impacts of the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership on Vietnamese Trade and 
Investment49 
5.1 Introduction 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a proposed free trade 
agreement (FTA) involving ASEAN and six FTA partners (Australia, New Zealand, 
China, Japan, Korea and India), with China and India being the largest and fastest 
growing economies (Kikuchi, Yanagida, & Vo, 2018). The first RCEP negotiation 
was in 2012, with 28 rounds completed as of September 2019.50  However, in 
December 2019, India opted out of RCEP because of concerns about imports from 
China. In the recent negotiating round 29, April 2020, the proposal to India, with a 
package of flexibilities, was agreed by the 15 RCEP parties, expecting that India 
can resolve its outstanding issues and RCEP will be signed by all 16 parties in 
November 2020.51 The goal of RCEP is to create a modern, comprehensive, high-
quality and mutually beneficial economic partnership agreement, in which trade in 
goods, trade in services, investment, economic and technical cooperation, 
intellectual property, competition and dispute settlement are included (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2012). RCEP is expected to harmonise overlapping rules and 
regulations of existing preferential trade agreements in the region, such as the 
ASEAN + 1 FTAs, which have hindered firms, especially small and medium ones 
from private sectors, from using the preferential systems (Basu Das, 2015; 
Fukunaga & Isono, 2013).  
With the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), RCEP has 
become Vietnam’s largest FTA negotiation. The RCEP region already contributes 
significantly to Vietnam’s integration in the world economy. Among the four 
largest export partners of Vietnam including the US, EU, ASEAN, and Japan, two 
                                                 
49 We are grateful to Alex Kravchenko of UNESCAP for providing new preliminary estimates of 
goods NTMs. Thanks are also due to Terrie Walmsley of ImpactECON for very insightful 
discussions on modelling FDI and analysing investment results. 
50 https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/agreements-under-negotiation/ 
51 https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Regional-Comprehensive-Economic-Partnership-
Negotiating-Round-29-Apr....pdf  
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of them (ASEAN and Japan) are included in the RCEP region. Vietnam also has 
large imports from other RCEP members including China, ASEAN, Korea and 
Japan. In 2018, RCEP members accounted for almost 60%52 of Vietnam’s total 
trade and 72%53 of Vietnam’s total foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. Given 
the importance of this regional grouping to Vietnam, it is of interest to explore the 
potential impact of RCEP on Vietnam. 
Although a variety of FTAs include provisions intended to reduce barriers to FDI,  
very few studies on FTAs using computable general equilibrium (CGE) models 
have accounted for liberalisation of  investment barriers, due in part to the dearth 
of detailed global FDI data (Strutt, Minor, & Rae, 2015). Indeed, most existing 
studies on RCEP analyse trade liberalisation of this agreement through only tariff 
cuts and non-tariff measures (NTMs) reductions (Cheong & Tongzon, 2013; Gilbert, 
Furusawa, & Scollay, 2018; Itakura, 2014; Kawasaki, 2015; Rahman & Ara, 2015). 
The limited research on RCEP covering Vietnam that model reductions in barriers 
to FDI and other trade liberalisation components under RCEP is the study of Petri, 
Plummer, Urata, and Zhai (2017). However, all of these studies focus on 
macroeconomic effects of RCEP for all members. Therefore, they do not provide 
insights into the impacts of RCEP on a particular member, including Vietnam, in 
terms of investment effects, sectoral trade effects, and the contribution of each 
liberalising component. For RTA studies on Vietnam, the impacts of RCEP on the 
Vietnamese economy are analysed by Nguyen et al. (2014) and Kikuchi et al. (2018) 
who focus on only trade liberalisation of this agreement, like most current studies 
on RCEP. 
The goal of this paper is to analyse the potential impacts of RCEP on Vietnam, 
focusing on trade and investment when liberalisation of investment barriers, along 
with reductions in tariffs and NTMs, are modelled. We use the global trade analysis 
project (GTAP) model with a long-run closure so that changes in both trade and 
investment can be examined. We first project the GTAP database to 2020, with the 
tariff baseline capturing the implementation of the Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and other regional trade 
                                                 
52 Authors’ calculations based on the data from Vietnam’s General Statistics Office accessed at 
https://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=780  
53 Authors’ calculations based on data from ASEAN Secretariat at https://www.aseanstats.org/ 
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agreements (RTAs) within RCEP members. This study models reductions in 
barriers to FDI following RCEP based on the OECD FDI restrictiveness index, 
which has not been used in previous studies of trade agreements for Vietnam. This 
is the first study that investigates the effects of RCEP on Vietnam in which 
increased FDI stock is accounted for. This is also the first study that provides 
insights into the investment effect of RCEP on Vietnam in both the short- and long-
run. Furthermore, this study uses the new bilateral ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) 
of goods NTMs at the GTAP sectoral level (Kravchenko, Utoktham, Narayanan, & 
Duval, 2019) and we carefully include existing FTAs in the baseline to avoid 
double-counting benefits. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 5.2 briefly summarises the existing 
literature. Section 5.3 describes the modelling framework and policy scenarios. Our 
simulated results are presented in Section 5.4, and Section 5.5 notes our conclusions. 
5.2 Review of Existing Studies 
Among the three notable modern FTAs Vietnam has signed or are under negotiation, 
including the CPTPP, RCEP, and EU-Vietnam FTA (EVFTA), most modelling 
attention has focused on the CPTPP and its precursor, the TPP. Based on models 
building on GTAP, the impact of this agreement focusing on either a member or a 
non-member has been widely evaluated, including for the US (USITC, 2016), New 
Zealand (Walmsley, Strutt, Minor, & Rae, 2018), China (Li & Whalley, 2014; Lu, 
2015), Turkey (Oduncu, Mavuş, & Güneş, 2014), the Philippines (Cororaton & 
Orden, 2015), and India (Narayanan & Sharma, 2016). For Vietnam, the TPP has 
been estimated to result in the largest percentage gains in comparison to other TPP 
members in terms of real GDP (Areerat, Kameyama, Ito, & Yamauchi, 2012; 
Burfisher et al., 2014), welfare (Itakura & Lee, 2012), real income and exports (Petri 
& Plummer, 2016; Petri, Plummer, & Zhai, 2012b). Of particular note is the study 
of Minor, Walmsley, and Strutt (2016) who use a dynamic GTAP model to analyse 
the impact of the TPP on Vietnam. They find that following this agreement, 
Vietnam’s real GDP would increase by a cumulative 8.1% by 2035, while 
investment would reach its peak at a 23% increase relative to the 2025 baseline. 
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Furthermore, Petri et al. (2017) analyse the TPP without the US and indicate that 
Vietnam still reaps large benefits, though these are now reduced.  
While there is a large number of studies on the TPP, RCEP as a proposed RTA in 
the Asia-Pacific has received more limited attention in the literature. There are some 
studies on RCEP which do not report any results for Vietnam. For instance, Li, 
Scollay, and Gilbert (2017) analyse the impact on China’s FDI inflows of RCEP. 
They use an innovative CGE model which is based on the theory of firm 
heterogeneity and extended to include FDI. Balistreri and Tarr (2017) assess the 
impact of RCEP on the Philippines using a CGE model with three different market 
structures including the Armington, Melitz, and Krugman. The two studies focus 
on China and the Philippines, thus the regions modelled are highly aggregated, with 
three regions (Li et al., 2017) and eight regions (Balistreri & Tarr, 2017)  
respectively, reducing the size of the effects to be observed (Gilbert et al., 2018). 
As Vietnam is not separately modelled in these studies, how RCEP affects Vietnam 
is not assessed. Unlike Li et al. (2017) and Balistreri and Tarr (2017), the regions 
modelled in the study of Rahman and Ara (2015) include Vietnam. However, the 
economic impacts of tariff elimination under RCEP are reported for the whole 
ASEAN region instead of individual member states because South Asian countries 
are their area of focus. 
With respect to RCEP studies covering Vietnam, some of them analyse RCEP along 
with other RTAs for comparative purposes (Cheong & Tongzon, 2013; Gilbert et 
al., 2018; Kawasaki, 2015). Regarding the economic impacts of RCEP on Vietnam, 
Cheong and Tongzon (2013) analyse tariff elimination under RCEP using a 
dynamic GTAP model and find that among RCEP members, Vietnam witnesses the 
largest GDP gains of 5.9% by 2027. Kawasaki (2015) modifies a standard GTAP 
model to account for some dynamic aspects of capital formation. His findings 
suggest that Vietnam is the greatest beneficiary of income gains in percentage terms 
following either tariff removals or tariff removals plus NTMs reductions through 
RCEP, compared with other RCEP members. In contrast, Gilbert et al. (2018) 
employ a modified GTAP model in which medium and long-run closures are used 
to allow factors to move across sectors and capital stock to vary. Their simulation 
results indicate that Korea experiences the largest increase in welfare (4.1%), 
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whereas Vietnam’s welfare rises by 1.4% due to RCEP trade liberalisation in the 
long-run. 
RCEP is also analysed by Itakura (2014) and Itakura (2015). Based on a dynamic 
CGE model, Itakura (2014) finds that tariff removal alone or full implementation 
of RCEP with tariff elimination, reductions in services trade barriers, and 
improvements in logistics result in the largest GDP and welfare gains for Vietnam 
and Thailand in percentage terms, compared with other ASEAN member states. In 
particular, Vietnam’s GDP and welfare rise by 13.4% and 11.2% respectively 
following the full implementation of RCEP. Itakura (2015) uses a dynamic CGE 
model to analyse different policy simulations of RCEP. He finds that the RCEP 
implementation through the four policy components, including tariff cuts, services 
NTMs reductions, logistics improvements, and country-specific risk reductions, 
increases both Vietnam’s GDP and exports by 2.9% relative to the 2030 baseline, 
which are smaller than the percentage increases in Cambodia, Thailand, and Korea. 
Moreover, Vietnam’s investment experiences an increases by 7.7%, while 
investment in Korea, Cambodia, and New Zealand increase by 24.7%, 23.4%, and 
14.9% respectively. 
Although the above studies provide some simulation results for Vietnam, all of 
them focus only on the macroeconomic effects of RCEP on all members, including 
real GDP, welfare, aggregate exports, imports, and investment. None of these 
studies provide insights into the contributions of different liberalising components 
to the changes, which may vary among members. Analysis of the sectoral effects 
of RCEP is also not covered. Furthermore, these studies do not model reductions in 
barriers to FDI as a result of RCEP.  
Most of the existing studies on RCEP have focused only on RCEP trade 
liberalisation through tariffs and NTMs, with the exception of some limited 
research by Li et al. (2017), Balistreri and Tarr (2017), and Petri et al. (2017), in 
which changes in FDI are also modelled. In particular, Li et al. (2017) endogenously 
incorporate FDI in the CGE model and FDI liberalisation is conducted through 
reductions in fixed trading costs of foreign firms. Balistreri and Tarr (2017) model 
reductions in FDI barriers based on the ad valorem equivalent (AVEs) of the 
barriers against foreign providers of services, which are taken from Jafari and Tarr 
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(2014). As previously mentioned, the two studies focus on China and the 
Philippines, with no results reported for Vietnam. Petri et al. (2017) use a dynamic 
CGE model in which tariffs, NTBs, FDI barriers, and non-preferential NTBs are 
captured. They model reductions in FDI barriers following TPP12, TPP11, TPP16, 
US-Japan, and RCEP using the approach discussed in Petri et al. (2012b) and Petri 
and Plummer (2016). In particular, potential increases in the bilateral FDI stock, 
which are later used in the model, are exogenously estimated based on a proxy for 
the investment climate (the World Bank’s Doing Business rank), the score of the 
FDI-related provisions, and the baseline bilateral FDI stock (Petri et al., 2012b). 
Consistent with Gilbert et al. (2018), they find that RCEP members such as China, 
Japan, Korea, and India are winners in terms of welfare gains. Their results also 
indicate that Vietnam’s exports rise by 4.9% in 2030, after Japan (11.4%), India 
(9.7%), Korea (5.7%), and China (5.2%). Like most of the current studies on RCEP, 
Petri et al. (2017) only focus on the macroeconomic effects of this agreement 
regarding the welfare gains and aggregate exports. Petri et al. (2017) do not provide 
analysis on changes in Vietnamese trade at sectoral levels and investment as a result 
of RCEP, as well as the policy instrument having the largest impact on the changes 
in Vietnam. 
For Vietnam, Nguyen et al. (2014) analyse the impacts of phasing out tariff barriers 
under RCEP on Vietnam, using the GTAP model. In addition to their main focus of 
tariffs, reductions in services trade costs are included in their three scenarios, with 
different levels of ambition. They find that the rise in Vietnam’s national exports 
ranges from 2.4% to 3.9%, and the change in its imports is between 3.7% and 5.6% 
relative to 2020 baseline. Furthermore, Vietnam’s real wage increases by 3% to 5% 
by 2020 as a result of RCEP. Regarding sectoral output, textiles, apparel, and 
leather witness the major expansion in percentage terms. Kikuchi et al. (2018) 
employ a static CGE model to analyse the effects of mega-RTAs on Vietnam 
including the EVFTA, TPP, CPTPP, and RCEP. Policy instruments include tariffs, 
time costs as proxies for trade costs on goods trade, services NTMs, and spill-over 
to non-member countries for goods. They find that as a result of RCEP liberalisation, 
Vietnam’s real GDP expands by 9.2% and agricultural sectors are not as adversely 
affected as they are under the EVFTA or TPP. However, the current study is able 
to expand on this previous work in a number of ways. In particular, we also model 
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potential reductions in barriers to FDI as a result of RCEP. Capturing investment 
liberalisation of RCEP is important as intra-RCEP FDI flows are significant sources 
of investment for each of the RCEP members. With respect to merchandise trade 
barriers, while Kikuchi et al. (2018) model improvements in time costs, other NTMs 
such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures, as well as other technical measures 
regarding labelling requirements and conformity assessment (UNCTAD, 2015) are 
not modelled in both studies. These goods NTMs may have significant impacts on 
the Vietnamese economy, given the increasingly important role of NTMs relative 
to tariffs. Finally, although these studies provide analyses on sectoral trade effects, 
there is no analysis of the investment effect of RCEP in both the short- and long-
run and the current study is also able to contribute in this space. 
The current study fills these gaps by applying a global CGE model to analyse the 
potential impact of RCEP through both trade and investment liberalisation on 
Vietnam. Policy instruments modelled include reductions in tariffs, goods NTMs, 
services NTMs, and reductions in FDI barriers based on the OECD FDI index. 
Indeed, this is the first study to date that analyses RCEP, focusing on Vietnam, in 
which changes in FDI stocks are modelled. In addition to the trade effects of RCEP, 
this study evaluates changes in Vietnamese investment in the short-and long-run. 
5.3 Modelling Framework and Scenarios 
5.3.1 Model and Baseline Scenario 
We use the GTAP model (Hertel, 1997) to analyse the impact of RCEP. The model 
is multi-sectoral and multi-country, allowing us to explicitly capture interactions 
between regions and sectors. Therefore, this type of model is ideal for analysing 
impacts of future trade agreements. Principle characteristics of the model include 
perfect competition, constant returns to scale, and maximisation of consumers’ 
welfare and firms’ profits based on budget and resource limitations respectively. 
Imports are differentiated by countries of origin due to the Armington elasticities. 
As capital stocks are fixed in the standard GTAP model, modifications need to be 
made to capture capital accumulation  (Francois & Reinert, 1997; Walmsley, 1998). 
Therefore, we modify the standard GTAP model so that changes in both trade and 
investment following RCEP can be examined. In particular, we employ a steady-
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state closure (long-run closure) with the assumption of fixed saving rates (Francois, 
McDonald, & Nordstrom, 1996). An increase in income results in increases in both 
savings and investment, and increases in saving are proportional to increases in 
income (Kawasaki, 2015). Furthermore, the trade balance is endogenous in our 
model, allowing capital to move across countries. 
Given the importance of economic effects of liberalising investment barriers, FDI 
has been incorporated into CGE models so that reductions in barriers to FDI are 
accounted for. The key characteristic of CGE-FDI models is the existence of both 
domestic and foreign investors in each sector and each region, which is different 
from one composite investor in the standard GTAP model (Ciuriak & Xiao, 2014). 
For instance, Petri (1997) was one of the pioneers who constructed FDI in a CGE 
framework to assess the impact of APEC liberalisation. Jensen, Rutherford, and 
Tarr (2007) develop a small open economy CGE model to examine the impact of 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the Russian economy. Based 
on CGE-FDI models, Lejour, Rojas-Romagosa, and Verweij (2008) analyse the 
Services Directive aiming at opening up commercial services markets within the 
EU, while Mérette, Papadaki, Hernandez, and Yu (2008) explore the impact of 
eliminating FDI barriers on Canada and the United States. As investment provisions 
are covered in new-generation FTAs, recent studies applying CGE-FDI models to 
the analysis of FTAs include Ciuriak and Xiao (2014) and Li et al. (2017). 
Particularly, Ciuriak and Xiao (2014) modify the dynamic GTAP model to add 
foreign-owned firms in each services sector so that services trade can be captured 
through foreign affiliates. The FDI-CGE model of Li et al. (2017) is a comparative 
static model, which is based on firm heterogeneity framework and can account for 
changes in both intensive and extensive margins as a result of trade liberalisation 
as well as new entry of foreign firms. Construction of CGE-FDI models, however, 
may be complicated and time-consuming, with data difficult to source. On the other 
hand, investment liberalisation can also be addressed based on an exogenous 
approach (Petri et al., 2012b). Petri, Plummer, and Zhai (2012a) and Petri et al. 
(2012b) estimate changes in FDI stocks due to improvements in the investment 
climate and reductions in FDI barriers respectively. These potential increases in 
FDI stocks are then used in their CGE model. In this study, to model investment 
liberalisation, we exogenously estimate changes in FDI stocks based on the OECD 
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FDI restrictiveness index. Following Lotze (1999), these estimates are introduced 
in our modified CGE model through changes in sectoral capital stocks. FDI 
liberalisation is then implemented as reductions in tax equivalents.   
The latest GTAP 10 database (Aguiar, Chepeliev, Corong, McDougall, & van der 
Mensbrugghe, 2019) is used as our starting point. Before simulating RCEP, we first 
project the 2014 baseline to 2020 with the assumption that national real GDP, 
population, skilled and unskilled labour grow at exogenous rates for each region 
modelled. GDP and population growth rates are from the World Bank. We also 
include labour force growth rate projections (Appendix, Table 5.10). The baseline 
we model also accounts for existing trade agreements to avoid double-counting 
benefits. In particular, the tariff rates in the baseline refer to the tariffs after the 
implementation of the CPTPP and other existing agreements within RCEP 
members, drawing on estimates from Walmsley et al. (2018). For the purpose of 
our analysis, we aggregate the 141 regions and 65 sectors of this data base into 18 
regions and 21 sectors, as described in Appendix, Table 5.11 and Table 5.12.  
5.3.2 Scenarios Modelled 
As guided in the principles and objectives for the RCEP negotiation (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2012) and the 27 rounds negotiated, trade in goods, trade in services 
and investment liberalisation are included under RCEP. Therefore, they are 
included in our policy scenarios. Table 5.1 briefly summarises two scenarios 
simulated in the current study. Each scenario has four components, with Scenario 2 
having greater degree of liberalisation. 
Table 5.1: Policy Scenarios 
Scenario 1 RCEP members reduce tariffs by 85% on all goods, NTMs on both goods and 
services by 7%, and investment barriers by 50%.  
Scenario 2 RCEP members reduce tariffs by 95% on all goods, NTMs on both goods and 
services by 25%, and investment barriers by 50%.  
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5.3.2.1 Tariffs 
In the five existing ASEAN+1 FTAs including ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand, 
ASEAN-China, ASEAN-India, ASEAN-Japan and ASEAN-Korea, the average 
tariff reduction committed to by ASEAN members was 90.9%, compared with the 
average committed rate of 92.6% by the ASEAN’s FTA partners (Fukunaga & 
Kuno, 2012). Fukunaga and Kuno (2012) point out that RCEP should aim for a 
higher rate of 95% so that its members receive additional benefits. Therefore, we 
assume a 95% tariff cut by each of the RCEP members in the more ambitious 
scenario (Scenario 2). However, sensitive and exempt lists that apply to dozens or 
hundreds of tariff lines may significantly weaken the liberalising effect. Although 
the tariff cuts under RCEP have not been specified, past agreements may provide a 
basis for making judgment of these cuts. Previous FTAs between ASEAN and India, 
China, Korea, and Japan specify long lists of sensitive and exempt products, which 
tend to be the same in each agreement. For instance, in the ASEAN-Korea FTA, 
Korea excluded a variety of tariff lines of products covering fish and aquatic 
invertebrates, prepared foodstuffs, meat and edible offal, edible vegetables & 
certain roots, cereal, edible fruits & nuts, coffee & tea, and products of milling 
industry. Vietnam excluded products such as tobacco, cars, car accessories and 
spare parts of cars, motorbikes, bikes, home electric appliances, etc. 54  Baker, 
Vanzetti, and Pham (2014) calculated tariffs changes at the six digit level using 
TASTE (Tariff Analytical and Simulation Tool for Economists), however, since an 
updated version of this tool is not yet available, we model a 85% cut as an 
approximation of the potential outcome in the more conservative scenario (Scenario 
1).55   
Table 5.2 indicates the average tariff rates imposed by Vietnam (other RCEP) on 
imports from other RCEP (Vietnam) after the implementation of the CPTPP and 
other existing agreements between the RCEP members. Manufactured products 
from other RCEP, on average, face relatively high tariffs in Vietnam, especially 
labour-intensive products (8.3%). Examining this in more detail, we find that 
                                                 
54  See Appendix 2. Highly Sensitive List of the ASEAN-Korea agreement, accessed at 
http://wtocenter.vn/chuyen-de/12745-asean-republic-of-korea-free-trade-area 
55 The 85% cut enables less sensitive sectors to approach very low tariff rates, while more sensitive 
sectors maintain higher relative tariffs. 
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Vietnam’s import tariffs applied to apparel and leather products are the highest 
(12.0%), followed by transport equipment (7.8%), and textiles (5.8%). In contrast, 
other RCEP partners, on average, impose negligible import tariffs on manufactured 
products from Vietnam except for chemicals (1.64%). Similarly, Vietnam imposes 
import tariffs of 2.8% against extraction products from the RCEP, compared with 
only 0.2% imposed by other RCEP. Unlike manufacture and extraction, Vietnam 
on average imposes an import tariff of 1.4%, which is much lower than the average 
rate imposed by other RCEP (5.6%) in agriculture. Among Vietnam’s agricultural 
products, Vietnam’s rice faces the highest tariff (20.6%) in the RCEP region.  
Table 5.2: Tariff Rates Imposed by Vietnam (Other RCEP Partners) on Imports 
from Other RCEP Partners (Vietnam) (%), 2020 
Sector Tariffs  imposed by Vietnam Tariffs  imposed by RCEP 
Agriculture 1.42 5.57 
    Rice 0.17 20.62 
    Fishing 0.03 0.34 
    OthAgri 0.93 7.69 
    MeatLstk 0.02 0.04 
    ForesWood 0.76 1.47 
    FoodBever 2.92 1.23 
Extraction 2.83 0.19 
Labor-intensive manufactures 8.25 0.07 
    Textiles 5.75 0.11 
    AppaLeath 12.01 0.05 
Other manufactures 1.34 0.23 
    Chemicals 1.03 1.64 
    Metals 0.60 0.05 
    ElecEquip 0.57 0.00 
    Machinery 1.43 0.04 
    TransEquip 7.76 0.29 
    OthManufac 3.39 0.01 
Source: Authors’ model results, drawing on Walmsley et al. (2018) 
5.3.2.2 Non-tariff Measures 
In addition to tariff reductions, we take into account reductions in non-tariff barriers 
on both goods and services. NTMs face a range of data and modelling challenges 
(Walmsley et al., 2018) and we note that it is difficult to accurately determine the 
extent of reductions in NTMs following RCEP. The estimation results of Hayakawa 
and Kimura (2015) show that NTMs of FTA members are, in general, 6.5% point 
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lower than those of non-members. Following Itakura (2015), we start with a 
relatively conservative assumption of a 7% cut in NTMs on goods and services in 
Scenario 1. In the second scenario, the assumptions are more ambitious when we 
reduce NTMs on both goods and services by 25%. 
In terms of NTMs on goods, we apply the bilateral technical AVEs of NTMs 
estimates by Kravchenko et al. (2019)56 which are different from the average AVEs 
of NTMs that each country imposes on rest of the world, as generally used in 
previous studies. 
With respect to NTMs on services, we use the latest estimates of AVEs of non-tariff 
barriers on services by Fontagné, Mitaritonna, and Signoret (2016) (Appendix, 
Table 5.13). Sectors estimated include communication, construction, insurance, 
business services, financial services, government service, trade, and transport, 
which are consistent with the GTAP 10 database. 
5.3.2.3 Investment Barriers 
In this section, we start with assumptions for liberalising barriers to FDI in the 
RCEP region. We then move to explanations for the calculations of shocks used in 
this model. 
Modelling investment liberalisation through declines in investment barriers is 
important as it may impact on changes in investment, trade, and other economic 
indicators. Most existing studies on FTAs that model FDI assume substantial 
reductions in the level of investment restrictions. For instance, FDI barriers are 
reduced by 50% following RCEP (Balistreri & Tarr, 2017; Li et al., 2017) and 59% 
following the TPP (Ciuriak & Xiao, 2014). In a case study of unilateral 
liberalisation, Lakatos and Fukui (2014) assume a cut of 75% in barriers to FDI in 
India’s distribution sector. Consistent with these existing studies, we assume that 
RCEP members reduce barriers to FDI by 50% in both scenarios. However, in 
Scenario 2, the ambitious scenario, we assume that increases in sectoral FDI stocks 
in each RCEP member are due to a 50% reduction in FDI barriers affecting both 
                                                 
56 We are grateful to Alex Kravchenko for supplying us with preliminary estimates from this new 
database. 
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RCEP members and non-members. These assumptions are based upon the 
observation that intra-RCEP investment is important to each member, accounting 
for a relatively significant share of each member’s total FDI stocks (Appendix, 
Table 5.14). In addition, as RCEP is a RTA, investment liberalisation from this 
agreement may encourage investment not only between members but from non-
members into the region as well. In Scenario 1, the more conservative scenario, the 
increases in FDI stocks by sector in each member are due to only RCEP members, 
based on the RCEP FDI stock share in each member’s total FDI stocks. 
Reductions in barriers to FDI in this paper are based on the OECD’s annual FDI 
regulatory restrictiveness index described in Kalinova, Palerm, and Thomsen 
(2010). FDI indices are commonly used to measure the restrictiveness in a sector or 
an economy (Lakatos & Fukui, 2014), ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values 
indicating higher restrictions on FDI. This index measures the restrictiveness of FDI 
in a country based on four different restrictions on FDI including foreign equity 
limitations, discriminatory screening, restrictions on the employment of foreigners, 
and other operational restrictions (OECD, 2018). The latest FDI indices in 2017 are 
used. We map the GTAP database’s more detailed sectors with OECD’s broader 
sectors. For instance, sub-sectors of agriculture in the GTAP database belong to the 
agricultural sector of the OECD with the same FDI index. FDI indices for the 21 
aggregated sectors modelled are shown in Appendix, Table 5.15. 
To estimate the impact of this policy component on RCEP members, we 
exogenously estimate the increase in FDI stocks in RCEP members, at the sectoral 
level. We use the ratios of FDI stocks and capital stocks in each sector to determine 
increases in sectoral capital stocks, which are later used in the model as exogenous 
variables (Lotze, 1999). Liberalisation of barriers to FDI is then simulated as 
reductions in tax on sectoral capital. 
In order to estimate how much sectoral FDI stocks will increase as a result of 
removing all FDI barriers, Lakatos and Fukui (2014) apply a gravity-like 
econometric specification, with further details described in Fukui and Lakatos 
(2012). They find that the estimated elasticity of FDI stocks with respect to the FDI 
restrictiveness index (α) is -1.44. Ciuriak and Xiao (2014) use a gravity model 
similar to that of Lakatos and Fukui (2014) and also report that FDI restrictiveness 
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indices adversely affect inward FDI stocks. Following Lakatos and Fukui (2014), 
percentage changes in FDI stocks for the 21 sectors modelled for RCEP members, 
given full liberalisation of FDI barriers, are presented in Appendix, Table 5.16. 
These values are calculated by multiplying the above estimate (α) adopted from 
Lakatos and Fukui (2014) with the OECD FDI index. For instance, the percentage 
change in FDI stocks of Vietnam’s extraction sector is 2.9%. This means that if 
Vietnam removes all the barriers to FDI in the extraction sector, there will be a 2.9% 
increase in FDI stocks in this sector. 
Regarding the data needed for the calculations of estimated sectoral FDI stock and 
estimated capital stock ratios in Vietnam, annual FDI stocks are available at 
UNCTAD (2018), while annual capital stocks can be collected from the Penn World 
Table 9.1 (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 2015). To split total FDI stocks into the 
sectors modelled, we use the global FDI stock database (Gouel, Guimbard, & 
Laborde, 2012; Lakatos, Walmsley, & Chappuis, 2011), which is the latest and most 
appropriate for CGE analysis. In addition, information on capital component of 
producer expenditure (EVFA from the GTAP database) is used to split total capital 
stocks within 21 sectors in our model. Based on the data, ratios of FDI stocks and 
capital stocks in 2017 are calculated (Appendix, Table 5.17). Combining the ratios 
with increases in sectoral FDI stocks (Appendix, Table 5.16), given full 
liberalisation of barriers to FDI, increases in sectoral capital stocks are calculated 
(Appendix, Table 5.18).57 Investment liberalisation is then simulated as shocks to 
taxes on sectoral capital. Table 5.3 indicates changes in Vietnam’s FDI stocks, 
capital stocks, and tax on capital given full removal of FDI barriers. Final shock 
values used in our model assume 50% reductions in barriers to FDI in both scenarios, 
with shocks in the more conservative scenario (Scenario 1) adjusted to reflect shares 
of RCEP FDI stocks in each member’s total FDI stocks (Appendix, Table 5.14).  
  
                                                 
57 Increases in sectoral capital are shocked together with equivalent increases in total capital. 
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Table 5.3: Changes in Vietnam’s FDI Stocks, Capital Stocks, and Equivalent Tax 
on Capital (%), with Full Removal of FDI Barriers, 2017 
  FDI stock Capital stock Tax on capital 
Rice 11.95 0.05 (0.004) -0.29 
Fishing 2.88 0.00 (0.000) -0.02 
OthAgri 11.95 0.00 (0.000) -0.01 
MeatLstk 11.95 0.41 (0.034) -0.88 
ForesWood 6.49 0.02 (0.004) -0.04 
Extraction 2.88 0.02 (0.009) -0.30 
FoodBever 6.48 0.06 (0.009) -0.16 
Textiles 6.48 0.04 (0.007) -0.04 
AppaLeath 6.48 0.02 (0.003) -0.02 
Chemicals 2.88 0.11 (0.037) -0.13 
Metals 2.88 0.07 (0.023) -0.07 
ElecEquip 2.88 0.07 (0.026) -0.08 
Machinery 2.88 0.08 (0.029) -0.08 
TransEquip 2.88 0.05 (0.018) -0.06 
OthManufac 6.48 0.04 (0.005) -0.06 
Construction 2.88 0.00 (0.000) 0.00 
FinBusTra 7.30 3.64 (0.499) -3.81 
Transport 76.03 0.22 (0.003) -0.24 
Commu 83.95 0.94 (0.011) -1.12 
GovSvs 32.69 0.16 (0.005) -0.15 
OthSvs 16.56 0.01 (0.001) -0.02 
Source: Authors’ calculations and model results 
Note: Values in the brackets are ratios of sectoral FDI stocks and capital stocks. 
5.4 Potential Impacts of RCEP  
5.4.1 Real GDP 
Table 5.4 summarises simulated changes in real GDP under RCEP liberalisation. 
In percentage terms, real GDP in Vietnam increases by 4.63% (10.9 billion US$) 
in Scenario 2, compared with a 2.35% increase corresponding to 5.5 billion US$ in 
Scenario 1. Other RCEP members also benefit from this agreement, with real GDP 
on average rising by 0.51% (124.5 billion USD) in Scenario 1 and 1.19% (293.4 
billion USD) in Scenario 2.  
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Table 5.4: Changes in Real GDP of RCEP Members (% and million US$), 2020 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
 PER CENT 
Vietnam 2.35 4.63 
Other RCEP* 0.51 1.19 
 US $ MILLION 
Vietnam 5,533 10,911 
Other RCEP* 124,494 293,417 
Source: Authors’ model results 
Note: Aggregation of regional compositions is defined in Appendix, Table 5.11 
Figure 5.1 decomposes the impact of liberalising components on Vietnam’s real 
GDP following Strutt et al. (2015). Liberalisation of FDI barriers has the smallest 
effect on Vietnam’s real GDP in the two scenarios. Similarly, reductions in services 
NTMs make relatively small contributions to the increase in real GDP, due in part 
to a small services share of Vietnam’s total exports (7.0%).58 
 In contrast, tariff reductions largely account for the percentage increase in 
Vietnam’s real GDP (1.59%) in Scenario 1, followed by goods NTM reductions 
(0.65%). However, the contribution of reductions in goods NTMs (2.59%) 
surpasses that of reductions tariffs (1.78%) in Scenario 2. 
Figure 5.1: Changes in Vietnam's Real GDP by Liberalisation Components (%), 
2020 
Source: Authors’ model results 
                                                 
58 Authors’ calculations from the GTAP 10 database 
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5.4.2 Trade Effects 
5.4.2.1 Aggregated Levels 
Table 5.5 shows changes in total real exports, imports, and bilateral trade of 
Vietnam and other RCEP. As a result of RCEP liberalisation, Vietnam’s total real 
exports rise by 6.40% in Scenario 1 and 10.05% in Scenario 2, whereas its total real 
imports experience a slighter increase by 5.39% and 9.10% respectively. In addition, 
Vietnam’s exports to other RCEP members rise by 4.13% in Scenario 1 and 8.33% 
in Scenario 2, reflecting an increase of 4.2 billion US$ and 8.5 billion 
US$ respectively. In addition, both scenarios indicate that Vietnam’s imports from 
other RCEP (other RCEP members’ exports to Vietnam) are larger than Vietnam’s 
total imports in both relative and absolute terms, reflecting evidence of trade 
diversion following RCEP. For other RCEP members, their bilateral trade with 
Vietnam has larger percentage increases, compared with their total trade in both 
scenarios.  
Table 5.5: Changes in Total Real Exports, Imports and Bilateral Trade (% and 
million US$), 2020 
  Scenario 1   Scenario 2 
  % MIL. US$   % MIL. US$ 
Total exports      
     Vietnam 6.40 14,153  10.05 22,218 
     Other RCEP 1.99 136,951  3.73 257,195 
Total imports      
     Vietnam 5.39 13,897  9.10 23,485 
     Other RCEP 2.46 153,365  4.64 289,128 
Bilateral trade      
     Vietnam exports to other RCEP 4.13 4,196  8.33 8,472 
     Other RCEP export to Vietnam 8.60 16,211   13.09 24,681 
Source: Authors’ model results  
Note: Aggregation of regional compositions is defined in Appendix, Table 5.11. 
5.4.2.2 Sectoral Levels 
Table 5.6 describes changes in Vietnam’s real exports and imports by sectors. 
Aggregating the sectors modelled into six sectors including agriculture, extraction, 
labour-intensive, other manufactures, and services, we find that all of them 
experience growth in both exports and imports following RCEP. With respect to 
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exports, the increase in Vietnam’s real aggregate exports is largely attributable to 
manufactured exports. Particularly, labour-intensive manufactures and other 
manufactures, on average, expand by 21.1% and 3.3% respectively, reflecting an 
increase of 10.3 billion US$ and 3.8 billion US$ in Scenario 1. These export 
expansions are much greater with more ambitious assumptions in Scenario 2. In 
general, manufactured exports expand largely due to wearing apparel and leather 
products, textiles, metals, and electric equipment.  
By contrast, agriculture, extraction, and services, on average, experience minimal 
export growth. In particular, the services sector witnesses small export growth, from 
0.7% in Scenario 1 to 1.7% in Scenario 2, exhibiting a gain of 82 million US$ and 
190 million US$ respectively. The agricultural sector, on average, exhibits a 
negligible export growth in Scenario 1, mainly due to rice. However, agricultural 
exports decline with greater liberalisation in Scenario 2. 
Our simulation results suggest that Australia and New Zealand have become 
increasingly important export markets for Vietnam as a result of RCEP. Export 
growth rates of apparel and leather products from Vietnam to Australia and New 
Zealand are high.  
Among the six aggregated sectors, increases in imports are much greater than in 
exports of agriculture, extraction, other manufactures, and services with the 
exception of labour-intensive manufactures in dollar terms, mainly because 
Vietnam’s key import partners such as China, ASEAN, Japan, and Korea are 
covered in RCEP. Notably, each sector modelled experiences an increase in imports 
except for the fishing sector. Among these sectors, wearing apparel and leather 
products and textiles experience the largest expansion in both percentage and dollar 
terms. The main reason is  the dramatic increase in exports of these products with 
heavy dependence on imported inputs used to produce them (Lu, 2015; Minor et al., 
2016). 
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Table 5.6: Changes in Vietnam's Real Exports and Imports by Sectors (% and 
million US$), 2020 
  Export   Import 
  Scenario 1   Scenario 2   Scenario 1   Scenario 2 
 % MIL. US$  % MIL. US$  % MIL. US$  % MIL. US$ 
Agriculture 0.1 27  -1.1 -308  2.7 993  5.5 2,001 
    Rice 29.8 908  34.1 1,038  16.6 8  23.9 11 
    Fishing 0.5 1  -1.3 -3  -1.3 -21  -0.1 -2 
    OthAgri -4.7 -412  -7.4 -659  2.2 232  3.5 377 
    MeatLstk -7.1 -32  -6.4 -28  3.6 211  7.3 426 
    ForesWood -2.2 -98  -4.2 -186  3.5 100  6.5 183 
    FoodBever -3.0 -339  -4.1 -469  3.0 463  6.5 1,006 
Extraction 0.7 121  1.7 303  7.0 1,133  12.7 2,057 
Labor-intensive 21.1 10,277  27.5 13,374  18.5 6,759  24.6 8,976 
    Textiles 10.9 764  14.3 1,003  16.7 3,635  22.9 4,981 
    AppaLeath 22.9 9,512  29.8 12,371  21.2 3,124  27.1 3,995 
Other manufac 3.3 3,763  7.7 8,848  3.8 6,198  7.7 12,370 
    Chemicals 2.3 234  2.0 206  4.3 1,358  7.1 2,245 
    Metals 2.3 211  13.9 1,281  2.6 747  6.9 1,982 
    ElecEquip 3.3 2,181  8.8 5,821  3.4 1,664  8.2 3,954 
    Machinery 4.0 618  5.2 791  3.1 1,131  5.8 2,092 
    TransEquip 1.7 65  3.8 146  8.2 765  12.3 1,153 
    OthManufac 4.2 453  5.6 602  7.2 533  12.7 945 
Services 0.7 82  1.7 190  2.8 423  7.5 1,115 
    Construction 0.9 0  1.7 0  5.1 2  11.8 5 
    FinBusTra 0.1 2  1.8 84  3.5 248  8.9 630 
    Transport 4.4 121  7.5 206  1.4 40  4.9 134 
    Communication 0.3 3  2.2 28  2.9 45  7.3 113 
    GovSvs -2.4 -6  -4.3 -10  2.6 7  8.1 21 
    OthSvs -1.5 -39   -4.7 -118  2.6 81  6.7 213 
Source: Authors’ model results 
Note: Aggregation of sectoral compositions is defined in Appendix, Table 5.12. 
         Agriculture includes processed food 
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5.4.3 Investment Effect 
To explain changes in long-run capital stocks, it is critical to first explore 
investment effects of RCEP in the short-run. Therefore, this section analyses the 
investment effects of RCEP in both the short- and long-run, focusing on Vietnam. 
In the GTAP model, investment is depicted as purchases of capital goods (Malcolm, 
1998). The supply of capital goods is based on the demand for investment. From an 
investor’s point of view, it depends on the rate of return which is in turn determined 
by the rental price of capital and the price of capital goods. According to  Hertel 
(1997), the current rate of return is specified as follows:  
rorc(r) = GRNETRATIO(r) × [rental(r) − pcgds(r)]                                          (1)                                                                               
In which r is a particular region; GRNETRATIO is the ratio of GROSS/NET rates 
of return on capital; rorc is the current rate of return; pcgds is the price of capital 
goods; and rental is the rental price of capital. Table 5.7 depicts changes in the short-
run current rate of return, rental price of capital, and price of capital goods. Among 
the RCEP members, Vietnam experiences the largest percentage change in the 
current rate of return, 5.00% in Scenario 1 and 9.20% in Scenario 2. These increases 
are largely attributable to the increase in the rental price of capital in Vietnam. 
As can be seen in this table, all of the RCEP members witness positive changes in 
their rental prices of capital. RCEP liberalisation results in increased demand for 
capital in each of RCEP member. Given the available regional supply of capital 
stocks in the short-run, there is an increase in the rental price of capital and a 
reallocation of capital stocks across industries in response to the enhanced demand 
in each region (Walmsley, 1998). The rental price of capital in Vietnam rises by 
2.90% in Scenario 1 and 5.89% in Scenario 2 which is much larger than other RCEP 
members.  
Unlike the rental price of capital, changes in the price of capital goods in RCEP 
members can be either positive or negative because they depend on two factors 
moving in opposite directions. Prices of imported capital goods are likely to reduce 
following trade liberalisation, whereas increased demand for capital goods results 
in a higher price (Walmsley, 1998). The price of capital goods in Vietnam declines 
by 0.17% in Scenario 1, but rises by 0.21% in Scenario 2, indicating that with 
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greater liberalisation, the increased price of capital goods resulting from the 
enhanced demand for capital goods dominates the net change in Vietnam’s prices 
of capital goods. 
Table 5.7: Changes in the Current Rate of Return, Rental Price of Capital, and Price 
of Capital Good in the Short-run (%), 2020 
Regions Scenario 1   Scenario 2 
  rorc rental pcgds   rorc Rental pcgds 
Vietnam 5.00 2.90 -0.17  9.20 5.89 0.21 
Indonesia 0.76 0.41 -0.15  2.08 1.48 -0.06 
Malaysia 1.63 0.93 -0.26  3.95 2.48 -0.41 
Philippines 1.36 0.76 -0.26  4.48 3.55 0.17 
Thailand 2.41 1.16 -0.47  5.69 3.37 -0.47 
Singapore 1.19 0.80 -0.17  5.87 4.38 -0.40 
OthASEAN 1.33 0.35 -0.73  2.91 1.18 -1.16 
Australia 0.97 0.64 0.12  3.07 2.66 0.99 
NewZealand 2.75 2.59 0.68  3.99 3.83 1.05 
China 0.53 0.17 -0.09  1.52 0.71 -0.07 
Japan 1.21 2.57 1.78  1.82 3.63 2.42 
SouthKorea 0.94 0.87 0.30  1.92 1.83 0.67 
Other RCEP* -  0.86 0.14    - 1.82 0.29 
Source: Authors’ model results 
Notes: Aggregation of regional compositions is defined in Appendix, Table 5.11 
Rental for other RCEP countries is based on the capital weighted average of other RCEP 
Pcgs for other RCEP countries is based on the capital goods weighted average of other RCEP 
The significant increases in the short-run current rate of return in Vietnam in both 
scenarios suggest that Vietnam’s capital stocks would expand significantly in the 
long-run when the regional supply of capital is no longer fixed. Table 5.8 shows the 
changes in long-run capital stocks and trade balances of RCEP members. All of the 
RCEP members experience gains in capital stocks and a deterioration in the trade 
balance. In particular, Vietnam’s capital stocks grow markedly from 4.35% in 
Scenario 1 to 8.17% in Scenario 2. Other RCEP members including Singapore, 
Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and New Zealand also benefit from the 
significant growth of capital stocks. This table also indicates that Vietnam is among 
the countries exhibiting the largest reductions in its trade balance, indicating an 
increase in foreign investment. For instance, in Scenario 2 with greater 
liberalisation, the trade balance of Vietnam reduces by 2.9 billion US$, after China 
(9.7 billion US$). 
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Table 5.8: Changes in Long-run Capital Stocks (%) and Trade Balances (million 
US$), 2020 
  Scenario 1   Scenario 2 
 Capital stock  Trade balance  Capital stock Trade balance 
  (%) (mil. US$)   (%)  (mil. US$) 
Vietnam 4.35 -1,500  8.17 -2,938 
Indonesia 0.90 -675  2.45 -955 
Malaysia 2.28 -253  5.64 42 
Philippines 2.10 -593  7.03 -2,459 
Thailand 3.55 -328  8.34 -520 
Singapore 1.86 56  9.73 -613 
OthASEAN 1.81 -153  3.91 -129 
Australia 0.77 -569  2.44 -1,965 
NewZealand 3.54 -478  4.95 -614 
China 0.35 -1,649  1.00 -9,727 
Japan 1.42 -920  1.93 -868 
SouthKorea 1.00 -1,716  1.92 -2,078 
Other RCEP  -  -    -  - 
Source: Authors’ model results 
Figure 5.2 decomposes changes in Vietnam’s capital stocks by liberalising 
components. In Scenario 1, tariff elimination contributes 3.10% to the changes, 
followed by goods NTMs (1.04%), tax on capital (0.16%), and services NTMs 
(0.06%). In Scenario 2, larger cuts to tariffs, NTMs, and tax on capital lead to 
changes in the contributions among the components. In particular, goods NTMs 
now contribute the most (4.11%), followed by tariffs (3.59%), tax on capital 
(0.26%), and services NTMs (0.21%). Our simulation results suggest that the 
impact of reducing the tax on capital has a more important role to the growth rate 
of capital in other RCEP compared with Vietnam, partly because of the higher 
barriers to FDI through the FDI restrictiveness index in a number of RCEP members. 
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Figure 5.2: Changes in Vietnam's Capital Stocks by Liberalising Components (%), 
2020 
 
Source: Authors’ model results 
Changes in the long-run current rate of return, rental price of capital, and price of 
capital goods of RCEP members are provided in Table 5.9. In terms of the rental 
price of capital, the above equation (1) can be rewritten as follows: 
rental(r) = [
1
GRNETRATIO(r)
] × rorc(r) + pcgds(r)                                                              (2) 
The long-run rental price of capital of Vietnam reduces by 0.56% in Scenario 1 and 
0.44% in Scenario 2, whereas that of other RCEP, on average, increases by 0.24% 
in Scenario 1 and 0.40% in Scenario 2. This fall in the long run rental price relative 
to the short run (rise) is due to the increase in the supply of capital, which in turn 
reduces the return. 
As can be seen in Equation (2), the change in the rental price of capital is determined 
by changes in the current rate of return and price of capital goods. However, in the 
long-run, changes in the current, expected, and global rates of return are equated. 
As shown in Table 5.9, the current rates of return in all regions increase by 0.15% 
in Scenario 1 and 0.42% in Scenario 2. Therefore, prices of capital goods have 
become more important in determining changes in rental prices of capital among 
regions. Table 5.9 indicates that the price of capital goods in Vietnam reduces by 
0.66% in Scenario 1 and 0.70% in Scenario 2, compared with an average reduction 
of only 0.01% and 0.07% in other RCEP members respectively. Indeed, some 
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RCEP members experience positive changes in the price of capital goods, while 
others witness negative changes. This is due to the high share of imported capital 
goods in Vietnam. Vietnam imports more than 30.7% of goods for the production 
of capital goods, whereas the imported shares of inputs in other RCEP members, 
on average, is around 8.5%. 59  Therefore, Vietnam tends to have much larger 
reductions in prices of capital goods following implementation of this agreement.  
Table 5.9: Changes in the Current Rate of Return, Rental Price of Capital, and Price 
of Capital Goods in the Long-run (%), 2020 
Regions Scenario 1   Scenario 2 
  rorc rental pcgds   rorc rental pcgds 
Vietnam 0.15 -0.56 -0.66  0.42 -0.44 -0.70 
Indonesia 0.15 -0.21 -0.32  0.42 -0.19 -0.50 
Malaysia 0.15 -0.31 -0.42  0.42 -0.48 -0.78 
Philippines 0.15 -0.41 -0.52  0.42 -0.31 -0.62 
Thailand 0.15 -0.82 -0.92  0.42 -1.21 -1.49 
Singapore 0.15 -0.15 -0.28  0.42 -0.50 -0.84 
OthASEAN 0.15 -0.82 -0.94  0.42 -1.30 -1.64 
Australia 0.15 0.00 -0.08  0.42 0.53 0.31 
NewZealand 0.15 0.15 0.04  0.42 0.41 0.12 
China 0.15 -0.11 -0.19  0.42 -0.13 -0.35 
Japan 0.15 1.52 1.42  0.42 2.15 1.87 
SouthKorea 0.15 0.23 0.14  0.42 0.59 0.34 
Other RCEP* 0.15 0.24 -0.01   0.42 0.40 -0.07 
Source: Authors’ model results 
Notes: Aggregation of regional compositions is defined in Appendix, Table 5.11 
Rental for other RCEP countries is based on the capital weighted average of other RCEP 
Pcgs for other RCEP countries is based on the capital goods weighted average of other RCEP 
 
 
     
  
                                                 
59 Authors’ calculations based on the projected GTAP 10 database to 2020 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This paper sheds light on the potential impacts of RCEP through both trade and 
investment liberalisation on Vietnam, with a focus on the trade and investment 
impacts. A long-run closure in the GTAP model is used so that changes in both 
trade and investment can be examined. RCEP trade liberalisation is modelled 
through three policy components, including reductions in tariffs, goods and services 
NTMs, while RCEP investment liberalisation is based on reductions in FDI barriers. 
Each of the two scenarios modelled comprises the four policy components, with 
Scenario 2 being more ambitious. 
The simulation results indicate that Vietnam’s total real exports increase by 6.4% 
in Scenario 1 and 10.1% in Scenario 2, while Vietnam’s total real imports rise by 
slighter rates of 5.4% in Scenario 1 and 9.1% in Scenario 2. The results further 
indicate that although RCEP creates an increase in trade flows among members, 
there is evidence of trade diversion following this agreement. Indeed, Vietnam’s 
increased imports from other RCEP are greater than its total imports in both relative 
and absolute terms. At the sectoral levels, all of the five aggregated sectors, 
including agriculture, extraction, labour-intensive manufactures, other 
manufactures, and services, witness both export and import growth. Among the 
more detailed sectors modelled, only meat & livestock and food & beverages 
experience significant declines in exports, while exports of apparel and leather 
products grow substantially. 
Regarding the investment effects of RCEP, our simulation results indicate that 
among RCEP members, the short-run current rate of return in Vietnam experiences 
the largest increase, suggesting a significant increase in Vietnam’s long-run capital 
stocks. In the long-run, Vietnam’s capital stocks grow remarkably from 4.36% in 
Scenario 1 to 8.17% in Scenario 2. These increases are due to both trade and 
investment liberalisation under RCEP. Among the policy instruments, tariffs and 
goods NTMs have the largest impacts on Vietnam’s growth of capital. With greater 
liberalisation in Scenario 2, the contribution of goods NTMs exceeds that of tariffs. 
Exports of some agricultural and processed food sectors contract following RCEP. 
Therefore, it may be necessary to have particular policies aiming at easing the 
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adverse impacts and assisting transitions of workers between sectors. In addition, 
Vietnam should diversify its export markets to include countries such as Australia 
and New Zealand in addition to Vietnam’s key and traditional export markets. 
Furthermore, reductions in barriers to FDI are found to have positive impacts on 
capital. Thus, restrictions on foreign equity, approval mechanisms, employment of 
foreigners, and operation such as branching and capital repatriation (OECD, 2018) 
should be eased to attract more investment. 
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Chapter Appendix  
Table 5.10: Annual Growth Rates of GDP, Population, and Labour Force (%), 2014-2020 
  Annual GDP growth   Annual population growth   Annual labour force growth rates 
  2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020   2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020   2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Vietnam 6.0 6.7 6.2 6.8 7.3 7.1 6.7  1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8  1.1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 
Indonesia 5.0 4.9 5.0 5.1 6.7 6.7 6.6  1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.7  1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 
Malaysia 6.0 5.1 4.2 5.9 4.8 4.7 4.6  1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4  1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 
Philippines 6.1 6.1 6.9 6.7 4.9 4.9 4.8  1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6  2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 
Thailand 1.0 3.0 3.3 3.9 5.1 5.1 5.1  0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4  0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 
Singapore 3.9 2.2 2.4 3.6 3.6 3.4 3.2  1.3 1.2 1.3 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.5  1.9 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 
OthASEAN 6.4 6.0 5.1 6.2 6.1 5.9 5.7  1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.6  1.2 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 
Australia 2.6 2.4 2.8 2.0 3.4 3.3 3.2  1.5 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.4  1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
NewZealand 3.5 4.4 3.5 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.2  1.5 1.9 2.1 2.1 1.0 1.0 1.0  0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 
China 7.3 6.9 6.7 6.9 8.1 7.7 7.3  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2  0.5 0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 
Japan 0.4 1.4 0.9 1.7 0.9 0.9 0.9  -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3  -1.0 -1.0 -0.9 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 
SouthKorea 3.3 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.8 3.7 3.6  0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2  0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.6 
India 7.4 8.0 8.2 7.2 6.9 6.8 6.7  1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.1  1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 
US 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.7  0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8  0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
HongKomg 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.3  0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8  0.4 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 
Taiwan 3.6 3.8 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.8 3.4  0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2  0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.6 
EU28 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2  -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
ROW 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.9   1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4   1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Source: Projections draw on middle of the road ‘business as usual’ trends (O’Neill et al., 2014) and the World Bank
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Table 5.11: Regional Aggregation 
No. Regions Description GTAP regions Aggregated regions 
  modelled     for reporting 
1 Vietnam  Vietnam VNM Vietnam 
2 Indonesia Indonesia  IDN Other RCEP 
3 Malaysia  Malaysia  MYS Other RCEP 
4 Philippines Philippines  PHL Other RCEP 
5 Thailand Thailand  THA Other RCEP 
6 Singapore Singapore  SGP Other RCEP 
7 OthASEAN Other ASEAN countries  LAO, KHM, BRN, XSE Other RCEP 
8 Australia Australia  AUS Other RCEP 
9 New Zealand New Zealand  NZL Other RCEP 
10 China China  CHN Other RCEP 
11 Japan Japan  JPN Other RCEP 
12 South Korea South Korea  KOR Other RCEP 
13 India  India  IND Rest of the world 
14 United States United States  USA Rest of the world 
15 Hong Kong Hong Kong  HKG Rest of the world 
16 Taiwan Taiwan  TWN Rest of the world 
17 EU28 European Union AUT, BEL, CYP, CZE, DNK, EST, FIN, FRA, DEU, GRC, HUN Rest of the world 
    IRL, ITA, LVA, LTU, LUX, MLT, NLD, POL, PRT, SVK, SVN  
    ESP, SWE, GBR, BGR, HRV, ROU  
18 ROW  Rest of World XOC, MNG, XEA, BGD, NPL, PAK, LKA, XSA, CAN, MEX, XNA,  Rest of the world 
   ARG, BOL, BRA, CHL, COL, ECU, PRY, PER, URY, VEN, XSM,  
   CRI, GTM, HND, NIC, PAN, SLV, XCA, DOM, JAM, PRI, TTO,   
   XCB, BHR, IRN, ISR, JOR, KWT, OMN, QAT, SAU, TUR, ARE,  
    XWS, EGY, MAR, TUN, XNF, BEN, BFA, CMR, CIV, GHA, GIN,  
    NGA, SEN, TGO, XWF, XCF, XAC, ETH, KEN, MDG, MWI, MUS,  
    MOZ, RWA, TZA, UGA, ZMB, ZWE, XEC, BWA, NAM, ZAF, XSC,  
   CHE, NOR, XEF, ALB, BLR, RUS, UKR, XEE, XER, KAZ, KGZ,  
       XSU, ARM, AZE, GEO, XTW    
Source: Authors' aggregation based on 141 regions of GTAP 10 Data Base  
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Table 5.12: Sectoral Aggregation 
No. Sectors Description  GTAP sectors Aggregated sectors  
  modelled     for reporting 
1  Rice Paddy rice; Processed rice PDR; PCR Agriculture 
2 Fishing Fishing FSH Agriculture 
3 OthAgri Wheat; Other grains nec; Oil seeds; WHT; GRO; OSD; Agriculture 
  Vegetables, fruit and nuts; Sugar cane and sugar beet; V_F; C_B;  
  Plant-based fibers; Crops nec PFB; OCR  
4 MeatLstk Bovine cattle and sheep; Other animal products nec; CTL; OAP; Agriculture 
  Raw milk; Wool, silk-worm cocoons; RMK; WOL;  
  Bovine cattle and sheep products; Other meat products CMT; OMT  
5 ForesWood Forestry; Wood products FRS; LUM Agriculture 
6 Extraction Coal; Oil; Gas; Minerals nec; COA; OIL; GAS; OXT; Extraction 
  Petroleum and coal products; Mineral products nec P_C; NMM  
7  FoodBever Vegetable oils and fats; Dairy products; Sugar; VOL; MIL; SGR; Agriculture 
  Food products nec; Beverages and tobacco products OFD; B_T  
8 Textiles Textiles TEX Labour-intensive manu 
9 AppaLeath Wearing apparel; Leather products WAP; LEA Labour-intensive manu 
10 Chemicals Chemicals; Pharmaceutical products; Rubber & plastic CHM; BPH; RPP Other manufactures 
11 Metals Ferrous metals; Metals nec; Metal products; I_S; NFM; FMP Other manufactures 
12  ElecEquip Electronic equipment ELE Other manufactures 
13 Machinery Electrical equipment; Machinery and equipment nec EEQ; OME Other manufactures 
14 TransEquip Motor vehicles and parts; Transport equipment nec MVH; OTN Other manufactures 
15 OthManufac Paper products and publishing; Manufactures nec PPP; OMF Other manufactures 
16  Construction Construction CNS Services 
17 FinBusTra Insurance; Finance; Other business services; Trade INS; OFI; OBS; TRD Services 
18 Transport Transport nec; Water transport; Air transport OTP; WTP; ATP Services 
19 Communication Communication CMN Services 
20 GovSvs Government services  OSG Services 
21  OthSvs Electricity; Gas manufacture and distribution; ELY; GDT; Services 
  Water; Recreational and other services; WTR; ROS;   
  Accommodation, food and service activities AFS  
  Warehousing and support activities WHS  
  Real estate activities; Education RSA; EDU  
    Human health and social work activities; Dwellings HHT; DWE  
Source: Authors' aggregation based on 65 sectors of GTAP 10 Data Base 
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Table 5.13: Ad-valorem Equivalents of Services Barriers in the RCEP Region (%) 
    Finance, business     Government Other 
Country Construction & trade Transport Communication Services Services 
Vietnam 34.49 59.78 41.26 47.35 59.90 - 
Indonesia 50.78 64.02 48.44 65.45 87.15 - 
Malaysia 12.82 38.83 22.78 32.17 57.28 - 
Philippines 100.72 83.78 52.06 87.88 83.64 - 
Singapore 51.40 16.93 0.00 19.02 43.99 - 
Thailand 31.40 35.22 19.98 71.12 60.03 - 
OthASEAN 28.76 131.29 50.68 77.71 82.25 - 
Australia 126.66 68.61 34.43 75.56 76.02 - 
New Zealand 52.83 53.36 22.91 53.09 62.45 - 
Japan 38.43 65.95 38.82 104.77 93.02 - 
China 68.02 66.92 68.83 106.29 104.11 - 
Korea 34.63 44.36 13.98 67.18 69.56 - 
India 77.75 53.97 46.20 81.90 112.85 -  
Source: Fontagne (2016). Trade weighted to aggregated sectors and regions by the authors 
*RestASEAN includes Lao, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Brunei. AVEs of services barrier for 
Myanmar are imputed using average values of similar countries (Vietnam, Lao, and Cambodia). 
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Table 5.14: Shares of RCEP FDI Stocks in Total FDI Stocks of Each RCEP Member (%), 2017 
Country Australia China Indonesia Japan Korea Malaysia NZ Philippines Singapore Thailand VN ASEAN4 
Australia  10,535 5,882 647 669 4,586 48,433 761 15,772 1,232 1,580 35 
Brunei  0 2,444 31 0 5 0 0 0 428 30 0 29 
Cambodia 0 189 0 0 5 0 0 21 160 -22 0 10 
China 36,175  10,539 3,197 5,983 4,915 2,492 820 44,568 5,358 4,965 17,849 
Indonesia 0 690  283 61 0 0 183 18,660 301 0 17 
Japan 68,682 116,970 30,389  36,592 14,309 3,730 14,986 58,969 61,496 15,608 1,393 
Korea 12,457 77,800 7,219 5,135  4,962 206 2,477 11,999 3,561 14,582 4,547 
Lao  0 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 -35 0 1 
Malaysia 5,993 2,122 11,348 135 -58 0 339 315 23,171 2,337 1,596 1,759 
Myanmar 0 61 1 0 1 0 0 0 1,043 16 0 0 
New Zealand 8,574 33 2 295 56 0  0 966 -10 0 1 
Philippines 57 384 95 -1 0 11 1  1,289 0 45 0 
Singapore 36,573 100,326 48,184 11,518 6,358 33,656 1,427 5,637  19,118 6,600 4,233 
Thailand 3,120 3,728 3,859 3,684 187 3,659 62 702 12,184  5,239 8,952 
Vietnam 0 6 71 0 -27 0 0 4 518 -47  372 
FDI stocks from RCEP 171,630 315,305 117,619 24,894 49,831 66,097 56,691 25,906 189,772 93,335 50,214 39,199 
Total FDI stock  689,396 1,488,676 231,492 200,193 229,399 146,602 76,028 79,016 1,393,380 223,816 129,491 62,550 
Share* 24.90 21.18 50.81 12.44 21.72 45.09 74.57 32.79 13.62 41.70 38.78 62.67 
Source: UNCTAD and IMF 
Note: * RCEP FDI stock shares in total FDI stocks of each RCEP member. 
Some bilateral outward FDI stocks from Lao, Cambodia, Myanmar, Brunei are unavailable. They are assumed to be zero. Even in case they are available (but 
small), they can hardly change the RCEP FDI stocks shares in each RCEP member 
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Table 5.15: FDI Index, RCEP Members, 2017 
Sectors Vietnam Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Singapore Rest ASEAN Australia New Zealand China Japan South Korea 
Rice 0.083 0.347 0.150 0.760 0.419 0.064 0.142 0.200 0.200 0.220 0.025 0.500 
Fishing 0.020 0.735 0.200 0.565 0.500 0.244 0.179 0.075 0.690 1.000 0.150 0.500 
OthAgri 0.083 0.347 0.150 0.760 0.419 0.064 0.142 0.200 0.200 0.220 0.025 0.500 
MeatLstk 0.083 0.347 0.150 0.760 0.419 0.064 0.091 0.200 0.200 0.220 0.025 0.500 
 ForesWood 0.045 0.060 0.014 0.073 0.046 0.020 0.082 0.102 0.190 0.050 0.002 0.000 
Extraction 0.020 0.112 0.000 0.582 0.331 0.029 0.249 0.085 0.190 0.193 0.052 0.000 
FoodBever 0.045 0.060 0.004 0.072 0.045 0.018 0.074 0.100 0.190 0.050 0.000 0.000 
Textiles 0.045 0.060 0.004 0.072 0.045 0.018 0.082 0.100 0.190 0.050 0.000 0.000 
AppaLeath 0.045 0.060 0.004 0.072 0.045 0.018 0.073 0.100 0.190 0.050 0.000 0.000 
Chemicals 0.020 0.087 0.000 0.065 0.051 0.018 0.037 0.075 0.190 0.060 0.008 0.000 
Metals 0.020 0.060 0.000 0.075 0.045 0.018 0.058 0.075 0.190 0.095 0.000 0.000 
ElecEquip 0.020 0.060 0.000 0.065 0.042 0.018 0.021 0.075 0.190 0.060 0.000 0.000 
Machinery 0.020 0.060 0.000 0.075 0.045 0.018 0.060 0.075 0.190 0.095 0.000 0.000 
TransEquip 0.020 0.060 0.031 0.065 0.052 0.018 0.025 0.075 0.190 0.245 0.000 0.000 
OthManufac 0.045 0.060 0.004 0.072 0.045 0.018 0.068 0.100 0.190 0.050 0.000 0.000 
Construction 0.020 0.210 0.250 0.465 0.308 0.018 0.095 0.075 0.190 0.170 0.000 0.000 
Finbustra 0.051 0.437 0.352 0.603 0.392 0.049 0.108 0.079 0.179 0.274 0.000 0.074 
Transport 0.528 0.426 0.296 0.655 0.459 0.210 0.139 0.268 0.273 0.540 0.275 0.508 
Commu 0.583 0.260 0.375 0.665 0.433 0.083 0.041 0.400 0.390 0.750 0.265 0.325 
GovSer 0.227 0.400 0.326 0.430 0.385 0.081 0.232 0.181 0.226 0.396 0.077 0.141 
OthSer 0.115 0.256 0.374 0.447 0.376 0.104 0.125 0.192 0.207 0.423 0.059 0.299 
Source: OECD FDI index and authors’ calculations 
Note: FDI indices for aggregated sectors and regions are calculated by weighting estimated FDI stocks of sectors and regions  
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Table 5.16: Changes in FDI Stocks by Sectors (%), with Full Removal of FDI Barriers, RCEP Members, 2017  
Sectors Vietnam Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Singapore Rest ASEAN Australia New Zealand China Japan South Korea 
Rice 11.95 49.97 21.60 109.44 60.34 9.22 20.47 28.80 28.80 31.68 3.60 72.00 
Fishing 2.88 105.84 28.80 81.36 72.00 35.14 25.80 10.80 99.36 144.00 21.60 72.00 
OthAgri 11.95 49.97 21.60 109.44 60.34 9.22 20.52 28.80 28.80 31.68 3.60 72.00 
MeatLstk 11.95 49.97 21.60 109.44 60.34 9.22 13.12 28.80 28.80 31.68 3.60 72.00 
 ForesWood 6.49 8.67 2.07 10.46 6.66 2.94 11.88 14.76 27.36 7.20 0.27 0.00 
Extraction 2.88 16.12 0.00 83.86 47.70 4.11 35.82 12.25 27.36 27.80 7.44 0.00 
FoodBever 6.48 8.64 0.58 10.37 6.53 2.59 10.67 14.40 27.36 7.20 0.00 0.00 
Textiles 6.48 8.64 0.58 10.37 6.53 2.59 11.74 14.40 27.36 7.20 0.00 0.00 
AppaLeath 6.48 8.64 0.58 10.37 6.53 2.59 10.56 14.40 27.36 7.20 0.00 0.00 
Chemicals 2.88 12.53 0.00 9.36 7.30 2.59 5.33 10.80 27.36 8.64 1.15 0.00 
Metals 2.88 8.64 0.00 10.80 6.48 2.59 8.35 10.80 27.36 13.68 0.00 0.00 
ElecEquip 2.88 8.64 0.00 9.36 6.00 2.59 3.09 10.80 27.36 8.64 0.00 0.00 
Machinery 2.88 8.64 0.00 10.80 6.48 2.59 8.58 10.80 27.36 13.68 0.00 0.00 
TransEquip 2.88 8.64 4.46 9.36 7.49 2.59 3.55 10.80 27.36 35.28 0.00 0.00 
OthManufac 6.48 8.64 0.58 10.37 6.53 2.59 9.76 14.40 27.36 7.20 0.00 0.00 
Construction 2.88 30.24 36.00 66.96 44.40 2.59 13.61 10.80 27.36 24.48 0.00 0.00 
Finbustra 7.30 62.87 50.62 86.79 56.48 7.11 15.57 11.34 25.84 39.52 0.00 10.67 
Transport 76.03 61.34 42.62 94.32 66.10 30.24 19.98 38.59 39.31 77.76 39.60 73.15 
Commu 83.95 37.44 54.00 95.76 62.40 11.95 5.97 57.60 56.16 108.00 38.16 46.80 
GovSer 32.69 57.60 46.94 61.92 55.49 11.66 33.42 26.06 32.54 57.02 11.09 20.30 
OthSer 16.56 36.90 53.84 64.30 54.09 15.01 17.95 27.58 29.75 60.84 8.48 43.11 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on OECD FDI index and Lakatos and Fukui (2014). 
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Table 5.17: Ratios of FDI Stocks to Capital Stocks, RCEP Members, 2017 
Sectors Vietnam Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Singapore Rest ASEAN Australia New Zealand China Japan South Korea 
Rice 0.0041 0.0024 0.0188 0.0068 0.0046 1.0000 0.0018 0.0719 0.2256 0.0071 0.0030 0.0175 
Fishing 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.0001 0.2143 0.0000 0.0183 0.0015 0.0000 0.0010 0.0085 
OthAgri 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1426 0.0000 0.0123 0.0005 0.0000 0.0014 0.0084 
MeatLstk 0.0341 0.0019 0.0033 0.0042 0.0067 0.6416 0.0061 0.0331 0.0536 0.0006 0.0028 0.0392 
 ForesWood 0.0038 0.0007 0.0025 0.0036 0.0045 0.2254 0.0013 0.0487 0.0245 0.0017 0.0062 0.0378 
Extraction 0.0085 0.0019 0.0116 0.0675 0.0198 1.0000 0.0133 0.1299 0.4519 0.0043 0.0682 0.1206 
FoodBever 0.0093 0.0028 0.0218 0.0028 0.0099 1.0000 0.0124 0.1298 0.1807 0.0046 0.0051 0.1003 
Textiles 0.0067 0.0010 0.0042 0.0021 0.0047 0.3254 0.0525 0.0536 0.0985 0.0011 0.0283 0.0272 
AppaLeath 0.0029 0.0015 0.0019 0.0021 0.0038 0.6761 0.0021 0.0314 0.0870 0.0006 0.0339 0.0187 
Chemicals 0.0368 0.0060 0.0136 0.0259 0.0105 0.1547 0.2175 0.4181 0.3252 0.0051 0.0421 0.0403 
Metals 0.0234 0.0006 0.0031 0.0027 0.0028 0.3860 0.0308 0.0397 0.0508 0.0002 0.0153 0.0079 
ElecEquip 0.0259 0.0044 0.0011 0.0006 0.0022 0.0591 0.0303 0.3214 0.4652 0.0017 0.0268 0.0055 
Machinery 0.0293 0.0050 0.0086 0.0064 0.0076 0.3241 0.1081 0.3131 0.2121 0.0017 0.0105 0.1174 
TransEquip 0.0178 0.0022 0.0204 0.0172 0.0061 0.7304 0.0457 0.2481 0.4685 0.0023 0.1964 0.0437 
OthManufac 0.0054 0.0015 0.0102 0.0083 0.0056 0.5967 0.0164 0.0724 0.1303 0.0015 0.0145 0.0452 
Construction 0.0002 0.0003 0.0159 0.0001 0.0025 0.0649 0.0004 0.0462 0.0037 0.0001 0.0051 0.0032 
Finbustra 0.4987 0.0962 0.1898 0.0818 0.1147 1.0000 0.3128 0.4514 0.2903 0.0549 0.0102 0.0520 
Transport 0.0029 0.0004 0.0029 0.0004 0.0009 0.0167 0.0008 0.0112 0.0324 0.0002 0.0023 0.0084 
Commu 0.0111 0.0028 0.0114 0.0029 0.0142 0.2644 0.0165 0.0221 0.0394 0.0024 0.0010 0.0271 
GovSer 0.0048 0.0014 0.0034 0.0016 0.0017 0.0904 0.0049 0.0054 0.0151 0.0007 0.0012 0.0008 
OthSer 0.0008 0.0003 0.0040 0.0012 0.0018 0.0726 0.0012 0.0125 0.0084 0.0003 0.0005 0.0025 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table 5.18: Changes in Capital Stocks by Sector (%), with Full Removal of FDI Barriers, RCEP Member, 2017 
Sectors Vietnam Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Singapore Rest ASEAN Australia New Zealand China Japan South Korea 
Rice 0.05 0.12 0.41 0.74 0.27 9.22 0.04 2.07 6.50 0.22 0.01 1.26 
Fishing 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 7.53 0.00 0.20 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.62 
OthAgri 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.31 0.00 0.35 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.60 
MeatLstk 0.41 0.09 0.07 0.46 0.40 5.91 0.08 0.95 1.54 0.02 0.01 2.83 
 ForesWood 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.66 0.01 0.72 0.67 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Extraction 0.02 0.03 0.00 5.66 0.95 4.11 0.48 1.59 12.36 0.12 0.51 0.00 
FoodBever 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.06 2.59 0.13 1.87 4.94 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Textiles 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.84 0.62 0.77 2.70 0.01 0.00 0.00 
AppaLeath 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 1.75 0.02 0.45 2.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chemicals 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.24 0.08 0.40 1.16 4.52 8.90 0.04 0.05 0.00 
Metals 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 1.00 0.26 0.43 1.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ElecEquip 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.09 3.47 12.73 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Machinery 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.84 0.93 3.38 5.80 0.02 0.00 0.00 
TransEquip 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.16 0.05 1.89 0.16 2.68 12.82 0.08 0.00 0.00 
OthManufac 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.04 1.55 0.16 1.04 3.57 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Construction 0.00 0.01 0.57 0.01 0.11 0.17 0.01 0.50 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Finbustra 3.64 6.05 9.61 7.10 6.48 7.11 4.87 5.12 7.50 2.17 0.00 0.56 
Transport 0.22 0.02 0.13 0.04 0.06 0.51 0.02 0.43 1.27 0.02 0.09 0.62 
Commu 0.94 0.10 0.61 0.28 0.89 3.16 0.10 1.27 2.21 0.26 0.04 1.27 
GovSer 0.16 0.08 0.16 0.10 0.10 1.05 0.16 0.14 0.49 0.04 0.01 0.02 
OthSer 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.08 0.10 1.09 0.02 0.34 0.25 0.02 0.00 0.11 
Source:  Authors’ calculations
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6 Chapter 6: Conclusions  
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) have increased at a significant pace and there is 
significant interest in investigating their effects. Regarding the trade effects, the 
current literature is characterised by a limited studies examining how the different 
RTAs a country has made affect its trade flows. Some types of trade agreements 
appear to work better than others in terms of stimulating trade flows (Busse & 
Gröning, 2012; Ullah & Inaba, 2012). With respect to the investment effect, how 
an RTA affects members’ foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows depends on a 
variety of factors such as patterns of FDI, the investment provision of FTAs, sources 
of FDI, and location-specific advantages in terms of  input prices, transport and 
communication costs, government intervention, education, and infrastructure 
(Dunning, 1981). However, whether the overall involvement in FTAs of a 
developing country enhances its FDI inflows has not been paid sufficient attention. 
Furthermore, a variety of RTAs have progressed toward deep and comprehensive 
RTAs, which are expected to have substantial impacts on trade and investment of 
members, especially developing countries. In order to provide a deeper 
understanding of the linkage between RTAs and trade and investment, it is critical 
to conduct more case studies. Therefore, the theme of this thesis is to investigate 
the key RTAs that a developing country, such as Vietnam, has entered into. The 
assessment is through their trade and investment effects for Vietnam.  
Vietnam is an interesting case study as it is one of the most active countries in the 
Asia-Pacific regarding integration into the world economy through RTAs. Vietnam 
is now involved with 16 RTAs and is one of the seven countries in the Asia-Pacific 
participating in the two largest agreements in this region, namely the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 
and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Vietnam is also the 
second member of ASEAN having an FTA with the EU, after Singapore.  
This thesis is a compilation of addressing the following research questions: (i) how 
do trade liberalisation agreements and FDI promote Vietnamese exports and 
imports?; (ii) how do free trade agreements impact on Vietnam’s inward FDI flows?; 
(iii) how might Vietnamese trade and investment change following the EU-Vietnam 
free trade agreement (EVFTA)?; (iv) how might Vietnamese trade and investment 
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change following RCEP? These research questions are addressed by making use of 
econometric and computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling.  
6.1 Main Findings and Policy Implications  
Chapter 2 employs the random effects technique to estimate the gravity models 
which are used to investigate the effects of trade agreements and FDI on 
Vietnamese trade. This study reveals that Vietnamese exports and imports have the 
greatest expansion following the bilateral trade agreements with the US and Japan. 
The impacts from other RTAs are more mixed. This study also provides empirical 
support for FDI inflows stimulating both exports and imports in Vietnam. However, 
the impacts on Vietnamese trade flows of some of the trade agreements are much 
stronger than that of FDI inflows. Furthermore, this study suggests that Vietnam’s 
exports have become more sensitive to FDI following the bilateral trade agreements 
with the US and Japan, whereas Vietnam’s imports have become less sensitive to 
FDI as a result of the trade agreement with Japan. 
These findings have important policy implications for Vietnam. First, the results 
suggest that trade liberalisation through bilateral and RTAs is a good channel to 
build growth in trade for Vietnam. The study also suggests that certain types of 
agreements are better at promoting Vietnamese trade. Therefore, Vietnamese 
policymakers should closely look at the trade agreements with Japan and the US, 
which are helpful for the negotiations of future trade deals. In addition, it should be 
noted that policies aiming at attracting FDI flows are also likely to stimulate trade. 
Chapter 3 investigates whether the overall involvement in FTAs of Vietnam 
increases FDI inflows. Therefore, this study contributes to the current literature with 
an empirical study evaluating the impact of overall FTAs on inward FDI of a 
developing country, which has been ignored. The regression results from gravity 
models suggest that FTAs, overall, are associated with increases in FDI flows. 
Based on these results and the outcomes for other FDI determinants such as trade, 
factor endowments, and the interaction term between FTAs and factor endowments, 
this study indicates that there is evidence of the dominance of vertical FDI in 
Vietnam. Further investigation of the later sub-period reveals that FTAs also affect 
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inward FDI flows to Vietnam through interaction terms with the real exchange rate, 
human capital, and factor endowments. 
From a policy perspective, the findings of this chapter suggest that FTAs are 
associated with increased FDI inflows. However, FTAs can be enhanced to 
encourage growth in investment. For instance, FTAs with investment protection 
agreements will help protect investors and investments in a host country. In addition, 
investment provisions should aim to reduce restrictions on foreign firms, allowing 
them to participate in a variety of sectors. Tax incentives can also be used to 
encourage FDI projects, particularly where there are substantial positive 
externalities for the rest of the economy. Moreover, in addition to Vietnam’s 
relatively cheaper labour costs, the Vietnamese government should continue to 
boost human resources and keep the exchange rate stable, given that the two FDI 
determinants have more important roles as a result of FTAs. 
Chapter 4 assesses the impact of the EVFTA, focusing on Vietnamese trade and 
investment, with a global trade analysis project (GTAP) model. Five policy 
components are modelled, including tariffs, non-tariff measures (NTMs) on goods 
and services, trade facilitation, and barriers to FDI. Among the policy instruments, 
improvements in trade facilitation and reductions in FDI barriers are only modelled 
for Vietnam which is characterised by relatively high barriers in comparison with 
the EU.  This chapter finds that the EVFTA leads to a stronger rise in Vietnam’s 
total imports than Vietnam’s total exports, suggesting a deterioration in the trade 
balance. This study also finds that the bilateral trade between Vietnam and the EU 
grows enormously and much faster than the growth rates of total exports and 
imports for the two sides. The simulation results indicate the presence of trade 
diversion which is explained by the findings that Vietnam imports more from the 
EU and less from the rest of the world. Similarly, the trade diversion effect of the 
EVFTA is also found for the EU. At the sectoral level, this study indicates that 
several Vietnamese sectors suffer from this agreement. Processed food, labour-
intensive manufacturing sectors, and transport equipment experience export growth 
in Vietnam, whereas there are declines in exports in the remaining sectors.  
With regard to the investment effect of the EVFTA, the simulation results indicate 
that this agreement would not increase the EU’s capital stocks, which is consistent 
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with the fact that Vietnam’s investment in the EU has been minimal. In contrast, 
this study suggests that Vietnam benefits from this agreement in terms of increased 
capital stocks in the long-run, due to the significant increase in Vietnam’s short-run 
current rates of return mainly resulting from the rise in the short-run rental price of 
capital. By decomposing the policy instruments, this study further find that tariffs 
contribute the most to Vietnam’s capital growth in both the conservative and 
ambitious scenarios. 
The findings of this chapter have important policy implications. Vietnam’s trade 
grows substantially following the agreement. However, at the sectoral level, the 
export expansion occurs in very few sectors, whereas a variety of Vietnamese 
sectors experience deep declines in exports. Therefore, the government should 
support workers in the industries that have been adversely affected following the 
trade agreement. This can be done through career transitions and training, assisting 
workers to find a new job as soon as possible.  
Chapter 5 employs a GTAP model with a long-run closure so that changes in both 
trade and investment following RCEP are examined. Reductions in tariffs, NTMs 
on goods and services, and barriers to FDI are modelled so that both RCEP trade 
and investment liberalisation are captured. Specially, this study uses bilateral ad-
valorem-equivalents (AVEs) of NTMs (Kravchenko, Utoktham, Narayanan, & 
Duval, 2019). The modelling of reductions in FDI barriers is based on the OECD 
FDI index. This chapter finds that Vietnam’s total real exports grow slightly faster 
than its total real imports. However, for bilateral trade, Vietnam’s imports from 
other RCEP countries exhibit greater expansion than its exports to other RCEP. The 
results further indicate that Vietnam is likely to divert its trade activities, especially 
imports, toward other RCEP members. With respect to the sectoral level, all of the 
aggregated sectors modelled, including agriculture, extraction, labour-intensive 
manufactures, other manufactures, and services, experience both export and import 
growth. Within the aggregated sectors, only some agricultural sectors suffer from 
the contraction in exports, whereas wearing apparel and leather products witness 
substantial export growth. The findings also suggest that Australia and New 
Zealand become more important export markets for Vietnam thanks to RCEP. 
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Regarding the investment effects, Chapter 5 finds that among RCEP members, the 
short-run current rate of return in Vietnam experiences the largest increase, which 
can explain the substantial gains in Vietnam’s long-run capital stocks. 
Decomposing the changes in capital stocks, this study concludes in general that all 
the policy components modelled contribute to the increase in capital stocks. 
However, with greater liberalisation in the ambitious scenario, goods NTMs have 
the most significant impact on Vietnam’s capital growth. Therefore, this study 
provides support for the importance of focusing on NTMs, especially goods NTMs. 
In addition, this study suggests that it is worthwhile to model investment 
liberalisation of RCEP as reductions in FDI barriers affect changes in Vietnam’s 
capital, though the impacts are not as large as those for reductions in tariffs and 
goods NTMs. This policy component, however, has a more important role on 
changes in capital stocks of other RCEP, mainly because some RCEP partners have 
relatively high restrictions on FDI.  
Chapter 5 has significant policy relevance. First, policymakers should be aware that 
investment liberalisation is a critical area of negotiations in modern FTAs, which 
has an important role in attracting FDI inflows. Therefore, to attract more FDI flows, 
the Vietnamese government should ease the restrictions on foreign equity, approval 
mechanisms, employment of foreigners, and operation such as branching and 
capital repatriation (OECD, 2018). Second, consideration should be given to 
specific policies aiming at reducing the adverse impacts on some agricultural and 
processed food sectors while taking advantage of the immense export growth of 
textiles, apparel and leather products. Vietnamese industries need to increase 
competitiveness and there may be a role for the Government to play in supporting 
this or assisting with the transition to alternative industries. Third, Vietnam should 
diversify its destination for exports such as Australia and New Zealand in addition 
to Vietnam’s key and traditional export markets such as the US, ASEAN, EU, and 
Japan. 
The simulation results of the EVFTA and RCEP indicate that both agreements have 
considerable economic impacts on Vietnam in terms of real GDP, trade, and 
investment. However, RCEP has greater economic impacts as it covers a variety of 
Vietnam’s important trading and FDI partners. Furthermore, in the scenario with 
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greatest liberalisation, results indicate that economic gains from reductions in goods 
NTMs following RCEP are the greatest, whereas tariff reductions contribute most 
to economic gains in Vietnam as a result of the EVFTA. The main reason for this 
is that tariff rates imposed within the RCEP region are relatively low, particularly 
as the baseline used accounts for the implementation of the CPTPP and other 
existing agreements in RCEP, however, there are higher tariffs between the EU and 
Vietnam. With respect to real exports by sector, the two agreements result in the 
greatest export growth of labour-intensive manufactures, especially apparel and 
leather products. Notably, most of the sectors modelled experience export growth 
following RCEP. In contrast, as a result of the EVFTA, exports of only some sectors, 
including labour-intensive manufactures, transport equipment, and processed food, 
expand, whereas those of the remaining sectors decline. The results reflect the fact 
that trade between Vietnam and the EU is complementary, and Vietnam is more 
likely to export relative labour-intensive products to the EU. 
6.2 Limitations and Future Research 
There are some limitations in this thesis, many of which may form the basis for 
future research. First, the panel datasets used in Chapters 2 and 3 comprise a limited 
number of cross-sections. The focus of this thesis is on Vietnam, thus the panel 
datasets cover the data for Vietnam and its key trading and FDI partners. One 
advantage is that the gravity models used in the two chapters do not suffer from the 
issue of extensive zero values that needs some appropriate econometric techniques 
to deal with. More techniques may be applicable to the estimation of the gravity 
models such as the differenced generalised method of moments (GMM) or the 
system GMM for panel datasets with more cross-sections and observations. Second, 
although the lagged variable approach was used to address possible endogeneity 
issues in this thesis, the approach might not necessarily overcome the problem if 
autocorrelation is present in data series. Third, investments produce impacts on 
outputs over a period of time, but did not recognise some type of distributed lag to 
explore the FDI impacts on exports.  
Fourth, it should be noted that the FDI indices used in the modelling of investment 
liberalisation of RCEP in Chapter 5 cannot fully measure the investment climate of 
a country (OECD, 2018). The OECD (2018) points out that other factors may affect 
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restrictions on FDI such as the implementation of FDI rules, state ownership in key 
sectors, the market size, the degree of integration with neighbours, and more general 
geographical issues. Modelling these factors is well beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Fifth, in the current modelling effort, the GTAP model used includes a number of 
well-documented potential limitations. For example, there is an assumption of 
perfect competition, however, significantly different market structures often exists 
in the real world, such as monopoly power and imperfect competition (Zhang & 
Folmer, 1998). For the current focus, a particular limitation is imperfect modelling 
of capital accumulation over time in the comparative static GTAP model. While we 
use a long-run closure to capture accumulation, we are not able to capture other 
aspects such as income flows associated with international investment 
(Ianchovichina & Walmsley, 2012). 
There is a variety of potential avenues for future research arising from this thesis. 
Firstly, based on Chapter 2, further research may explore the nature of the trade 
agreements that are more efficient in promoting Vietnamese trade. Lessons may be 
available for other countries. Regarding changes in sensitivities of trade to FDI, 
future studies may examine which of Vietnam’s FDI patterns (horizontal or vertical 
FDI) has the greatest impact on this. 
Secondly, the panel datasets in both Chapters 2 and 3 can be extended by including 
other ASEAN countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand. Based on the new datasets, future research may investigate the impact of 
FTAs on ASEAN trade and FDI flows. Developing the empirical study in this 
direction is worthwhile as ASEAN member states have involved in a wide range of 
FTAs. In addition, the CPTPP and EVFTA have been signed and so they should be 
incorporated into future panel data analysis of Vietnamese trade and FDI flows. 
Thirdly, from Chapters 4 and 5, future research may focus on examining changes 
in investment over time following the EVFTA and RCEP. For instance, the 
investment creation and diversion effects (Baldwin, Forslid, & Haaland, 1995; 
Kalotay, 2007; Lakatos & Walmsley, 2012) of RCEP may be explored. To do this, 
potential research may follow the expanded GTAP model developed by  Lakatos 
and Walmsley (2012). In addition, future research may evaluate net effects of the 
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EVFTA and RCEP on Vietnam, given that some sectors are adversely affected by 
the EVFTA, but they benefit from RCEP. 
 In summary, this thesis has provided a broad picture of how the RTAs Vietnam has 
entered into change Vietnamese trade and investment. I identify which of 
Vietnam’s trade agreements have been more efficient in terms of expanding trade 
and how Vietnamese trade has become sensitive to FDI following the trade 
agreements. I contribute to the literature a case study which investigates whether 
the overall involvement in FTAs of a developing country, such as Vietnam, is 
associated with an increase in FDI flows. To examine the EVFTA, I model as 
closely to the text of this agreement as possible. With respect to RCEP, I model 
reductions in FDI barriers in addition to other trade liberalisation components that 
may be agreed. In addition to exploring the changes in Vietnamese trade at both 
aggregated and sectoral levels, I investigate the investment effects of the two 
agreements in both the short- and long-run. 
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